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[작통권]그린 전 미NSC국장 '전작권 환수는 동맹발전 위한 것' |
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Michael Green |
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정치외교연구센터 / 한반도와 미국 |
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참고자료 |
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기타 |
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국정브리핑 |
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2006/08/19 |
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Thank you very much, Immanuel. I should say I뭢 also a professor at Georgetown University, and they become unhappy when I don뭪 mention that. And I should apologize: I뭢 losing my voice, which will be very convenient right about the time I get the first difficult question, when my voice may disappear suddenly. Anyway, I should be able to speak for a while. It뭩 hard to explain how you get this kind of voice in beautiful weather like this, but there you have it.
This is a very important group, and there뭩 another group in the next room, I see, watching on television. You know this issue well: of the U.S.-Korea Alliance, and the public affairs minister and Immanuel asked me to talk a little bit about the alliance. Some of you have heard me talk about this before, and some of this may be old for you, but I뭠l go through my thinking in addition to recent developments such as wartime operational command, or developments in the North Korean nuclear issue.
But I sometimes like to stop and think about how the U.S.-Korea Alliance would look if you came from another planet, you landed on Earth, and you never read the New York Times or Chosun Ilbo, Hankyoreh Shinmoon, Oh My News, or any media, but simply looked at the output of the U.S.-ROK alliance ?if you had a kind of ledger and you could say, 뱖hat has been produced in this alliance over the last few years???if you did that and you didn뭪 pay attention to the news media or the internet or political speeches and just looked at what has been done, you would conclude that the U.S.-Korea Alliance must be the strongest alliance that the U.S. has anywhere in the world.
After all, we are negotiating a Free Trade Agreement which will be, if completed, the mot significant trade liberalizing agreement in the Asia-Pacific region. It will be a gold standard for other free trade agreements. We뭨e not doing that with Japan, we뭨e not doing it with China ?we뭨e doing it with the Republic of Korea. We have successfully negotiated the future of the alliance, the FOTA process, to effect the most significant realignment of U.S. forces in Asia, under the Bush administration or the Clinton administration, and one of the most significant realignments in the history of the U.S.-Korea Alliance.
The ROK has dispatched forces to Iraq, the third largest contingent after the United Stated and the UK, and we are cooperating together in a variety of fields, whether it is in the WTO or APEC, where I can tell you from my experience, Korea was one of our most trusted partners in that multi-lateral forum.
But if you only read the media and you only read political speeches, and you didn뭪 look at the output ?and I뭢 not criticizing the media here; there are reasons for this I뭠l get too ?you would in that circumstance probably conclude, 밢h my god, this alliance is dead. This has got to be the worst U.S. alliance anywhere in Asia, maybe the worst alliance in the world.?You would read about lots of criticism of the United States, protests at PyeongTech, senior officials in Seoul blaming the Unites States for the North Korean nuclear escalation, U.S. newspapers and editorials arguing that the U.S. has mismanaged the U.S.-Korea Alliance. So if you just read media, especially internet media, you would conclude that this alliance is dead.
How do you explain this? If you뭨e interested in international relations theory, and I know that Seoul has the third largest membership in the American Political Science Association after Washington and Boston, so there may be some people here how are interested in international relations theory. But in international relations you try to explain the behavior of states in a number of ways. Some people argue, as realists, that states make their decision based on material power. And if you뭨e looking at the U.S.-Korea Alliance, you would say, 밳ou have North Korean nuclear development, missile tests, Japan is deciding its future, China is rapidly increasing its power. The U.S. is naturally the honest broker, and furthermore, the U.S. and ROK are bonded by common values.?And you would assume that they뭨e in very good shape.
But another way to look at international relation is what is sometimes called constructivism. The idea is based on sociology and a social theory that countries or people construct their reality ?when they look at the world, they carry with them historical context or their own culture, their own domestic political environment. This kind of constructivist view does help to explain why the U.S.-Korea Alliance on the one hand can look so productive and positive, and on the hand seem so troubled.
And I뭭e pondered this. The way I think you can explain it in terms of strategic culture or thinking ?not objective national interest, but just how people feel about the world ?is that the U.S. and Korea are in particular places right now: the American people and the Korean people. Both the American people and the Korea people since 9/11 have something that the fear, and something that they hope for, something they dream for, that will address that fear.
I think it is fair to say that for most Americans, since 9/11, the great fear is that terrorist groups will get access to weapons of mass destruction and will attack Washington, New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, or wherever, and cause damage many time more significant and horrible than in the World Trade Center. And if you look at the world and you뭨e concerned about terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, North Korea is one of the more frightening and difficult challenges that we face.
The hope that I think the American people have, still, is that we can help to transform the world, transform the Middle East, create more democracy, more rue of law, more values, so that countries will be more responsive to their people, so that terrorism won뭪 take root, so that people won뭪 want to become suicide bombers or attack with bombs, let alone weapons of mass destruction. So the fear is terrorism married with WMD, and the hope is that through transforming the world, encouraging better government, behavior, better governance, more democracy, terrorism gradually over time can be taken away. It뭩 a realist fear with an idealist solution in the long run.
I think for the people of the Republic of Korea there is also a fear and a hope. The fear is war on the Korean peninsula. I hear this from my friends in Hannaradang, I hear it from my friends in Wooridang ?this is a common fear. If you asked the Korean people, 뱖hat do you fear??it would be war on the Korean peninsula, for good reasons. It is well known to President Bush that the DMZ is as close to downtown Seoul as Dulles airport [is to him], that the large artillery and missile deployments of the DPRK would cause massive damage to everything that뭩 been built in the South, and there뭩 a real fear about that.
The hope I think the Korean people have is that reconciliation with the North, over time, will make this possibility of war steadily go away. So in some ways it parallels the American peoples?fear and hope: they have a fear of suffering great damage, and they have a hope, an idealistic hope, that in the long run they can transform the world. The Korean people have a fear of war on the peninsula, and I think a hope that over time, through reconciliation with the North, there could be a peaceful environment that makes war unlikely.
So we both have our fears, we both have our hopes, but in some ways they뭨e a little out of sync. They뭨e a little out of connection in terms of the political culture in the U.S. and the political culture in the Republic of Korea. And I reiterate: if you think about real interests, the U.S. cannot achieve its interests without a strong U.S.-Korea Alliance. We have to deter North Korea; we have to deal with North Korea. Asia is exploring the ideas of East-Asian community, integration, or architecture. [We] the United States cannot do that with just Japan and Australia. We cannot help to shape the East-Asian integration that뭩 open and inclusive and trans-Pacific based on universal norms of democracy, rule of law, and governance. We can뭪 do that with just Japan and Australia ?we have to have the ROK, in the long run, so that the Asian integration process is shaped in ways that reflect shared values between the American and Korean people.
We need Korea, strategically. That뭩 why we뭨e doing an FTA. Korea is an important part of it. And Korea clearly needs the United States. How will Korea deal with ?really, if you think about it ?rising Chinese power, or with uncertainties about Japan뭩 future, or with this regional architecture, unless it is locked in an alliance with the United States?
So I reiterate that the interests, and I think, based on common values, would dictate that the alliance should get stronger. But we have these different political cultures and strategic culture, this, what the Germans call 밯eltanschauung??this different worldview right now that makes it culturally and politically more challenging to manage this alliance.
I think the problem is made worse by the particular political dynamics in both countries right now. [There is a] myth that somehow the United States wants regime change ?of course the United States wants regime change. The ROK wants regime change ?it뭩 just a question of how you do it. But the myth that the United States has an active plan for regime change ?an active plan for attacking North Korea, or using force against North Korea ?is very strong in South Korea. It뭩 strong, and it reinforces this fear in the ROK that some how war is possible and that the Americans could cause it. And that becomes a real obstacle to alliance management. I think this myth is persistent, for some reasons that will make sense to you if I mention them.
One is that there is a very strong myth that the United States almost went to war with North Korea in April 1994 at the time just before Jimmy Carter went to Pyongyang. And I say myth because although the Pentagon was looking at options for what is called flexible deterrents ?blockading North Korea and then war if they should attack ?although the Pentagon was looking at that, I think it뭩 a very open question whether the White House or the State Department or President Clinton was really seriously contemplating war on the Korean peninsula. So planning is one thing, but that does not mean necessarily that war was imminent in April 1994.
But in the years since the, it as become part of the mythology that the U.S. almost went to war with North Korea. And so it was stopped by Jimmy Carter going, by bilateral engagement, and it was stopped by the so-called 밃greed Framework.?And I think with the North Korean uranium enrichment program and the collapse of the Agreed Framework, people sort of thin through the logic and think, 뱖ell if we don뭪 have the Agreed Framework, and we don뭪 have the engagement, then this will naturally lead right back to war, and we뭠l go back to April 1994.?
I think that뭩 a myth because first of all, as I뭭e said, I뭢 not so sure that we were that close to war in April 1994. It뭩 certainly worth historians going back and seriously thinking about it and looking at it.
Second, this is not 1994. In 1994, the United States did not know ?did not think ?that North Korea had nuclear weapons. In 1994 North Korea did not have 200 Nodong missiles aimed at Japan. In 1994, the U.S. did not have the six-party process to work this. There are many very important differences.
On the U.S. side, in these kinds of crises or situation, the president never rules out any option. You can rue out a military attack by the United States on the Republic of Korea, or on Japan, or on Canada ?that뭩 easy. But when you뭨e talking about a country that is technically in a state of war with the United States and developing nuclear weapons designed to hit the United States an our allies, even if your overwhelming emphasis is on diplomacy, you never rue out the option of force. You never rule out those options.
So as the administration that I was a part of kept reiterating, there뭩 a necessary backstop for diplomacy that we never rule out any options. I think that reinforced the concern in the ROK.
Another thing that reinforced this myth that somehow the U.S. is poised to attack North Korea or cause regime change is the president뭩 very strong feeling ?and I would argue the American people and American congress?very strong feeling ?about human rights in North Korea. The North Koreans have done a very skillful job of convincing countries around the world that criticizing the human right situation in North Korea is tantamount to regime change. [They] have conditioned a lot of governments around the world into thinking that worrying about human rights will be seen in North Korea as hostile, that it will become an obstacle to diplomacy, and will make war more likely.
And so somehow the North Koreans very skillfully have made U.S. concerns about human rights, or others?concerns about human rights, a hostile provocative act that could ruin diplomacy and lead to war. So people are very skittish. Even in this country, about mentioning human rights. Even President Bush is very, very careful about what he says about human rights in North Korea, because so many people around the world have been conditioned to thin that criticizing human rights is the same as regime change. This has also made this more complicated.
I would argue that if all the countries in the world talked openly about the human rights situation in North Korea and came up with a common approach, North Korea couldn뭪 use this strategy. But right now they뭨e rather successfully dividing countries on this issue. And I would hoe that the human rights envoy, Jay Lefkowitz, can get a good reception in Seoul and elsewhere, and that he뭠l listen and that this won뭪 be a one-way U.S. monologue, but rather a dialogue, even a multi-lateral discussion about what practical steps all of us can take together to improve human rights. If we all do it together, it뭩 going to be much harder for North Korea to blame one country and say its regime change, and silence another country.
And I would also argue that, in some ways sort of like 밡ixon goes to China,?the progressive camp in the ROK, President Noh and his advisors, are the perfect people to do this. After all, they have credentials ?they fought, suffered, sweated, and were imprisoned to improve human right and democracy in South Korea. So they뭨e the very people who should be taking this, and taking the lead on defining how we define human right in North Korea. But I뭢 afraid right now, in many ways, Seoul is marginalized in this debate, and is following rather than leading this discussion. That should change, and unfortunately that is factor that also reinforces this myth that the U.S. is on the verge of regime change.
I was in the White House four and a half years working on North Korea. We never had a plan to cause the six-party talks to fail and topple North Korea. There is no doubt and no secret that President Bush abhors this regime and most Americans in both parties feel the same way. But the emphasis is clearly on trying to make the diplomacy and the six-party talks work.
The Blue House has not helped ?in some way, itself ?because politically I think the Blue House has found it useful to argue that it can control the Americans, and, in some ways ironically, the argument is that because we dispatched troops to Iraq, and because we are pushing for a strong alliance relationship with the U.S., that we the current government [of ROK] are best equipped to stop the U.S. from attacking.
And frankly the progressive camp in the Blue House have used this myth and have portrayed themselves as skillfully manipulating the Americans to stop them from attacking North Korea. Which is probably good politics, particularly with their base, but it plays back in Washington and it makes it more difficult to manage the alliance and demonstrate that we뭨e on the same page.
So these are some of the reasons why I think, although our interests and our values very closely coincide, and although we have had very productive output in management of the alliance, nevertheless the perception in the American and Korean publics, and in the world, is that this alliance is in trouble, is drifting, and is under friction. But if you isolate these cultural and constructivist factors ?these political and cultural things from the reality ?it can help you start to think about how we would manage the alliance to keep it very much on track.
And I think we need to do that, as I said, because of the challenges that we face with China뭩 growing role, with the North Korean expanded threat, frankly, and with the world trading system and our FTA.
Let me say one last thing about wartime operational command, and then I뭠l take some questions. I worked on this issue when I was on the White House, and I am an advocate of being bold in alliances, and it was a bold vision to think about transitioning wartime operational command from U.S. to ROK commanders. Particularly bearing in mind that technically, as probably everyone here knows, wartime operational command does not mean automatic operational command of the other side뭩 forces. Wartime operational command still depends upon national command authorities, which is the President and the president of the Republic of Korea. Agreed? There is no automatic command over the other side뭩 forces. It is still based on, and requires, a decision by the leadership in both countries to move forward. But for the purpose of planning, you have to decide which troops relate to which units, and so forth.
So for planning purposes, you have this wartime operational command, but everyone I think should know that in reality, nobody has any control over anyone without the expressed OK from the national command authority.
So as a technical matter, you can transfer wartime operational command, and in some ways, as a purely military matter, given the strength and capability of the ROK forces, it doesn뭪 change the military picture that much. You can still manage the alliance in wartime and in a military context pretty well.
I also think that it would be a mistake for the United States, if asked by the Republic of Korea, to say 밡o, we뭨e not going to return wartime operational command.?After all, it뭩 an alliance that requires both parties to be satisfied with how it뭩 working, and our forces are in Korea as guests.
So for those reasons, I think wartime operational command transference is a worthy topic and a worthy goal. I do have, personally, real concerns about timing. I think the context, especially the strategic context, matters a lot. For me, personally, to accelerate and agree on dates for transferring wartime operational command in the wake of North Korean provocations of this scale ?and these are very strong provocations, as is clear from China뭩 strong response in the Security Council ?to do it now might send a very bad signal.
North Korea, many people believe, has had three goals over the past four years: get rid of the national security law in the South, change the Northern limit line, get rid of wartime operational command and transfer it back to the ROK. These are very clear North Korean goals.
So what signals does it send, after North Korea refuses to come back to the six-party talks, launches these missies in defiance of international opinion, and may be preparing for a nuclear test ?what signal does it send that unilaterally start giving North Korea its demands? I think we have to think very carefully about that.
Secondly we have to think very carefully about Japan. The U.S.-Japan Alliance, it뭩 hard to say this these days, but it뭩 important for the ROK. The U.S.-ROK Alliance is important for Japan. And for hundreds, indeed, thousands of years, Japanese security has required that there not be a threat from the Korean peninsula. They call it the dagger aimed at the heart of Japan. Well Japan has taken a very passive security role on the Korean Peninsula ?a diplomatic role, yes, but not a military one ?for the past 50 years precisely because the Japanese could count on a strong U.S.-ROK Alliance. And we need to think about how we explain this to Japan, and how it뭩 taken in Japan. Japan thinks about it뭩 own security.
And finally we have to think about the U.S. Congress. Does the U.S. Congress understand this? Will they argue that U.S. forces should, quote-unquote, 밷e under Korean wartime operational command? What effect will it have on support for sustaining the U.S. presence in the peninsula?
These things really have to be thought through, and the whole thing has to be put in the context of the future vision for the alliance -- which President Bush and President Roh did. I worked on it. But to be honest, there were joint statements, and we bureaucrats work very hard to produce a good joint statement. I뭢 very proud of those joint statements. And President Bush and President Roh had very good discussions about the alliance.
But most of the time, they were management issues. What we really haven뭪 done is create a broad, or broadly accepted, vision for what this alliance is about in the future. That context is really going to be important.
I mention that not because I am opposed to wartime operational command, but we need to think very carefully about the strategic context as we move forward.
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www.news.go.kr/dn.php/2006.08.19/c83c13c9d6cdf276060b68d9/Michael+Green+speech.doc |
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※ 코리아연구원은 기획재정부에서 공익성기부금대상단체(2006-176호)로 선정되었으므로
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