September 3 2010 RECENT RELEASE ¢º The PSPD's Stance on the Naval Vessel Cheonan Sinking by PSPD Center for Peace and Disarmament Article 1.` p3 The PSPD's Stance on the Final Investigation Report on the Cheonan and the countering measures of the Lee Myung-bak administration 1. Brief on the Cheonan Incident 3 2. The Basic Stance of the PSPD on the Cheonan's Sinking 4 3. PSPD's Brief Evaluation of the Final Report released by the JIG on the Cheonan Incident 5 4. Problems related with the Counter-Measures decided by President Lee Myung-bak after the JIG Final Report 7 5. PSPD's Recommendations 8 Article 2. p10 Eight Questions Needing Answers on the Investigation of the Sunken Naval Corvette Cheonan 1. Summary of the Report by the Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group(JIG) of South Korean Government 11 2. Insufficient Evidence Proving a Torpedo Attack 12 Question 1. Had been really a torpedo-induced water column? Question 2. No such severe injuries evident of a torpedo explosion found in the bodies of survivors and deceased soldiers Question 3. Is it true that there is no TOD recordings from the early stage of the Cheonan incident? Question 4. There are no severe damages evident of an explosion on the severed surface, on the bottom of the ship and in the interior of the hull. Question 5. Why the military concealed the finding and refloating of the gas turbine room? And why did they omit the investigation of the gas turbine room from investigating? Question 6. Were the oxidized aluminum substances, not gun powder, evident of an explosion? 3. Lack of evidence showing the attack was from a North Korean submarine 18 Question 7. What is the profile of the YONO class submarine? Is it understandable that the submarine had not been followed for several days by the ROK and the U.S. surveillance? Question 8. Why couldn't a torpedo launch be detected? Article 3. p21 Six Problems on the Investigation Process of the Cheonan Sinking 1. Objectives 21 2. Problems with the military in censoring information and selective disclosure of information 22 Problem1. The military not disclosing and censoring basic information on the Cheonan vessel Problem2. Hiding of the TOD video-recordings of the Cheonan breaking into half and sinking and changing of words Problem3. Imposing political and legal measures and restrictions against ordinary citizens raising doubts 3. Problems with the JIG 25 Problem4. The JIG practically excluding civilians Problem5. The JIG that limited investigative efforts by civilian members Problem6. Unknown roles of the foreign investigators ¢º Improving Human Rights in North Korea: The Interdependence of Peace and Human Rights by Bohyuk Suh Peace is a requirement for the general realization of human rights as well as a human right in itself. Ongoing military tensions such as the armistice on the Korean peninsula, U.S. security threats toward North Korea, and North Korea¡¯s nuclear development are challenges to peace and could make improvement of human rights in North Korea difficult. Therefore, it is meaningless to discuss peace on the Korean peninsula without the improvement of human rights and to discuss human rights in North Korea without peace on the Korean peninsula. Mutual interdependence of peace and human rights on the Korean peninsula is expected to deepen further. ¢º North-South Korean talks are South Korea's strategic asset: Why the Lee Myung-bak administration .. by Bohyuk Suh So the current suspension of talks with the North is strategically not advantageous to South Korea. It should not wait until North Korea bows its head and proposes talks, but should actively head start and engage in leading North-South relations. Inter-Korean talks stand as a bridge to the harmonization role of South Korea in North Korea-U.S. talks, the increase of South Korea¡¯s role in the North Korean nuclear problem, overcoming the economic crisis and establishing trust between the two Koreas. The North-South Korean talks is a strategic asset only South Korea can possess. Holding complex significance, it should not be further wasted as a tool to clash with North Korea. Can the Minister of Unification designate initiate inter-Korean dialogue toward the road of ¡®mutual benefits and common prosperity¡¯? ¢º South Korean Leaders: Repeating the Mistakes of the Past by Yeon-chul Kim The Obama administration plans to take a comprehensive approach to U.S. policy on North Korea. The apparent willingness of Obama's foreign policy team to negotiate with North Korea is linked to the current situation in the United States. With the world having moved away from U.S. unilateralism, and toward a more multilateral approach to world affairs, one of the primary roles for the United States in the areas of diplomacy and security in the interim will be to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Obama's foreign policy team appears to regard the North Korean nuclear issue as the front line for nuclear non-proliferation in the Middle East and the third world. Realists in the Republican Party, such as Henry Kissinger, also agree that resolving the North Korean nuclear issue could have a positive influence on non-proliferation efforts in the rest of the world. Thus, it seems as though the major political parties would be in agreement with the comprehensive approach Obama is likely to employ with regard to North Korea. A decisive obstacle is South Korean conservative government. There are still some Korean officials who are insisting that the Lee administration follow Kim Young-sam's hard-line policy. However, Obama's North Korea policy is certain to differ from that of the Clinton administration, which was heavily dependant on South Korean cooperation, even if Clinton ultimately became frustrated with, and disappointed by, the Korean government's actions. It is for this reason that the Lee administration should not try to follow Kim Young-sam's policy line on North Korea, which is largely regarded as an outdated paradigm. ¢º Moral Realism Boomerang: Eight Months into the Lee Administration's North Korean Policy by Bo-hyuk Suh Bo-hyuk Suh, Research Fellow at the Korea National Strategy Institute in Seoul, writes, "it is time inter-Korean relations should change, which would begin by respecting the agreement reached at the South-North summit meeting¡¦ The South Korean government should offer North Korea an unconditional dialogue to discuss inter-Korean cooperation, including the implementation of the October 4 Declaration." The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.

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