Worldwide Threats to U.S. National Security
	Senate Armed Services Committee
	Á¤Ä¡¿Ü±³¿¬±¸¼¾ÅÍ / Çѹݵµ¿Í ¹Ì±¹
	Âü°íÀÚ·á
	Á¤Ã¥º¸°í¼­
	DIA
	2012/02/16
Turning to Asia, North Korea's third generation leadership transition is underway. Improving the economy and regime survival remain enduring leadership priorities. Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programs provide strategic deterrents, international prestige and leverage to extract economic and political concessions. While North Korea may abandon portions of its nuclear program for better relations with the United States, it is unlikely to surrender its nuclear weapons. Pyongyang's forward position military can attack South Korea with little or no strategic warning but it suffers from logistic shortages, aging equipment and poor training. Pyongyang likely knows it cannot reunite the peninsula by force and is unlikely to attack on a scale that would risk it's own survival. We see no sign that the leadership transition has changed the regime's calculus regarding nuclear weapons and the defense intelligence agency retains continued focus on the peninsula to provide warning against additional attacks from the North. China continues to build a more modern military to defend its core interests which are territorial sovereignty, national unity and sustained access to economic resources. Countering U.S. forces in a Taiwan or a South China sea contingency remains a top Chinese military priority. Investments in naval, anti-air and anti-ship capabilities are designed to achieve periodic and local sea and air superiority to include the islands closest to the mainland.
Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on Worldwide Threats to U.S. National Security February 16, 2012 LEVIN: OK. Good morning, everybody. Let me start by welcoming our witnesses for today's hearing on current and longer-term threats and challenges around the world. We're glad to have the director of national intelligence, James Clapper, and DIA director General Ron Burgess as our witnesses. We thank you both for your long and continued service to our nation on behalf of our troops to whom we all owe so much. This committee has a special responsibility to the men and women of our armed forces to be vigilant about intelligence programs because the safety of our troops, decisions on whether or not to use military force and the planning for military operations depend so heavily on intelligence. LEVIN: The security situation in Afghanistan remains one of our highest priority threats for our intelligence community. In the last year there are clear signs of progress. African security -- excuse me, Afghan security forces are in the lead in providing security in Kabul including during the gathering of over 2,000 Afghan leaders for the recent Loya Jirga last November. The Afghan army and police are in charge of security in former Taliban strongholds in southern Afghanistan. In addition, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense planners have developed a plan for the ministries combined team operations for 2012 and 2013. The Afghan army is widely respected and even the Afghan police, traditionally lagging far behind in that virtue, are gaining increasing respect among the Afghan people. Nevertheless, security remains fragile. A key to progress on security in Afghanistan is the process of transitioning the lead for securing the Afghan people from coalition forces to the Afghan Security Forces. The transition process is underway and continues at pace with the Afghan army and police assuming the security lead in more and more areas throughout the country. We heard on Tuesday from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dempsey, that the transition process is on track to meet the goal of having the Afghan Security Forces take the lead throughout Afghanistan by 2014. Successful transition is going to depend on a number of factors, including the growth in the capabilities of the Afghan army and police and their readiness to take the security lead, the nature of the insurgency and progress on reconciliation talks. We'd be interested in hearing our witnesses assessment of the current security situation in Afghanistan and their views on the progress, both in terms of providing security and of transition and the possibilities for reconciliation with the Taliban. I'm concerned by recent news reports that the latest National Intelligence Estimate, or NIE, reflects a difference of views between the intelligence community and our military commanders over the security situation in Afghanistan. According to these news reports, the NIE contains a set of additional comments endorsed by coalition commander, General Allen, Ambassador Crocker, Central Command Commander, General Mattis and European Command Commander, Admiral Stavridis disagreeing with the NIE's assessment relative to the sustainability of security gains, particularly in the south. I hope our witnesses will address this alleged difference of views in the recent NIE. Security in Afghanistan is going to remain in jeopardy so long as there continues to be sanctuary in Pakistan for insurgents conducting cross-border attacks against U.S. coalition and Afghan forces, and against the Afghan people. Pakistan's refusal to go after the safe havens of the Haqqani Network in North Waziristan and of the Afghan Taliban Shura in Quetta, belies Pakistan's assertions that it is committed to peace and security in the region. Pakistan's support to the Haqqani Network, which former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen called, a quote "Veritable arm of the ISI" Pakistan's Intelligence Agency is a major cause for U.S./Pakistan relations reaching a low point. Where they're going to remain until the Pakistan military ends its ties to these extremists carrying out cross-border attacks. And we need to understand the intelligence community's assessment of Pakistan's strategy with respect to these insurgent groups and the reconciliation process as to Pakistan's power to determine -- and as to Pakistan's power to determine outcomes. The U.S. campaign against the global Jihadist movement, as Director Clapper's opening statement calls it, had a number of significant successes in the last year, notably operations against Osama bin Laden and Anwar al-Awlaki. These successes struck major blows to Al Qaida's senior leadership and to one of its most active affiliates. As a result of these operations and sustained pressure in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and North Africa, Al Qaida and its affiliates are showing strength. We'd be interested in the intelligence community's assessment of last weeks announcement of a merger between Al Qaida and al-Shabaab and whether it signals an increased threat to the United States and our interests from Somalia -- in Somalia. Excuse me. Last August, the president issued Presidential Study Directive 10 which identifies the prevention of mass atrocities and genocide as a core national security interest and moral responsibility of the United States. I'm pleased to see Director Clapper has included in his testimony, a discussion of the importance of the prevention of mass atrocities and the need for the intelligence community to report on these incidents rapidly so as to inform policy-makers of these deeply concerning events. Over the past year, the international community has acted to prevent a mass atrocity in Libya, but we're currently witnessing a mass atrocity in Syria. These tragedies have resulted in deaths of many civilians seeking their universal freedoms and destabilized a sensitive region that is critical to the United States and our allies. Not relative to Iran, which is obviously a major topic. Excuse me. There is a strong, bipartisan determination on this committee and in this Congress to do all that we can to counter the threat posed by Iran and in particular, to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. In the most recent Defense Authorization Act, we made a major breakthrough with respect to Iran's sanctions by requiring foreign financial institutions to choose between maintaining ties with the U.S. financial system, or doing business with the Central Bank of Iran, especially relative to the purchase of Iranian petroleum and related products. President Obama has appropriately focused considerable and determined diplomatic effort, quote "To prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon" and he has repeatedly said there are, quote "No options off the table to achieve that goal." The American people are entitled to a clear, intelligence community estimate about the length of time it would take Iran to construct a usable nuclear weapon if and when they decide to produce one and how likely is it that they will decide to do so? An additional matter of concern with regard to Iran was raised in a recent report discussing Iran's apparent willingness to host and support senior Al Qaida leaders and facilitators. This is a matter that has not received a great deal of attention in recent years. However if true, Iran's sanctuary of an -- of Al Qaida could preserve some of the group's most senior leaders and potentially provide Iran with a dangerous proxy. The committee looks forward to the director's testimony on that matter as well. On Syria, the recent veto by Russia and China of the Arab League drafted resolution at the United Nations Security Council has bolstered the Assad regime and has regrettably demonstrated the willingness of China and Russia to support regimes seeking to crush individuals who are seeking a better and a freer life. We hope that the directors here will share with the committee what we know about the individuals seeking to overthrow the Assad regime. What do we know about who is supplying the Assad regimen with weapons? What the regimen's intentions are and what we know about the willingness of the Syrian military to continue to kill and maim their own countrymen. Relative to Iraq, despite the political, economic and security challenges that confront Iraq, the government's leaders appear to be willing to work generally together to resolve issues politically rather than through violence. While there is much this new democracy needs to do, to build a new and truly pluralistic, stable and sovereign nation, we'd like to hear our witnesses' views on the Iraqi's progress to date, their outlook for stability and political compromise. We also would be interested in the risk of unchecked Iranian influence in Iraq and what is the Iraqi government's commitment and capability to deal with that influence or their willingness to deal with that influence. I'm going to put my comments relative to China and the Asia Pacific in general, in the record -- the record and end with just a comment on cybersecurity. Director Clapper's prepared statement indicates that the intelligence community places the cybersecurity threat to our country and our economy in the top tier or threats, alongside of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. And that's surely where that cyber threat belongs. A recent report from the National Counterintelligence Executive stated that entities operating from within China and Russia are responsible for the massive and routine theft of U.S. commercial and military technology and that could threaten our national security and our prosperity. It is important to know what our intelligence community regards this economic espionage as. Whether it is a significant national security threat and also whether that view is shared by our policy-makers and whether China would believe that we are just bluffing if we talk about ending normal trade relations if the economic espionage and counterfeiting and theft of our intellectual property do not end. Before turning to Senator McCain for his opening remarks and to our witnesses for their testimony, we have arranged for a closed session in Room SVC-217, the Office of Senate Security following this open session in the event that such a closed session is necessary. Senator McCain? MCCAIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me join you in welcoming General Clapper and General Burgess and thanking them for their many years of distinguished service. MCCAIN: I also want to take this opportunity to express our enormous gratitude to the men and women of our intelligence community. It is a truism that intelligence often fails publicly, but succeeds privately. I only wish the American people could know the full extent of what our intelligence community does to keep us safe. Today's hearing is a fitting companion to the one this committee held on Tuesday to review the president's annual budget request for the Department of Defense, as well as his broader proposal to cut $487 billion in defense spending over 10 years. As Secretary of Defense Panetta, the chairman of the Joint of Staff, told this committee on Tuesday, the administration's plans, reductions in defense spending would entail greater risk to our military, to our missions, and to our national security. This stands to reason, but what does not is why we would choose to increase the already growing risk to our national security at this time. Just consider the scale and scope of these risks. Despite the remarkable damage inflicted on Al Qaida's core leadership by our military and intelligence professionals, Al Qaida officials -- affiliates -- in Iraq, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb are growing stronger, more independent, more diffuse, and more willing to attack American interests. As evidenced by their plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in a Washington restaurant, the rulers in Iran clearly pose a more direct threat to us than many would have assumed just a year ago. And that is on top of the hostile actions in which Iran has been engaging for years, including killing Americans in Ira and Afghanistan, supporting terrorist groups across the Middle East, destabilizing Arab countries, propping up and re-arming the Assad regime in Syria, and continuing their undeterred pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability. The threat posed by the Iranian regime could soon bring the Middle East to the brink of war, if it's not there already. North Korea is in the midst of a potentially dangerous and destabilizing transition. An inexperienced 29-year-old is now in charge of a government that continues to produce nuclear weapons, develop ever- more sophisticated ballistic missiles, threaten our ally in the Republic of Korea, and administer the most brutal apparatus of state oppression of any country on Earth. The chances of increased conflict and miscalculations are as real as ever before. The Peoples Republic of China continues with a non- transparent buildup of its military forces, while engaging in provocative acts against its neighbors in international waters. Indeed, tensions in the South China Sea have rarely been higher. At the same time, the number and sophistication of cyber attacks on American targets by Chinese actors, likely with Chinese government involvement in many cases, is growing increasingly severe and damaging. Indeed, as last year's report from the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive makes clear, quote, "Chinese actors are the world's most active and persistent perpetuator -- perpetrators -- of economic espionage." In Afghanistan, the Taliban insurgency is damaged, but not broken. And regrettably, the will to stay in the fight against the international coalition and our Afghan partners has only been increased by the administration's repeated public commitments to certain dates for withdrawing down our military forces, regardless of conditions on the ground. Meanwhile, Pakistan remains as fragile and combustible as ever, and as our witnesses' statements make clear, Pakistan's intelligence service continues to support terrorist elements in side Afghanistan that are attacking and killing Americans. In Iraq, the fragile stability of democratic gains that Iraqis have been able to forge thanks to the surge now seems to be unraveling. Prime Minister Maliki appears to be consolidating his power at the expense of the other political blocks. Violence is up significantly since the departure of U.S. troops. Al Qaida in Iraq and violent Shia extremist groups are still very much active and threatening to Iraq's stability. It is increasingly difficult to argue that Iraq, to use the president's words, is, quote, " ... stable and self-reliant." One year into the Arab Spring the situation remains fluid, uncertain, and in places, very troubling. From Tunisia and Libya to Egypt, Yemen and Bahrain, countries are undergoing monumental changes, and the outcome of those changes are still far from clear. And the there is Syria, where the conflict appears to be entering a new phase. More than 6,000 lives have been lost and there appears to be no end in site. The bloodshed must be stopped, and we should rule out no option that could help save lives. We must consider, among other actions, providing opposition groups inside Syria, both political and military, with better means to organize their activities, to care for the wounded, to find safe havens, to communicate securely, to defend themselves and to fight back against Assad's forces. The time has come when all options must be on the table to end the killing and force Assad to leave power. We should -- we could continue for some time listing a myriad of other threats facing our nation, and I'm confident we'll cover most of them in today's hearing. What should be clear is that by no objective assessment are the threats to our national security decreasing. To the contrary, they are increasing, as the prepared testimonies of our witnesses make vividly clear. So the question that members of Congress and the members of this committee in particular need to think long and hard about is this. Why in an international environment of growing uncertainty, risk and threat would we choose to add to those risks by making large and misguided cuts to our national defense budget? Cuts that by themselves will not significantly reduce our national debt, the real driver of which is our domestic entitlement programs. I don't see a compelling answer to this question at this time, and I imagine today's hearing will underscore that point. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. LEVIN: Thank you so much, Senator McCain. Director Clapper? CLAPPER: Thank you, Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, distinguished members of the committee for inviting us to present the 2012 worldwide threat assessment. I have observed you've probably already given it for us. I am joined today by the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, my friend and colleague of longstanding, Lieutenant General Ron Burgess. These remarks and our statement for the record reflect the collective insights of the extraordinary men and women of the United States intelligence community whom you've recognized, and we most appreciate that, and whom it is our privilege and honor to lead. And we're most appreciative of your acknowledgement of the work, sometimes under very hazardous conditions, that are done by the men and women of the community around the world. We won't attempt to cover the full scope of worldwide threats in these brief oral remarks, so I would like to highlight some of the issues that we identify for the coming year, some of which you've already done for us, as I said. Earlier this month was the 51st anniversary of my enlistment in the Marine Corps. And during my subsequent entire career I don't recall a more complex and interdependent array of challenges than we face today. The capabilities, technologies, know-how, communications and environmental forces aren't confined by borders and can trigger transnational disruptions with astonishing speed. And never before has the intelligence community been called upon to master such complexity on so many issues in such a resource-constrained environment. We're rising to the challenge by continuing to integrate the intelligence, taking advantage of new technologies, implementing new efficiencies, and as always, simply working hard. But candidly, maintaining the world's premier intelligence enterprise in the face of our shrinking budgets will be a challenge. We will be accepting and managing risks more so than we've had to do in the last decade. And when I say 'we,' I mean both the legislative and the executive. We begin our threat assessment, as we did last year, with the global issues of terrorism and proliferation. The intelligence community sees the next two to three years as a critical transition phase for the terrorist threat, particularly for Al Qaida and like-minded groups. With Osama bin Laden's death the global jihadist movement lost its most iconic and inspirational leader. The new Al Qaida commander is less charismatic, and the death or capture of prominent Al Qaida has shrunk the group's top leadership layer. However, even with its degraded capabilities and its focus on small, simpler plots, Al Qaida remains a threat. As long as we sustain the pressure, we judge that core Al Qaida will be of largely symbolic importance to the global jihadist movement. But regional affiliates, and to a lesser extent, small cells and individuals will drive the global jihad agenda. Proliferation, that is, efforts to develop, acquire, or spread weapons of mass destruction is also a major global strategic threat. Among nation-states, as you've alluded, Iran's technical advances, particularly in uranium enrichment, strengthen our assessment that Iran is more than capable of producing enough highly enrichment uranium for a weapon if its political leaders, specifically the supreme leader himself, chooses to do so. North Korea's export of ballistic missiles and associated materiels to several countries, including Iran and Syria, illustrate the reach of the North's proliferation activities. We don't expect that Kim Jong Un, North Korea's new, young leader, to change Pyongyang's policy of attempting to export most of its weapons systems. I note that in this year's statement of the record, as you've noted yourselves, that we elevated our discussion of cyber threats to follow terrorism and proliferation. And perhaps in something of a "Coals to Newcastle," just to affirm the cyber threat is one of the most challenging ones we face. We perceive a cyber environment in which emerging technologies are developed and implemented before security responses can be put in place. Among state actors, we're particularly concerned about entities within China and Russia conducting into U.S. computer networks and stealing U.S. data. And the growing role that non-state actors are playing in cyberspace is a great example of the easy access to potentially disruptive and even lethal technology and know-how by such groups. Two of our greatest strategic cyber challenges are, first, definitive real-time attribution of cyber attacks, that is, knowing who carried such attacks and where perpetrators are located. And second, managing the enormous vulnerabilities within the I.T. supply chain for U.S. networks. CLAPPER: In this regard, a cybersecurity bill was introduced recently introduced by Senators Lieberman, Collins, Rockefeller and Feinstein. It addresses the core Homeland Security requirements that would improve cybersecurity for the American people, for our nation's critical infrastructure, and for the federal government's own networks and computers. Intelligence community considers such legislative steps essential to addressing our nation's critical infrastructure vulnerabilities which pose serious national and economic security risks. Briefly looking geographically around the world, in Afghanistan, and General Burgess will have more to say about this. During the past year, the Taliban lost some ground but that was mainly in places where the International Security Assistance Forces, of ISAF, were concentrated and Taliban senior leaders continued to enjoy safe haven in Pakistan. ISAF's efforts to partner with Afghan national security forces are encouraging but corruption and governance challenges continue to threaten the Afghan forces operational effectiveness. Most provinces have established basic governance structures, but they still don't provide essential services. The International Security Assistance Forces and the support of Afghanistan's neighbors notably and particularly Pakistan will remain essential to sustain the gains that have been achieved. And although there's broad international political support for the Afghan government, there are doubts in many capitals, particularly in Europe about how to fund the Afghanistan initiatives after 2014. In Iraq, violence and sporadic high profile attacks continue. Prime Minister Maliki's recent aggressive moves against Sunni political leaders have heightened political tensions. But for now, we believe the Sunni's continue to view the political process as the best venue to pursue change. Elsewhere across the Middle East and North Africa, those pushing for change are confronting ruling elites, sectarian, ethnic and tribal divisions, lack of experience with democracies, stalled economic development, military insecurity force resistance and regional power initiatives. These are fluid political environments that offer openings for extremists to participate more assertively in political life. States where authoritarian leaders have been toppled such as Tunisia, Egypt and Libya have to construct or reconstruct their political systems through complex negotiations among competing factions. And no where is this transition, I believe more important than in Egypt, which I think will be a (inaudible) and the course is so strategically important because of its size, its location and of course the peace treaty that it now has with -- with Israel. In Syria, regime intransigence and social divisions are prolonging internal struggles and could potentially turn domestic upheavals into regional crises. In Yemen, although a political transition is underway, the security situation continues to be marred by violence and fragmentation of the country is a real possibility. As the ancient Roman historian Tacitus once observed, the best day after a bad emperor is the first. And after that, I would add things get very problematic. Intelligence community is also paying close attention to development across the African continent throughout the Western Hemisphere, Europe and across Asia. And here too, few issues are self contained. Virtually every region has a bearing on our key concerns and terrorism proliferation, cybersecurity and instability and throughout the globe, where ever there are environmental stresses on water, food and natural resources as well as health threats, economic crises and organized crime, we see ripple effects around the world and impacts on U.S. interests. Amidst these extraordinary challenges, it's important to remind this distinguished body and the American people and in all of our work, the U.S. intelligence community strives to exemplify American values. We carry out our -- our missions with respect for the rule of law and the protection of (inaudible) and privacy. That pledge leaves me to mention our highest legislative priority this year and it requires the support of both Houses of Congress. I refer specifically to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act -- Amendment's Act of FAA, which is set to expire at the end of 2012. Title VII of FISA allows the intelligence community to collect vital information about international terrorists and other important targets overseas. This law authorizes surveillance of non-U.S. persons located overseas who are of foreign intelligence importance, meaning they have a connection to or information about threats such as terrorism or proliferation. It also provides for comprehensive oversight by all three branches of government to protect the privacy and civil liberties of U.S. persons. The Department of Justice and my office conducted extensive oversight reviews of these activities and we report to Congress on implementation and compliance twice a year. Intelligence collection under FISA produces crucial intelligence that's vital to protect a nation against international terrorism and other threats. We're always considering whether there are changes that could be made to improve the law, but our first priority is reauthorization of these authorities in their current form. We look forward to the speedy enactment of the legislation reauthorized in the FISA amendments and acts so there can be no interruption in our ability to use these authorizes to protect the American people. So I'll end this brief statement where I began and then turn it over to -- to General Burgess. The fiscal environment we face as a nation and in our intelligence community will require careful identification and management of the challenges the I.C. focuses on and the risk we must mutually assume. With that, I thank you and the members of the committee for your dedication to the security of our nation, your support for our men and women of the intelligence community and your attention here today. So with that, I'll stop and turn it over to General Burgess. LEVIN: Thank you, Director Clapper. General Burgess? BURGESS: Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain and other members of the committee, I want to thank you for the opportunity to join my longtime friend and professional colleague, Director Clapper. I am representing the men and women of the United States intelligence community. I would like to begin with current military operations in Afghanistan where we assess that endemic corruption and persistent qualitative deficiencies in the Army and police forces undermined efforts to extend effective governance and security. The Afghan army remains reliant on ISAF for key combat support, such as logistics, intelligence and transport. While Afghan Army performance improved in some operations when partnered with ISAF units, additional gains will require sustained mentoring and support. Despite successful coalition targeting, the Taliban remains resilient and able to replace leadership losses while also competing to provide governance at the local level. From it's Pakistani safe havens, the Taliban leadership remains confident of eventual victory. To the West, Iran remains committed to threatening U.S. interest in the region through it's support to terrorists and militant groups, including in Iraq and Afghanistan while it remains committed to strengthening its naval, nuclear and missile capabilities. Iran can close the Straits of Hormuz, at least temporarily and may launch missiles against United States forces and our allies in the region if it is attacked. Iran could also attempt to employ terrorists surrogates worldwide. However, the agency assesses Iran is unlikely to initiate or intentionally provoke a conflict. Iranian ballistic missiles in development could range across the region and Central Europe. Iran's new space launch vehicle demonstrates progress toward a potential ICBM. Iran today has the technical, scientific and industrial capability to eventually produce nuclear weapons. While international pressure against Iran has increased, including through sanctions, we assess that Tehran is not close to agreeing to abandoning its nuclear program. In Iraq, DIA assesses that Baghdad security forces probably can maintain current security levels this year despite manning shortages and overly centralized command and control. Despite perceptions of sectarian bias and a need for logistics, intelligence and tactical communications training, Iraq security forces are putting forces on the street, they are securing high profile sites and they are conducting intelligence driven targeting. However, Sunni insurgents and Shia militant groups likely will remain serious challenges for Iraq and remaining U.S. personnel until more comprehensive political reconciliation reduces lingering tensions among religious and tribal constituencies. More broadly across the region, the popular forces sweeping the Middle East and North Africa are demonstrating the potential to reorder longstanding assumptions, relationships and alliances in a way that invites risk and opportunities for the United States and our allies. Armed domestic opponents pose an unprecedented challenge to the Al-Assad regime in Syria and it's collapse would have serious implications for Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas and Lebanon. Turning to Asia, North Korea's third generation leadership transition is underway. Improving the economy and regime survival remain enduring leadership priorities. Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programs provide strategic deterrents, international prestige and leverage to extract economic and political concessions. While North Korea may abandon portions of its nuclear program for better relations with the United States, it is unlikely to surrender its nuclear weapons. Pyongyang's forward position military can attack South Korea with little or no strategic warning but it suffers from logistic shortages, aging equipment and poor training. Pyongyang likely knows it cannot reunite the peninsula by force and is unlikely to attack on a scale that would risk it's own survival. We see no sign that the leadership transition has changed the regime's calculus regarding nuclear weapons and the defense intelligence agency retains continued focus on the peninsula to provide warning against additional attacks from the North. China continues to build a more modern military to defend its core interests which are territorial sovereignty, national unity and sustained access to economic resources. Countering U.S. forces in a Taiwan or a South China sea contingency remains a top Chinese military priority. Investments in naval, anti-air and anti-ship capabilities are designed to achieve periodic and local sea and air superiority to include the islands closest to the mainland. BURGESS: Once focused on territorial defense, China's air force is developing off-shore strike, air and missile defense, strategic mobility and early warning and reconnaissance capabilities. China may incorporate new capabilities and novel ways that present challenges for U.S. forces. Last year's first flight of a fifth generation fighter and launch of China's first aircraft carrier underscore the breadth and quality of China's military modernization program. However, a lack of modern combat experience is but one example that steps remain before China achieves the full potential of its new technologies, platforms and military personnel. Regarding cyber-threats, we continue to see daily attempts to gain access to our nation's government and business computer networks including our own secure systems. This threat is large and growing in scale and sophistication. Finally, Al Qaida losses in 2011 have focused the core group and its affiliates in Yemen, Somalia and North Africa on self-preservation and reconstitution. Though damaged, the group and its affiliates remain committed to transnational attacks in Europe and against the United States. Al Qaida in the lands of the Maghreb, or AQUIM, acquired weapons from Libya this year, kidnapped Westerners and continues its support to Nigeria-based Boko Haram. While we have made important gains Al Qaida and its affiliates, we remain in a race against their ability to evolve, regenerate leadership and launch attacks. Self-radicalization or lone wolf individuals including within the United States and even within our own ranks remain an enduring concern. I would like to close by noting how honored am I to represent the men and women of the Defense Intelligence Agency. We remain acutely aware that while much of what we do is secret, our work is always a public trust. On their behalf, I would like to thank the members of this committee for your continued support and confidence in our work. Thank you. LEVIN: Thank you very much, General Burgess. Let's try seven minutes for a first round. I hope that there will be time for a second round. Director Clapper's prepared statement said the following in terms of the intelligence community's assessment about Iran's nuclear program, quote, "We assess Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons should it choose to do so. We do not know, however, if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons." And his statement also said that, "We judge Iran's nuclear decision making as guided a cost-benefit approach, which offers the international community opportunities to influence Tehran." General Burgess, do you agree with that statement of Director Clapper in his prepared statement? BURGESS: Yes, sir. And I, sir, I think it would be very consistent with what the vice chairman of the joint chiefs and myself along with a couple of other witnesses stated before this committee almost a year and a half ago. LEVIN: And, Director Clapper, I understand then that what you have said and that now General Burgess agrees with, is that they have -- that Iran has not yet decided to develop nuclear weapons. Is that correct? Is that still your assessment? CLAPPER: That is the -- sir, that is the intelligence community's assessment that that is an option that is still held out by the Iranians. And we believe that the decision would be made by the Supreme Leader himself and he would base that on a cost-benefit analysis in terms of I don't think he'd want a nuclear weapon at any price. So that I think plays to the value of sanctions particularly the recent ratcheting up of more sanctions and -- and anticipation that that will induce a change in their -- their policy and behavior. LEVIN: And -- and it's the intelligence community's assessment that sanctions and other international pressure could, not will necessarily, but could influence Iran and its decision as to whether to proceed? CLAPPER: Absolutely, sir. And of course the -- the impacts that the sanctions have -- are already having on the Iranian economy, the devaluation of their currency, the difficulty that they're having in engaging in banking transactions, which will of course increase with the recent provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act. And so to the extent that the Iranian population becomes restive and if the regime then feels threatened in terms of its stability and -- and tenure, you know, the thought is that that could change -- change their policy. I think it's interesting that they have apparently asked the E.U. for resumption of the Five Plus One dialogue. And of course there's another meeting coming up with another engagement with the International Atomic Energy Administration. So we'll see whether that's, you know, the Iranians may be changing their mind. LEVIN: Well, I must tell you I'm skeptical about putting any significance in that. But nonetheless, it's not my testimony that we're here to hear. It's your testimony and it's obviously important testimony. Director Clapper, in a recent interview Defense Secretary Panetta said that if Iran decides to pursue a nuclear weapon capability, quote, "It would probably take them about a year to be able to produce a bomb and then possibly another one or two years in order to put it on a deliverable vehicle of some sort in order to deliver that weapon." Do you disagree with the Defense Secretary Panetta's assessment? CLAPPER: No, sir. I don't disagree. And particularly with respect to the year, that's, I think, technically feasible but practically not likely. There are all kinds of combinations and permutations that could affect how long it might take the Iranians to make a decision to pursue a nuclear weapon. How long that might take I think the details of that are best -- it's rather complex and arcane and -- and sensitive because of how we know this are best left to a closed session discussion. LEVIN: But when you say it's -- that the year is perhaps right but it's more likely that it would take longer, was that the implication of your... CLAPPER: Yes, sir. LEVIN: OK. Now, a Washington Post columnist recently wrote that a senior administration official believes that an Israeli strike against Iran was likely this spring. General Burgess, in the view of the intelligence community has Israel decided to attack Iran? BURGESS: Sir, to the best of our knowledge Israel has -- has not decided to attack Iran. LEVIN: I was concerned, as I indicated in my opening statement, Director Clapper, by recent news reports that the latest National Intelligence Estimate reflects a difference of views between the intelligence community and our military commanders over the security situation in Afghanistan. And I made reference to who signed up to that -- that difference of views, including General Allen, Ambassador Crocker -- not including, these are the ones who signed the difference, General Allen, Ambassador Crocker, General Mattis and Admiral Stavridis. Can you tell us whether those news reports are accurate that there is a difference of views on that matter? CLAPPER: Without going into the specifics of classified national intelligence estimates, I -- I can certainly confirm that they took issue with -- with the NIE on -- on three counts having to do with the assumptions that were made about the force structure, didn't feel that we gave sufficient weight to Pakistan as -- and its impact as a safe haven and generally felt that the NIE was pessimistic. I have to say... LEVIN: About that or about -- about other matters as well? CLAPPER: Just generally it was pessimistic. LEVIN: About the situation in... CLAPPER: In Afghanistan. LEVIN: And it's... CLAPPER: And the prospects for post-2014. And that -- that by the way was the timeframe. It was -- it was after -- after 2014. If you'll forgive a little history, sir, I served as an analyst briefer for General Westmoreland in Vietnam in 1966. I kinda lost my professional innocence a little bit then when I found out that operational commanders sometimes don't agree with their view of the success of their campaign as -- and as compared to and contrasted with that perspective displayed by intelligence. Fast forward about 25 years or so and I served as the chief of Air Force intelligence during Desert Storm. General Schwarzkopf protested long and loud all during the war and after the war about the accuracy of the intelligence in fact that didn't comport with his view. Classically, intelligence is supposedly in the portion of the glass that's half empty and operational commanders and policy-makers for that matter are often in the portion of the glass that's half full. Probably the truth is somewhere in the -- at the water line. So I don't find it a bad thing, in fact I think it's healthy that there is a contrast between what the operational commanders believe and what the intelligence community assesses. LEVIN: Thank you very much. Senator McCain? MCCAIN: I want to follow up on the chairman's question. So you believe that post-2014 Afghanistan faces extremely difficult challenges? CLAPPER: Yes, sir, I do. I think in terms of governance and the ability of the ANSF, which we're, you know, striving hard to train -- train up. There are some indications that that's having success. But I think the -- the -- the Afghan government will -- will continue to require assistance from the West. And of course another issue is the extent to which we and other coalition members will be able to sustain that support. Importantly as well is the achievement of a strategic partnership agreement with the Afghan government, which would premise, be a preface for our continued presence in some form to -- to advise and assist and perhaps to conduct -- assist with, particularly with counterterrorism. MCCAIN: And there has been no change in the ISI relationship with the Haqqani Network who are killing Americans in Afghanistan? CLAPPER: Yes, sir. You know, with -- with respect to the Pakistani government and ISI as kind of a micro chasm of the larger government, their existential threat is India. And they view everything -- and they focus on -- on that as... (CROSSTALK) MCCAIN: I understand that. (CROSSTALK) CLAPPER: Their concern is, of course, sustaining influence and presence in Afghanistan and they -- they will probably continue to do that through proxy militias. MCCAIN: So our relationship with Pakistan must be based on the realistic assessment that ISI's relationship with the Haqqani Network and other organizations will probably not change? CLAPPER: Yes, sir. I mean there are cases where our interests converge. I -- you know, government to government and that relationship and that factoid is reflected in the relationship with ISI. MCCAIN: Secretary Panetta publicly stated that Israel will decide in April, May or June whether to attack Iran's nuclear facilities or not. Do you agree with that? CLAPPER: Well I think he was -- that was quoted by a columnist. I -- I think General Burgess answered that question. We -- we don't believe at this point that they've made a decision to do that. Would could have given rise to this, is simply the fact that the weather becomes better obviously in the -- in the spring and that could be conducive to an attack. But, to reemphasize what General Burgess said, we do not believe they've made a -- such a decision. MCCAIN: We're seeing a very intriguing kind of situation evolve here. There have been, what is believed to be, Iranian attacks or attempts to attack worldwide. In the United States in the case of the Saudi ambassador, Georgia, India, the explosions there. Now today we read about Thailand. Does this tell us a number of things including the extent of the Iranian worldwide terrorist network? And does this also tell us that there is a covert conflict or war going on between Israel and Iran? CLAPPER: Well, I think Iran is -- well there are two dimensions to this. I think on the one count, they feel somewhat under siege and on the other hand they are sort of feeling their oats. Through the Iranian lens, they probably view Arab Spring as a good thing and opportunity -- opportunities for them to exploit, which thus far have not worked to their favor. So, they, through their proxy's, the IRGC particularly, decided -- made a conscious judgment to reach out against primarily Israeli and secondarily against U.S. interests. MCCAIN: And that... (CROSSTALK) CLAPPER: ... pointed out... (CROSSTALK) MCCAIN: ... displaying -- they're displaying some capabilities. CLAPPER: Well, yes, sir to a certain extent. They, even though the attacks that you reference were not successful. In one case they blew one of their own up, but they regard those as successful because of the psychological impacts they -- they have on each -- in each one of the countries. MCCAIN: Quickly, is -- in the situation in Mexico, do you believe that -- as you know 50,000 Mexicans have lost their lives as a result of drug related violence. Is your assessment that these violent criminal organizations pose a threat to the United States, including states along the border? CLAPPER: Yes, sir they do. There -- there is always the prospect of spillover and that's one reason why we were working closely with the Mexican government and that's particularly true with respect to intelligence initiatives that we're working with them, which I can -- happy to discuss in closed session. But there is a profound threat to both countries. MCCAIN: Have you seen any indication that the top candidates vying to succeed President Calderon will alter the way the Mexican government addresses the threat of the cartels? CLAPPER: I believe, sir that -- I can't do a one by one assessment, but I believe that the -- no matter who succeeds President Calderon, they -- they will be committed to continue this -- this campaign. MCCAIN: Well, I suggest you look a little more carefully because I think that may not be the case, at least with one of the candidates. If the status quo remains in Syria with increasing Iranian, Russian arms and equipment, Iranian presence and assistance to Assad, what -- what's the outlook as far as the situation in Syria is concerned? And what in your view do we and the Arab League and other like minded countries need to do to alter that equation, if it is an apparent stalemate with the massacre continuing? CLAPPER: Well in -- there are four, as we call them, or characterize them, four pillars of -- of the Assad regime. The continued effectiveness of military and support, his own military which is quite large. There have been desertions but for the most part. And they've engaged about 80 percent of their maneuver units in assaults on the civilian population. The economy is another pillar that has really taken some hits. The price of gas has doubled since September. The price of food has gone sky high. They have periodic electrical interruptions. So that is -- the economy is -- is going south. The state of the opposition, which is quite fragmented. It's very localized. The -- the Syrian National Council really doesn't only control command and control -- these opposition's groups. The Free Syrian Army is a separate organization, not connected to the Syrian National Council. And of course, the other is the cohesion of the elites. And while we've seen signs of some of the seniors in the Assad regime making contingency plans to evacuate, move families, move financial resources, to this point they've held together. Assad himself probably because of his psychological need to emulate his father, sees no other option, but to continue to try to crush the opposition. MCCAIN: I guess my question, sir was, unless something changes as far as assistance from the outside, do you see a continued stalemate in Syria? CLAPPER: I do, sir. I think it will just continue. We don't see any -- short of a -- of a coup or something like that, Assad will hang in there and continue to do as he's done. MCCAIN: And the massacre continues? CLAPPER: Yup. MCCAIN: I thank you Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses. It's been very helpful. LEVIN: Thank you Senator McCain. Senator Lieberman? LIEBERMAN: Thanks Mr. Chairman. Director Clapper, General Burgess, thanks for your really extraordinary leadership of the intelligence community all you do to protect our security. Director Clapper, I want to just go back to Iran for a couple of minutes quickly. You said this morning that it's your assessment, or the I.C.'s assessment that Iran has not made a decision to build a nuclear weapon. But -- but I assume you also believe, based on International Atomic Energy Agency reports and information that the intelligence community has, that Iran has taken steps to put them in a position to make a decision to break out and build a nuclear weapon? CLAPPER: Yes, sir. That's a good characterization. LIEBERMAN: OK. I... (CROSSTALK) CLAPPER: There also are certain things they have not yet done... LIEBERMAN: Right. CLAPPER: ... which I'd be happy to discuss in closed session, that would be key indicators that they have made such a decision. LIEBERMAN: Yeah. And that -- but they have done things, is it fair to say, that are inconsistent with just wanting to have peaceful nuclear energy capacity? CLAPPER: Well, the -- obviously the -- the issue here is the extent to which they produce a highly enriched uranium. LIEBERMAN: Right. CLAPPER: And, you know, they've -- had produced small amounts of highly -- of 20 percent highly enriched uranium which ostensibly could be used for legitimate, peaceful purposes. So if they go beyond that, obviously, that would be, you know, not a -- a -- a negative indicator, I'll put it that way. LIEBERMAN: Right. General Burgess, you want to add to that? BURGESS: Well, sir I would just -- I would agree with what Director Clapper said, sir. I would agree with your characterization because of the movement from the 3.5 to the 20 percent uranium. That is already a leap. It is not that much of a bigger leap to the bigger, 90 percent that they would need to go to. LIEBERMAN: Right. Thank you. And do you both agree that, or is it your assessment that if Iran makes a decision to build a nuclear weapons capability and in fact achieves it, that it is likely to set off a -- a nuclear arms race within the region. In other words, that other countries, Saudi Arabia for instance, will want to also have nuclear weapons capacity? CLAPPER: Well it's certainly a possibility, sir. Absolutely. LIEBERMAN: And is it also fair to say, and we've talked about the Iranian sponsorship of terrorism that if they did have nuclear weapons capability, it might well embolden them in their use of terrorism against regional opponents and even the United States? CLAPPER: Yes, sir. It would serve as -- as a deterrent. Even I think to a certain extent the ambiguity exists now, serves as a deterrent and does serve to help embolden them. LIEBERMAN: OK, thanks. I -- let me go over to cybersecurity. I thank you very much Director Clapper for your statement of support for the legislation that Senators Collins and Rockefeller and Feinstein and I introduced. The -- the main intention of the legislation -- it does a lot of things, but -- is to create a system where the federal government through the Department of Homeland Security, advised and supported, if you will by the NSA, can work with the private sector to make sure that the private sector is defending itself and our country against cyber attack. I mean to me -- we've spent a lot of time on this. Right now because of the remarkable capacities of cyber attackers and -- and the extent to which they can attack privately owned and operated cyber- infrastructure for either economic gains or -- or -- or to literally attack our country, that we -- we need to ask the private sector to make investments to defend themselves and us that I'm afraid a lot of them are not yet making. Is -- is that your general impression? In other words, bottom line do we have a vulnerability at this moment? Does -- does the privately owned and operated cyber-infrastructure of America have a vulnerability to both economic thievery and perhaps and -- and strategic attack? CLAPPER: Well, sir, and -- and you, both the chairman and the ranking member cited the National Counterintelligence Executive Report that we issued in -- in October, which called out both China and Russia as our primary concerns with -- and particularly with respect to the Chinese and their theft of intellectual property, of course, which occurs, much of occurs in the private sector. I know the -- the bill is quite lengthy, some 270 pages. I have not read it all. The important thing for me was the precepts that it addresses, which is, you know, delineates roles of the various components of the government and include the Department of Homeland Security, which I believe has an important role to play here. It defines a -- what I feel is a good balance of -- and a relationship with the private sector and how intrusive the government is going to be, which is a -- certainly an issue and most importantly protects civil liberties and -- and privacy. I'm sure there are other provisions in the bill that other -- some might take issue with but the precepts, I think, are important in terms of the balance between protection and freedom. LIEBERMAN: OK. I -- I -- I appreciate very much what -- what you've just said. Part of the problem here as we go forward I think is that so much of the vulnerability we have and even the attacks that are occurring, or the exploitation occurring, are largely invisible to the public. So am -- am I right in this regard that there's -- there -- there is as well and -- and the report you just cited said it. There -- there is extensive ongoing theft of intellectual property of American businesses, which in fact enables competition from abroad that actually costs us jobs here at home and -- and diminishes our economic prosperity at home. CLAPPER: Absolutely, sir. It -- it -- one of the downsides of this, profound downsides for the United States of course is particularly when people are robbing our tech -- robbing us of our technology, which of course saves them the investment in R&D. And so that's... LIEBERMAN: Right. CLAPPER: ... almost a double whammy, if you will. And I -- I think there is a -- a difficulty for some in something you can't see, feel or touch... LIEBERMAN: Right. CLAPPER: ... since it is a passive theft and you don't directly see immediately the negative impacts of that. Unlike an attack, which obviously is by its nature active, in which you -- you would feel the effect of a seizure of the banking system or the stopping of our electrical grid or some other egregious effect like that. LIEBERMAN: And -- and would you agree finally that -- that, with General Burgess, that right now we're not -- our privately owned and operated cyber-infrastructure, electric grid, banking system, transportation, even water supply and dams are not adequately defended against such an attack? CLAPPER: That's probably true and it's, you know, it's -- it's uneven. Some -- some parts of the infrastructure are -- are reasonably well protected. LIEBERMAN: I agree. CLAPPER: But it's not -- it's not complete. And of course, you're kind of in the, you know, the weakest link proposition here is the vulnerability. LIEBERMAN: General Burgess, do you want to add something? BURGESS: Sir, I was just going to say and I'm, like Director Clapper, I have not read the whole thing but from my days when I was in the Director of National Intelligence and took on the issue with Mike McConnell of cyber-security, I think what you have put on the table, sir, is -- is a great first step. And as an American citizen, thank you to the Senate for doing that. It -- it is a good first step. It is progress. Change is generally evolutionary... LIEBERMAN: Right. BURGESS: ... as opposed to revolutionary. And I would say this is evolutionary, in my humble opinion. If I had one thing that I would poke a little on as -- as I think I understand, there's not a requirement to share some information, is encouraged. I always tell people when I speak publicly we're a nation separated by a common language. We all define words a little differently. So in terms of economic attack (inaudible) some entities may not want folks to know about what has been taken. And they're not required to divulge that. So, sir, just a comment from -- from the peanut gallery. LIEBERMAN: I take that seriously. It's a good comment. It's a -- it's a thoughtful poke and thank you for your -- your words. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. LEVIN: Thank you, Senator Lieberman. Senator Inhofe? INHOFE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I -- I -- I really think this is one of the better hearings that we've had and the straightforward responses and I -- I appreciate that very much. I -- and your comment about language, I'm gonna get that for the record and use that later on. LEVIN: I just wrote it down. INHOFE: Oh, you did? LEVIN: Yeah. INHOFE: That was a good one, in general. I -- I think we've pretty much decided on this 20 percent, getting back to Iran now, that it certainly has either achieved or is being achieved as we talk. And, General Burgess, you said we have the scientific, technical and industrial capabilities of producing a weapon but we didn't really talk about when. When is the big issue. I -- I -- I remember what -- what Secretary Panetta said just the other day about -- we've repeated that several times, several of the questioners have, and I think that's consistent. That's consistent. Back in the debate where we had a difference of opinion as to whether or not we should continue with the ground-based interceptor in Poland, at that time the unclassified date was actually 2015. So this is -- this is pretty consistent. One thing I don't understand and I -- I think are a lot of people who don't and I -- I'd like to get the clarification. We -- we do know in terms of the percentage necessary for the production of power. We're talking about from 3.5 to 5 percent enrichment. Is that pretty well something that's been used? CLAPPER: I think so, sir. I'd have to clarify for... INHOFE: Well, the... CLAPPER: ... power generation. I don't know what the percentage is but I think that's right. INHOFE: All right. But 20 -- it's something less than the 20 percent that apparently is where they are right now? CLAPPER: That -- yes, sir, I would guess. INHOFE: This morning in the -- today's Early Bird, they talked about Iran has invoked the medical reactor to justify its enrichment of uranium to 20 percent, the higher level of refinement that nuclear power systems require. The higher enriched material also enables Iran to potentially move more quickly. So it talks about something that I have heard and I assume that's correct that the difficulty is getting up to the 20 percentage. The time between reaching that level and reaching the 90 percent that we have been concerned about goes much rapidly, more rapidly than it would be to get up to 20 percent. Is this -- is -- is this accurate? CLAPPER: That's generally true, sir. But there are a number of factors that would affect the pace and volume, which would frankly be best left to a closed discussion. Be happy to do that with you. INHOFE: Yeah. Sure. Well, that -- and that's good but I have heard this. These are things that we assume, we've talked about and -- and my concern has been when we, you know, can -- do end up getting to that point. The -- it's been reported by the president that he's weighing the options of cutting down our -- our nuclear arsenal unilaterally by up to 80 percent. And that's something that I'm very much concerned about. And there are a lot of us who actually back during the new -- when the treaty, the new START Treaty was debated were concerned about these things and I -- and I still am. It's my understanding and I remember and I'm gonna read a quote by the president. When the president was trying to get the additional Senators on board to -- to pass the treaty he made some commitments. He said, "I recognize that nuclear modernization requires investment in the long term. It's my commitment to the Congress that my administration will pursue these programs and capabilities for as long as I am president." And yet the fiscal year '13 budget is decreasing that amount by -- by $347 million and actually delaying the system of modernization. I have a quote that I've used recently by -- by Gates that talks about -- I can't find it right here. But it talks about the fact that we have some 30 other countries that depend on our nuclear umbrella here. And I -- do you have, either one of you have any comments to make about this, which is not a proposal yet but it is a discussion of reduction of -- by -- of some 80 percent? CLAPPER: Well, sir, that's -- that's news to me. And I -- that's, you know, whether or to what extent we may reduce or not our nuclear arsenal is certainly not an intelligence goal. But I can assure you that the intelligence community will be a participant in such deliberations and would certainly convey, you know, the threat dimensions of this particularly with respect to our primary nuclear -- the nations of primary nuclear concern, which of course are Russia and -- and -- and China. INHOFE: Well, the -- yeah, you -- you said it's news to you but this was released yesterday. And maybe you were preparing for this hearing and didn't get that. The -- let me just mention something about North Korea. Many years -- I've always... CLAPPER: What I meant was news to me, sir, was reducing that to that extent. INHOFE: OK. Well, that was in the release yesterday. The -- in the area of North Korea I've always been concerned about the accuracy of our -- our intelligence there. And I -- I've told the story of going back to 1998 when we made -- I made the request as to when North Korea would have the capability. And it -- at that time, this was a multistage rocket. At that time they talked about three to five years. And it was seven days later in 1998, August 31st, that they actually fired one. I'd just like to know how -- how confident you, the two of you are, on the quality of the intelligence we have on North Korea. CLAPPER: Sir, I've followed North Korea for a long time. I served as the director of intelligence to U.S. forces Korea in the '80s. And I will tell you that North Korea is one of the toughest intelligence targets we have and has long been. A very, very secretive society, very controlled society. So I -- and there is ambiguity about our insight into North Korea nuclear capabilities and their intentions. And there is -- there are some promising developments, which I'd be happy to discuss with you in closed session with respect to enhancing the quality of our intelligence insights. INHOFE: I appreciate that very much. Thank you Mr. Chairman. LEVIN: Thank you very much Senator Inhofe. The -- Senator Webb is next. WEBB: Thank you Mr. Chairman and -- Mr. Chairman and Senator Inhofe both actually, the writer in me has to say this, before you used that quote from General Burgess, I believe the first person who made that statement was Winston Churchill when he said that the United States and Britain were two countries separated by a common language. So, you know, I didn't want to out you General Burgess, but somebody was going to do it sooner or later. (CROSSTALK) BURGESS: Well I appreciate that. WEBB: And it -- it actually goes to one of the points that I need to make this morning and -- and
	www.dia.mil/public-affairs/testimonies/2012-02-16b.html

¡Ø ÄÚ¸®¾Æ¿¬±¸¿øÀº ±âȹÀçÁ¤ºÎ¿¡¼­ °øÀͼº±âºÎ±Ý´ë»ó´Üü(2006-176È£)·Î ¼±Á¤µÇ¾úÀ¸¹Ç·Î        ¿¬¸»Á¤»ê ¶§ ¼Òµæ°øÁ¦¸¦ ¹ÞÀ¸½Ç ¼ö ÀÖ½À´Ï´Ù.