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Transforming an Asymmetric Cold War Alliance: Psychological and Strategic Challenges for South Korea
Wonhyuk Lim
0630Lim.pdf
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www.nautilus.org
2006/04/18
There appear to be basically two options for the U.S., depending on what kind of relationship with China it envisions. One is to place South Korea within a hub-and-spoke alliance against China, using the North Korean nuclear crisis as a catalyst. This policy is, however, likely to find little support in South Korea and risk a nationalist backlash if the U.S. is increasingly viewed as an impediment to Korean reunification and regional security. It would also increase the possibility of a ¡°Korea shift¡± and exacerbate a continental-maritime division in Northeast Asia. In fact, even if the U.S. objective were to prolong tension in the region and contain China, its hard-line policy toward North Korea would likely be counterproductive, for that would only help China to expand its influence in the Korean peninsula. The United States would find itself increasingly tied to Japan, whose reluctance to come to terms with its imperialist past has limited the effectiveness of its diplomacy. Under this strategic vision, the U.S. essentially risks ¡°losing¡± the Korean peninsula in order to cement its relationship with Japan and contain China....


The other alternative is to deal with South Korea on more equal terms and engage it as a partner in building a new order in the region, facilitating China¡¯s gradual transition and resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis to end the Cold War in Northeast Asia. This alternative would require the U.S. to be more ¡°equidistant¡± between China and Japan, consistently signaling to China that the existing U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea are not designed to threaten China. At the same time, the United States would also have to reassure Japan that this policy is not ¡°Japan passing.¡± The U.S. would assume the role of a stabilizer in Northeast Asia, much as it does in Europe. This approach would not only strengthen the U.S. position in the Korean peninsula but also enhance its policy options in dealing with China and Japan. It would also have the effect of encouraging Japan to improve relations with its neighbors. Under this vision, South Korea would play the role of an advocate for cooperation in the region, not a balancer in the neorealist sense of the term. South Korea is likely to support such a shift in U.S. policy, for the last thing it wants is a continental-maritime division in Northeast Asia that would greatly complicate Korean reunification and increase tension in the region. This strategic vision would not only serve the interest of the ROK-U.S. alliance but also enhance regional security.
www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0630Lim.pdf

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