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NEW DIRECTIONS

FOR **KOREA'S FOREIGN POLICY**

AND **THE EAST ASIAN COMMUNITY**

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&

Korea National Strategy Institute

PROGRAM

9:00 - 9:15	Registration	
9:15 - 9:30	Opening Remarks	Director, Asiatic Research Center
9:30 - 12:00	Session I: Korea's New Foreign Policy	Chair: Wonhyuk Lim
10:50 - 11:00	Coffee Break	
12:00 - 13:30	Lunch	
13:30 - 16:00	Session II: The East Asian Community	Chair: Sunhyuk Kim
14:50 - 15:00	Coffee Break	
16:00 - 17:45	Roundtable: Korea's New Foreign Policy and the East Asian Community	Chair: Chung-In Moon
17:45 - 18:00	Closing Remarks	President, Korea National Strategy Institute
18:00 - 21:00	Dinner	

C O N T E N T S

Session I: Korea's New Foreign Policy

"Recasting Policy: Reflections"

Sunhyuk KIM, Korea University, Korea

Discussant: Joon-Hyung KIM, Handong University, Korea

"Beyond Alliance and toward a Community: To Embed Bilateral Relationships in a Pacific Asia"

Jae-Jung SUH, Cornell University, USA

Discussant: Heajeong LEE, Chung-Ang University, Korea

"Structural Change of South Korea-Japan Relation: Its Limits and Potentialities"

Tadashi KIMIYA, University of Tokyo, Japan

Discussant: Keeseok KIM, Kangwon National University, Korea

"Korean-Japanese Relations and the East Asian Community"

Jong Won LEE, Rikkyo University, Japan

Discussant: Yong Wook LEE, Brown University, USA

Session II: The East Asian Community

"Korea Peninsular and China: A Chinese Perspective"

WANG Yizhou, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, China

Discussant: Jae Ho CHUNG, Seoul National University, Korea

"Ideational Base for the East Asian Community"

Jang-Jip CHOI, Korea University, Korea

Discussant: Chung-In MOON, Yonsei University, Korea

"Grave Threats and Grand Bargains: The United States and Regional Order in East Asia"

John FEFFER, USA

Discussant: Myongsob KIM, Yonsei University, Korea

"New Inter-Korean Relations and the East Asian Community"

Wonhyuk LIM, Korea Development Institute, Korea

Discussant: Jinwoo CHOI, Hanyang University, Korea

Presentation

(In Order of Presentation)

SUNHYUK KIM

Recasting Korea's Foreign Policy: Theoretical Reflections

Abstract

The main purpose of this paper is to examine the theoretical foundations on which South Korean "mainstream" International Relations(IR)/International Politics(IP) experts base their observations, point out their limitations, and explore alternative theoretical frameworks for South Korea's foreign policy. The thematic argument of this paper is threefold: 1) the "mainstream" IR/IP epistemic community in South Korea, contrary to its self-identification, has little to do with American neorealism; 2) even the original and orthodox neorealism in the US IR community is not very useful for theoretically undergirding South Korea's new foreign policy; and 3) a new theoretical paradigm, the "inside-out" approach, must be created and developed using social constructivism and other domestic politics-centered approaches to foreign policy. South Korea's national identity has undergone such a profound change over the past few decades that its national strategy and foreign policy should also change to agree with the modified national identity. In particular, democratization, which has been one of the most important political changes in South Korea, requires a similarly significant transformation of foreign policy.

요약

한국 외교정책에 대한 재고: 이론적 고찰

이 논문의 주목적은 한국의 "주류" 국제관계/국제정치 전문가들이 그들 주장의 근거로 삼는 이론의 토대를 살피고 한계를 지적하며, 한국 외교 정책의 대안이 될 수 있는 이론적 체계를 찾아보는 것이다. 이 논문의 주 논점은 세 가지다. 첫째, 한국의 "주류" 국제관계/국제정치 지식 사회는 스스로에 대한 규정과는 달리 미국의 신현실주의와 별 관계가 없다. 둘째, 미국 국제관계 분야의 정통 신현실주의도 한국의 새로운 외교정책을 이론적으로 단단히 무장시키는 데에는 별로 유용하지 않다. 셋째, 사회구성주의와 외교정책에 대한 다른 국내 정치 중심 접근법을 이용하여 새로운 이론적 패러다임으로 내부로부터의 접근법("inside-out" approach)이 만들어지고 발전되어야 한다. 지난 수십 년 간 한국의 국가정체성은 심대한 변화를 겪어왔고 따라서 국가전략과 외교정책도 새로운 국가정체성과 일치할 수 있도록 바뀌어야 한다. 특히, 한국에서 가장 중요한 정치적 변화의 하나였던 민주화는 마찬가지로 외교정책의 중대한 변화를 요구한다.

Full Text

I. South Korea's Foreign Policy, Chronically Unsupported

If anything, the current Roh Moo Hyun government of South Korea will likely be remembered for the changes it has brought about in foreign policy and international relations. The South Korean government has been unprecedentedly independent of and self-assertive toward the US. It has been playing an

increasingly active role in resolving North Korea's nuclear issue, which eventually resulted in the recent breakthrough in inter-Korean relations and the resumption of the 6-party talk. South Korea is no longer an idle bystander in the North Korea-US nuclear impasse. This is not a negligible achievement.

Curiously enough, however, the Roh government's foreign policy has not enjoyed wide domestic support, particularly from intellectuals. South Korean specialists in International Relations (IR) and International Politics (IP) have been extremely critical of Roh's foreign policy ("Peace and Prosperity Policy"), expressing at times profound distrust and disdain. The "mainstream" IR/IP experts, who work in major universities and research institutions (both state-funded and private), had previously expressed deep skepticism about the engagement policy toward North Korea under the previous Kim Dae Jung government ("Sunshine Policy"). At the time, their criticism was not limited to the instrumental dimension of the policy, i.e., whether to use "carrots" or "sticks." Rather, the skepticism was ever-sprawling, ultimately questioning the necessity, desirability, utility, and efficacy of the engagement policy. The debate in the end escalated to an ideological battle, on the "pro-North" nature of the policy and whether the "impetuous" aids to North Korea was justified.

Yet, criticisms of Kim Dae Jung's foreign policy were largely kept within Korea, because the engagement policy of the Clinton administration was hospitable to the "Sunshine Policy." The external environment is no longer so favorable. The fault-finding with Roh's foreign policy, in synergy with the unilateralist foreign policy stance of neoconservatives in Washington DC, have gained far greater influence in South Korea. The dominant discourse in the community of "mainstream" IR/IP experts has defined the correlation between inter-Korean relations and ROK-US alliance as a zero-sum relationship, with South Korea having to choose either of the two. According to this simplistic and binary scheme, the fault line lies between, on one side, an "amateurish" and thus "unreliable" government that allegedly pursues a more "independent" line of foreign policy and, on the other side, a community of "seasoned" "veteran" IR experts who know much more about alliance and international power politics. Most of the time, the latter naturally appears more credible, reliable, and convincing.

Moreover, due to the ongoing power-shift from older to younger generation and from conservative to progressive ideological camp, conservative media, politicians, and intellectuals feel increasingly uneasy and uncomfortable. They have repeatedly pointed out the unrealism, futility, and danger of preferring inter-Korean relations over the ROK-US alliance, accentuating the political, social, and economic damages, costs, and tragedies we have to face when the ROK-US alliance is damaged. As a result, the crucial changes in foreign and security policy are taking place without domestic intellectual support and, relatedly, without any serious scholarly attempt to offer alternative theoretical justifications for the new foreign policy. Left as is, the crucial changes in South Korea's foreign policy will remain unsustainable and reversible. It is pivotal to develop theoretical frameworks for South Korea's new foreign policy.

The main purpose of this paper is to examine the theoretical foundations on which the "mainstream" IR/IP specialists base their observations, point out their limitations, and explore alternative frameworks for South Korea's new foreign policy. The thematic argument of this paper is threefold: 1) the "mainstream" IR epistemic community in Korea, contrary to its self-identification, is distant from American neorealism; 2) even the original and orthodox neorealism is not very useful for explaining and rationalizing South Korea's new foreign policy; and 3) the alternative theoretical paradigm must be found

in social constructivism and domestic politics-oriented paradigms. I argue that the national identity of South Korea has undergone a profound change through economic development and political democratization over the past few decades, and the foreign policy and national strategy of South Korea should accordingly change to suit the changed national identity. In other words, democratization, which has been one of the most important changes in domestic politics of South Korea, also requires a parallel change in foreign policy.

The paper specifically proceeds as follows. In Section II, I summarize the central argument often put forth by many "mainstream" IR experts in South Korea about South Korea's foreign policy. Then, I show that their arguments, contrary to their claims, are far from neorealism they want to use as their main theoretical basis. The main purpose of this exercise is to demonstrate that the argument for the so-called "pro-(ROK-US) alliance" camp is theoretically unfounded. In other words, South Korean version of "neorealism" is not very neorealistic. Even worse, provided that it is indeed neorealistic, it is not likely to provide an adequate basis for theorizing and justifying South Korea's new foreign policy. In Section III, I first examine the "reality" in which neorealism is being challenged and pillorized in its hometown, i.e., the US. Then I show why neorealism is inappropriate and inadequate for providing theoretical support for South Korea's new foreign policy and instead explore alternative paradigms such as neoliberalism, new institutionalism, and constructivism. I reflect on implications of all these theoretical paradigms for South Korea's new foreign policy. In Section IV, I conclude the paper by pointing out why it is necessary and desirable to explore and develop a new foreign policy for South Korea.

II. The South Korean Version of "Neorealism" and Its Limits

One of the favorite terms widely used in the current discourse of the "mainstream" IR specialists in South Korea is indisputably "the reality." "The reality" is frequently used to defend and justify their views. Imagine for example a debate between an NGO activist who supports a more independent foreign policy stance of the South Korean government and a major university professor specialized in IR. In response to the NGO activist's observation that the absolutization of the ROK-US alliance is not inevitable and we need to make a breakthrough in inter-Korean relations to "pull" ROK-US relations, the hypothetical professor would respond with all seriousness: "As a realist, I must say that the situation is not so simple." As soon as the debate becomes something about the "reality," it is considered to be between a naïve, unrealistic dreamer and a mature, professional "realist."

Then, what is really the nature of "the reality" so many South Korean IR experts are constantly and habitually emphasizing? What is the theoretical framework that can account for such reality and can also offer normative policy prescriptions? As well, what is the relationship between "the reality" they emphasize and the "neorealism" that had been dominant in the IR literature in the postwar American academia? To answer these questions, it is imperative to summarize the main tenets of the argument by the mainstream South Korean IR specialists.

First of all, the greatest consensus the "mainstream" IR specialists in South Korea have attained is the unipolar nature of the post-Cold War international political system. The Cold War bipolar structure with the two global superpowers (i.e., US & USSR) is now a history, and the post-Cold War system is characterized by a unipolar system dominated by the only global superpower, i.e., US. What is interesting is the way many "mainstream" IR experts in South Korea interpret the end of the Cold War and post-Cold

War developments. The end of the Cold War is basically synonymous with the triumph of the market economy and liberal democracy over the plan economy and communist "dictatorship." As a result, the end of the Cold War is the beginning of a unilinear and unstoppable procession of the American-style market economy and liberal democracy, without any alternatives. In this respect, what the "mainstream" South Korean IR experts accept and internalize in themselves is not very different from the triumphalism the American neoconservative intellectuals prematurely entertained in the name of the "end of history" (Fukuyama 1992).

Second, because the essential nature of the post-Cold War international political system is unipolarity characterized by America's absolute superiority as the sole global hegemon, the fates of individual countries in the world are determined more or less by their relationship with the US. Efforts to cooperate with the US (both militarily and politically) and adapt to the US-dominated international order become critically important. Economic and trade policies are no exception. Many "mainstream" South Korean IR experts uncritically accept US-led neoliberalism and "globalization." Survival of a country depends on how the country effectively and proactively adapts and adjusts to the "globalization" process led by the US. All in all, foreign policies of individual countries should not be drastically different from one another, in that they all try to maximize their capacity to adapt to the US-dominated world order.

Third, for a country such as South Korea, which has traditionally and historically had a very close relationship with the US in political, military, and economic terms, the impact of the relationship with the US on the future fate of the country is even greater. Even in the past bipolar system, the influence of the US was great, but now in the unipolar era, the influence of the US is literally massive. Fortunately, South Korea has so far maintained a strong alliance relationship with the US and successfully imported and developed an effective market economy and liberal democracy, which is a rarity in East Asia. Consequently, in principle, there must not be much conflict between South Korea and the US in terms of national interests. Rather, there must be a high degree of compatibility between US interests and South Korean interests. By contrast, it is very dubious whether the interests of, say, China or Russia are compatible with those of South Korea, because China and Russia are not yet full market economies and liberal democracies, which all makes them unreliable and untrustworthy diplomatic partners.

Fourth, the September 11 terror incident in 2001 had the US undergo drastic and dramatic epistemological and policy changes. The concept of "homeland security" has fundamentally changed in front of the unprecedented attacks on the American mainland, and Americans are now willing to pay anything to prevent similar terror attacks and ensure the security of their own people. They are uncompromising on the issue of terror and firmly adhere to a Manichean Weltanschauung, clearly distinguishing friends and foes. As a strong ally, South Korea must be cognizant of and sensitive to these fundamental changes and be sympathetic and cooperative to stay in the category of "friends."

Fifth, as far as North Korea is concerned too, the top priority is to "read" and figure out what the US thinks about North Korea and what kind of strategy it is pursuing. Most of all, the Bush administration has profound hatred and visceral abhorrence toward the Kim Jong Il regime over a range of issues such as human rights, poverty, tyranny, and nuclear development and proliferation. As well, a sizable number of neoconservative policy makers in the Bush administration believe that the collapse of North Korea, i.e., regime change, is likely and desirable. Now, in the post-September 11 world in which

the Bush administration included North Korea on the roster of "outposts of tyranny," it is very unlikely that the US would go through a bilateral negotiation as it did during the Clinton administration. Rather, South Korean "mainstream" IR experts observe, the US would become more fundamentalist and rigid in its stance on North Korea, reflecting the hardened domestic sentiments.

If we put together all the pieces of the argument made by the "mainstream" IR specialists in South Korea, a number of unmistakable and clear policy prescriptions emerge. The first priority is to understand/comprehend the US correctly and cooperate with the US as an ally. This is not very different from the pattern during the Cold War period when the South Korean foreign policy was in alignment with that of the US. Therefore, this means that the South Korean government needs to succeed and continue the policy orientation of the Cold War, without any alterations. Rather, because the US has emerged as a stronger "global empire" in the post-Cold War era, it has become even more critical to read the "American mind" and to replicate the US policy lines.

In terms of North Korea policy too, it is important to follow the US policy line, verbatim and unrevised. Commenting on inter-Korean relations, many "mainstream" South Korean IR specialists emphasize at various occasions that the South Korean government must play the role of a messenger, delivering and representing the American position to North Korea in detail and as is, to help North Korea make the "right" decision. In essence, South Korea should warn North Korea of the dire consequences of its misbehavior and persuade it with various rewards it could receive when it gives up the nuclear option. In sum, the main contents of South Korea's foreign policy proposed by the "mainstream" IR experts in South Korea are tantamount to unconditional duplication of the Bush administration's North Korea policy.

By now, "the reality" the "mainstream" South Korean IR experts frequently refer to becomes clearer. "The reality," whose image they indiscriminately disseminate through media, is nothing but the America-led international political system or global order and the pitiful status of South Korea having nothing but the "freedom" to adapt and conform to the strong structural constraints imposed by such an international system. Of course the image of such "reality" assumes an extraordinary level of asymmetry and inequality between the hegemonic state and ordinary states (particularly small and weak states). Whereas the hegemonic nation enjoys the "privilege" of changing its foreign policy paradigm reflecting the domestic changes it experienced (such as the September 11 incident and its aftermath i.e., changes in the public opinion), a small and weak state like Korea cannot even claim such a right. Or to be more precise, South Korea, under the constant casting influence of the US in terms of its political, economic, and social institutions, had better not claim such a right. In sum, the extraordinary power asymmetry between South Korea and US is "the reality," and the main task of South Korea's foreign policy is to develop and nurture the mind-reading capacity of South Korea i.e., the skills to read the American mind.

Now, do the arguments of the "mainstream" South Korean IR specialists, which are allegedly based on "the reality," have anything to do with neorealism in the American IR literature? The origins of neorealism can be traced back to Morgenthau (1948) who rebelled against Wilsonian moralism and idealism and developed an interpretation of world politics based on the concept of power. Waltz (1979) and many others later developed the neorealist framework. Neorealism, which was a dominant theoretical paradigm in the 1970s and 1980s in the American IR field had the following elements as its central dicta.

First, neorealism focuses on nation states as major actors in international politics. Moreover, nation states are assumed to be rational and unitary actors. As a result, nation states are very frequently

personified. For example, "if country A takes action a, country B will take action b, and country C will take action c" is a very common logic of analysis in neorealist research. Such nation state-centered assumptions have a very narrow focus on inter-national and inter-governmental activities and events, thus ignoring other significant activities by various domestic actors such as NGOs, firms, interest groups and supranational and transnational actors such as international organizations, multinational corporations, and transnational NGOs.

Second, according to neorealism, the overarching characteristic of the world order or the international political system is its anarchical nature. Different from the domestic politics in which there exists a sovereign state and an authoritative government that can apply exclusive coercion, there exists no world government in international politics and thus the logic of the survival of the fittest prevails in international politics. This distinction between domestic politics and international politics implies that what applies to domestic politics cannot easily apply to international politics.

Third, in response to the anarchical nature of the international political system or world order, nation states are required to prepare and pursue self-help. Self-help has certain commonalities. Above all, nation states pursue national interest defined first in terms of military prowess and second in terms of economic might. In this respect, foreign policy behaviors of nation states show a high degree of similarity and convergence. Furthermore, the different dimensions of national interest have a lexicographic relationship. In other words, economic interest can be pursued only after the military interest is ensured. The pursuit of different national interests is completely sequential, starting with military interest and then descending to other types of interests. As a result, foreign policies of respective countries do not differ significantly from one another in that they pursue and try to maximize national interests mainly defined in terms of military power.

Fourth, the only element that differentiates countries, which show similarities in terms of their willingness to pursue similar national interests, is their capacity. National capacity is, again, defined and measured by a country's military power. Military power varies from country to country. It is even possible to rank all countries in the world according to the level of their military power. If we combine the third dictum above with the fourth dictum, a "billiard ball model" is derived. According to the billiard ball model, which served as one of the fundamental assumptions in the neorealist IR theory, the international political system is analogous to none other than a billiard ball table, with a lot of billiard balls of different sizes (size = national power) on it. International politics is interactions (mostly conflicts) among the billiard balls, namely nation states.

Fifth, the inseparable obverse of the billiard ball model is the "black box model." According to this model, differences and varieties among individual nation states are unimportant, both theoretically and practically. In other words, what determines and accounts for foreign policies of individual countries is the status of the country, which is in turn determined by its relative power defined in terms of military capacity. That is to say, the foreign policy behavior is almost singly determined by the relative structural position of individual states. As far as most "ordinary" states are concerned, their foreign policy behaviors tend to converge on a simple pattern. The only exception is the hegemonic state. The hegemonic state, with military and economic interests securely achieved, could enjoy a relatively free position from the structural constraints imposed by the international political system and thus could pursue non-material (i.e., ideological) national interests (Krasner 1978). Nevertheless, the reason a

hegemonic state stands out has nothing to do with its domestic structures or features but due to the relative positionality of the hegemonic state in the pecking order of the international political system. In summary, according to the "black box model," whether it is the hegemonic state or an ordinary state, domestic political, economic, social institutional variables can never qualify as variables for explaining foreign policy behaviors.

Now, by comparing the tenets supported and proposed by the "mainstream" IR scholars in South Korea and the dicta of the original neorealism in the US academia, I want to check whether and how precisely the Korean version of "neorealism" retains, preserves, and applies the central contents of the original neorealism.

What is most notable is regarding the interpretations of national interests. According to neorealism, the US, as a hegemonic state in the international political system, exclusively enjoys the freedom (or leisure) to pursue nonmaterial, ideological national interests. This was true during the Cold War period and even truer in the current unipolar era centered around the unchallenged US hegemony. Neoconservatives in the US could design and carry out the foreign policies in a unilateralist way, largely because it is the only hegemonic superpower in the current international political system. In the case of South Korea, which is obviously not a hegemonic country, the pursuance of ideological national interests makes little sense. Rather, it makes much more sense to pursue military, economic, and sociocultural national interests, taking account the security calculus in Northeast Asia and also the global environment. This must be much more neorealist. Nonetheless, the self-styled "neorealists" in South Korea put forward a novel assumption that the national interests of the US and those of South Korea are somehow in total alignment. This is odd, particularly considering that the mainstream "neorealist" IR experts in South Korea themselves notice the immense power difference between South Korea and the US. It is far closer to a religion than a (political) science to believe or wish that South Korea and the US, with all their asymmetrical and unequal positions arising from their power differentials, automatically agree, align, and harmonize with each other.

Second, while the original/orthodox American neorealists, according to the "billiard ball model" and the "black box model," are consistently oblivious to the emergence and transformation of domestic institutions, cleavages and conflicts among domestic political and social forces, changes in the domestic economic and class structures, the South Korean "neorealists" seriously lack such theoretical consistency. The original/orthodox American neorealists maintain their theoretical "purity" by explaining foreign policy behaviors by solely relying on the hierarchical order in the international political system and national power (defined mainly in terms of military might). To them, it does not matter much whether the country in question is big or small. However, the South Korean "neorealists" are much less consistent and much more "flexible." In explaining American foreign policy, they use domestic variables such as the emotional shock and patriotism after September 11 and emphasize that South Korea, as an ally, must understand them. By contrast, they have no comments on how, in the case of South Korea, the dramatic political, economic, social, cultural changes in the past decades can (and must) affect and determine its foreign and security policies. Intriguingly, US is not a "black box," while South Korea still remains a "black box."

What is even more inscrutable is South Korean "neorealists'" view on North Korea. North Korea, which is one of the poorest countries in the world, a rogue state, and an "outpost of tyranny" is

somehow not a "black box." Most of all, North Korea is not considered to be a rational actor. Kim Jong Il is often pejoratively depicted as an irrational, dangerous madman. This directly contravenes the first dictum of neorealism (i.e., rationality of nation states as actors in international politics). As well, they also point out that considering various domestic factors, North Korea is likely to collapse and it is prudent to also consider scenarios for regime change in North Korea. More reasonable analysts mention the impact of North Korea's potential hard-line-soft-line conflicts on North Korea's policy toward the US. But in a fundamental sense, the "neorealists" in South Korea, if they are true neorealists, neednot bother to pay attention to what is happening within North Korea. Because the foreign policy behaviors of North Korea can and should be parsimoniously explained by structural factors dictated by the external, international political system. The greatest problems with the "mainstream" South Korean IR experts consist in that they pretty selectively and flexibly apply the neorealist "black box model" to the cases of their choice. If one is a serious neorealist, he/she is not supposed to be interested in the peculiarities and idiosyncracies of the Kim Jong Il regime. In this respect, the "mainstream" self-styled neorealists in Korea, who often parade stinging criticisms about the immorality of the North Korean regime, have little to do with the original American neorealists who appreciate cold-headed analyses based on power relations and capabilities.

Third, that North Korea pursues nuclear development for its survival is perfectly normal, understandable, and explicable from a neorealist point of view. In an anarchical international political system envisaged by neorealism, each state is supposed and inclined to pursue self-help, usually through strengthening the military capability. On the contrary, if North Korea, a rational unitary actor, is not intent on developing nuclear weapons, that is a puzzle to solve, from the neorealist perspective. As well, according to the lexicographic ordering of national interests i.e., military interests first and non-military interests second it is extremely natural that North Korea can initiate economic reform or opening (a la Chinese or Vietnamese model) only after it has ensured its military security. If South Korean "neorealists" are not interested in explaining the sense of threat North Korea, as a pariah state, feels in front of the only hegemonic superpower in the unipolar system and are not willing to explain why North Korea is attempting to ensure its survival through nuclear development, they are very far from neorealism. Very strangely, most of the mainstream South Korean IR experts do not consider North Korea to be a rational decision maker, distrust it, ignore the sense of threat and insecurity North Korea has toward the US and thus disregards the rationality of North Korea's foreign policy of pursuing nuclear weapons. Whereas the principle of rationality was assumed equally for all individual sovereign states in the original neoregionalism, in the Korean version of neorealism, rationality has become a kind of prerogative reserved only for some countries like the US and South Korea, not for North Korea.

Fourth, regarding South Korea's foreign and security policies, they are also distant from those possibly the original neorealism would have provide. The South Korean version of neorealism, as mentioned above, offers a prescription that South Korea must put more efforts to read and follow the US policy, active cooperation and conformity with the US policy. Yet, according to the neorealist alliance theory, what is generally preferred as a foreign policy is not necessarily a policy of bandwagoning on the great power but a policy of balancing against the hegemony (Walt 1987). It is considered to be prudent and rational to form an alliance against a regional power or a global hegemon and try to maintain a balance of power. But the Korean version of "neorealism" argues that a complete and wholesale

bandwagoning policy on the US is the only choice. It entirely turn blind eyes to the negative consequences of such unconditional bandwagoning policy to potential allies in the Northeast region and other potentially friendly nations in the world and thus spreading a negative image of South Korea and causing sarcasm and enmity.

Fifth, the South Korean "neorealism" cannot even differentiates elementary concepts (particularly in comparative politics) such as the state, regime, and administration. As will be shown in the next section, the neorealist assumption that nation states are the only actor in international politics is problematic. But the South Korean version of "neorealism" does not even stop there. It does not only regard nation states as meaningful actors in international politics it regards only the ruling government in power as the only meaningful players. This is a very myopic and status quo-centered view. In particular, SouthKorean self-styled neorealism equates the US with the Bush administration, equates the preferences of the US with those of the Bush administration, equates the interests of the US with those of the Bush administration. All this is unreasonable. As well, such hasty assumptions do not take into account the pluralistic interest articulation and decision making processes, social and ideological conflicts, and political cleavages in American democracy.

Sixth, the understanding of power in the South Korean version of "neorealism" is extremely physical, visible, and a historical. It overlooks the moral, invisible, nonmaterial dimensions of power including soft power, influence, and authority by exclusively focusing on "hard power." Underestimation or intentional belittlement of international norms and ethics and procedural justice and immoral exercise of power will eventually undermine the legitimacy and credibility of the hegemonic state, leading to its gradual weakening and eventual collapse (Reus-Smit 2004). The South Korean version lacks such a historical perspective.

This problem is in part due to the fact that the South Korean version of neorealism is not sufficiently updated. It is true that the original formulation of neorealism focused on the military dimension ("hard power") when it defined "national capability." However, some later neorealist works tried to overcome such narrow conceptualization of power and emphasized the normative and institutional aspects of international politics (Krasner 1983). As well, there were works on the historical and cross-temporal vicissitudes of hegemonic states (Gilpin 1981). Unfortunately, in the process of importing neorealism, such post-neorealist problematique was largely lost. As a result, the mainstream "neorealists" in South Korea conceptualize power in a very physical, mechanic, and hard power sense. Such biased conceptualization of power prompts them to consider the American hegemony to be a long-lasting "constant," thus overestimating the power and status of America, the dominance of conflictual international relations, and South Korea's need to adapt to the world order dictated by the US.

As shown above, most of the argument the "mainstream" IR or IP experts in South Korea put forward in the name of "reality" or "(neo)realism" is quite different from the original and orthodox American neorealism. Without any convincing explanations, the outstanding strengths of American neorealism such as theoretical parsimony, consistency, and "fair" application of the rationality assumption all vanished. As a result, the Korean version of "neorealism" is neither parsimonious, nor consistent, nor powerful, having a very deformed and brittle theoretical structure.

What is even more serious is that neorealism, both the orthodox version and its mutated South Korean version, is neither adequate nor sufficient for providing a theoretical foundation for South Korea's

new foreign policy. I now turn to this issue.

III. In Search of an Alternative: The Inside-Out Approach

As a matter of fact, during the past fifteen years or so since the end of the Cold War, the influence of neorealism has remarkably and dramatically decreased in the international politics discipline in the US academia and also in the foreign policy making. The single most important cause for the decreased influence of neorealism is the collapse of the Cold War system. What was traditionally appreciated in neorealism and considered to have superior explanatory power was what Waltz, the inventor of neorealism, dubbed "the Third Image," i.e., the international political system. Risking the danger of becoming overly structural or/and deterministic, neorealism argued that the international political system was the most important causal variable explaining foreign policy behaviors of individual countries. One negative result of this obsession with the international macro structure was that except for a few who were interested in hegemonic stability and historical changes of hegemonic countries, most neorealists were not interested in changes in the international political system itself. In this regard, American neorealism was very much status quo-oriented and static. In other words, it was not able to provide any effective explanations regarding when, how, and why the international political order changes.

Not surprisingly, neorealism was totally unable to predict a cataclysmic change in the international political order the end of the Cold War, which irreparably erodes its theoretical legitimacy and credibility. The greatest strength and merit of neorealism, with a few assumptions reminiscent of neoclassical economics, lay in that it had theoretical parsimony and abilities for ex post explanation as well as ex ante prediction. However, not being able to predict the end of the Cold War, such strengths of neorealism no longer exist, and various alternative frameworks are being explored now in the American IR field.

Neorealism, even in its heydays during the Cold War, was already faced with diverse challenges. Most of all, the neoliberal approach spearheaded by Keohane & Nye (1971, 1977) in the 1970s and 1980s paid attention to various non-state actors in the international arena, including multinational corporations, international NGOs, individual citizens in various market and voluntary sectors. They investigate how international cooperation emerged and developed through interactions and complex interdependence among diverse actors in the international arena. In the 1970s when the neorealist paradigm was dominant, neoliberals suggested "transnational politics" as an alternative to "international politics" (which apparently gives premium to nation states). Neoliberal theorists, based on the proliferation of various non-state actors on the global scale, envisioned "world politics in transition." One corollary of the multiplication of actors on the international stage was that now national power was not only defined in terms of the military power but in multiple dimensions (military, economic, cultural, etc.). Naturally, neoliberals were more interested in how to foster and develop coexistence and cooperation among different international actors, in contrast to neorealists interested in conflicts and tension among nation states.

The neoliberal approach, by highlighting the multiplicity of actors and multidimensionality of national interests, questioned the unitary actor model and the definition of national interests and the international political system centered around military power. In comparison, a series of works done in

the late 1970s questioned and challenged the "billiard ball model" and the "black box model" of neorealism. For example, the comparative policy studies led by Katzenstein(1978) et al. in the late 1970s analyzed foreign policies of central and northern European countries in terms of their domestic political, economic, and social institutions. Refuting the overly deterministic (and hence unduly unrealistic) nature of the causal influence of the international political system, these works emphasized that the foreign policies of small European states are better explained by domestic political, economic, and social institutional variables. As a consequence, it was emphatically shown that domestic factors were not irrelevant to foreign policy and its explanation, as wrongly stipulated in the "black box" formulation of the neorealist framework. Domestic institutions became important explanatory variables worthy of serious discussion and analysis.

In the 1980s, a number of new institutionalists such as Ikenberry(1986) demonstrated that individual countries' responses and policies to the same international phenomenon could diverge and vary depending on specific domestic institutional arrangements and power relations among social forces. This means that the "Third Image" (i.e., the international political system) overemphasized in neorealism might not as important as the "Second Image" (individual characteristics of nation states including domestic factors).

Although not as influential as new institutionalism, there were a lot of other research efforts that focused on the variables and mechanisms inside the "black box." Examples include how the military-industrial complex pursues its interests through lobbying and how they determine US foreign policy(Weisskopf 1974), how bureaucratic politics composed of complex and independent interactions among various intra-state units determine foreign policy outcomes(Allison 1971), and how cognitive, psychological, and perceptual dimensions of policy makers (the "First Image") affect the foreign policy results(Jervis 1976), all challenging and discrediting the unrealistic assumption of "black box" of neorealism.

Yet, the most important challenge to neorealism emerged in the post-Cold War period. Most of all, the "democratic peace" theory, developed by neoliberalists and new institutionalists, is an attempt to investigate how domestic political institutions (e.g., democracy) are causally interrelated with foreign policy orientations and behaviors (e.g., pursuit of peace). This is a frontal assault on the neorealist claim that domestic variables are at best secondary or outright unimportant. By focusing on domestic institutional mechanisms, politico-economic conditions, and cultural foundations that made possible democratic foreign relations, the democratic peace theory, which was founded on Hartz(1991) and spearheaded by Doyle(1983), unambiguously demonstrated that nation states were neither "billiard balls" nor "black boxes" any more (Maoz 1993; Russett 1995).

The most recent challenge to neorealism, which constitutes a contemporary alternative to it, is social constructivism. Wendt(1999) et al. problematized the objectivity and substantivity of "interest" and "national interest" neorealism used to take for granted. Constructivists argue that the interests of individuals, collectivities, and nation states do not visibly and indisputably (and hence objectively) exist out there. Rather, interests emerge intersubjectively, in constant interaction with actors' identities that are formed, defined, perceived, and recognized quite subjectively by the concerned actors. In other words, subjective identities of a political actor and its derived "objective" interests have an inseparable and mutually constitutive relationship. As a matter of fact, this criticism is not only against neorealism. It is a

fundamental criticism of all materialistic and rationalistic theories including neoliberalism and new institutionalism that emphasize "objectivity" and rationality. Social constructivism is the greatest beneficiary of the crisis and relative stagnation of neorealism. Together with various existing theories emphasizing the importance of domestic political, economic, and social variables, constructivism, emphasizing ideational variables such as culture, ideas, and ideologies, is rapidly expanding its influence owing to its explanatory richness and attention to contexts.

What all these alternatives to neorealism have in common is their flat rejection of the "black box model." In other words, domestic politics and foreign policy are indivisible, characterized by interdependence, co-determinancy, and interrelationship. In this respect, Putnam (1988)'s two level games are not only applicable to a few old democracies but to all democracies in general. This also means that in the post-Cold War era, international politics and domestic politics are undetachable which also means that there should be a lot of linkages and cooperation between International Relations and Comparative Politics as the two main subdisciplines of political science.

There are many reasons why neoliberalism, new institutionalism, constructivism and many others are theoretically more relevant to South Korea's new foreign policy than neorealism. The most important reason is that South Korea has been democratized, largely led by civil society and social movements(Choi 2002). Democratization and the subsequent political and social changes have redefined the state identity of South Korea. Most of all, South Korea's identity has changed from an anti-communist authoritarian state to a democratic state. This change in state identity inevitably requires a new definition of national interest. And from the newly defined national interest, new national strategy and new foreign policy must be derived. As South Korean politics gets more democratized and the society pluralized, the theoretical foundation for South Korea's new foreign policy must be neoliberalism, new institutionalism, and constructivism.

During the past authoritarian period, it was possible for a small number of elites to design and implement foreign policy, insulated from the public purview. Foreign policy making was characterized by its lack of transparency, secrecy, and centralization. Now, after the democratization, South Korea's foreign policy is increasingly determined by domestic politics. Even in a democracy, some argue that because of the nature of foreign policy its difficulty, complexity, and technicality its decision making process must be secretive. However, because foreign policy is immensely consequential in terms of affecting the daily lives of ordinary citizens, it is crucial to ensure citizen participation in the making of foreign policy. Democracy is a political system in which there are democratic structures through which sensible (to the general public) foreign policies can be pursued. In a democracy, elites and masses must jointly decide the goals, paths, and orientations of their foreign policies(Russett 1990).

There exist two different approaches to theoretically undergirding and making policy prescriptions for Korea's new foreign policy. The first is the past neorealist approach, which I term "outside-in approach." This perspective starts with an external factor, called the international political system. Yet, the "international political system" in the post-Cold War unipolar system is a synonym of the US. Neorealism and its South Korean version ask: what is the interest of the US, the only superpower in the unipolar system? It then considers South Korea's interest only secondarily. Does our national interest match that of the US? If yes, it may be pursued without any problem. If no, however, it is always "realistic" and prudent to give up our own national interest and to try to understand the "reality"(aka the

US) and internalize the outer interest in ourselves.

In contrast, I propose an inside-out approach. This approach appreciates what South Korea has undergone and experienced in the past few decades all those political, economic, and social changes. It inevitably involves efforts to reflect and project the ideals and ideas of democratization and civil society into and onto foreign policy. Rather than asking what the US wants, it first asks what are South Korea's identity and national interest. In particular, it asks what is our new national interest that reflects our new identity that has emerged in the past few decades. If the national interest derived that way matches with that of US, of course we will pursue it. However, if our interest does not match that of the US, the inside-out approach suggests South Korea ought not conceal or give up its own interest. Rather, South Korea must reveal its different interest, try to explain it to the US, and try to induce changes in and of the US, if ever possible. This must be the new direction of Korea's new foreign policy. This also means that the ROK-US relations must develop into a more equal and symmetric relationship.

For example, South Korea must be ready to convince the US that the maintenance and deepening of tension in the Northeast Asian region will, in the long haul, be detrimental to US interests by undermining and weakening American legitimacy and influence, escalating anti-American sentiments, promoting militarization of Japan and China, delaying democratization of China, causing a new Cold War, damaging America's commercial interests, and so forth. Whereas the previous "outside-in" approach made it a habit to accept what is given by the US and try to adjust to the American-made "reality," now South Korea must be prepared and willing to persuade the US, through dialogues and mutual interactions. At the end of the day, however, if South Korea's vital interest differs from that of the US, that vital interest can never be subject to compromise or negotiation. Commonality of the two countries' interests are certainly recommendable, but it is neither inevitable nor mandatory. If South Korea pursue the ROK-US alliance before its vital interest, South Korea is no longer a sovereign independent state.

The reason why "inside-out" approach to South Korea's foreign policy is possible today includes, in addition to the important changes in the national identity of South Korea, the systemic superiority of South Korea over North Korea (and the resultant end of the systemic competition), fundamental changes in inter-Korean relations since the 2000 South-North Summit, the change of the mainstream in various dimensions of South Korean society, and the relative elevation of South Korea's political and economic status in the world.

IV. Recasting South Korea's Foreign Policy: Making Democratization Matter

Despite the sarcasm, skepticism, ridicule, sabotage, criticism, and opposition of the "mainstream" South Korean IR experts and other intellectuals, South Korea's new foreign policy has already launched in earnest. The speeches President Roh made in November-December in 2004 in the US, Latin America, and Europe provided an important turning point in South Korea's foreign policy. He, through these speeches (which might be collectively called "the Roh Moo Hyun Initiative"), recapitulated the three principles of solving the North Korean nuclear crisis, i.e., no tolerance of North Korea's nuclearization, peaceful resolution through dialogues, and an active role of South Korea. The "three principles" have been there all the time since Roh's inauguration. But in the first two years, the emphasis was put on the first principle, i.e., no tolerance of North Korea's nuclearization. Recently the emphasis has been steadily moving to the second and the third principles. This implies that there is now room for

South Korea to disagree with the US and South Korea will not be shy about expressing its differences and disagreements. To put more dramatically, Roh just made explicit a simple truth that South Korea, as a sovereign state, has a right to differ from the US.

The Roh Moo Hyun Initiative has become materialized through the "Peace Initiative" the Minister of Unification Chung Dong Young declared in his speech in Berlin last January and through the dramatic breakthrough in inter-Korean relations enabled by Chung-Kim Jong Il meeting on June 17. North Korea, on July 9, announced that it would return to the 6-party talk. With the recent announcement of South Korea's "grand proposal" (providing electricity to North Korea) and many other proposals for promoting South-North exchanges, inter-Korean relations are dramatically improving. All these are mostly owing to the Roh Moo Hyun Initiative and the subsequent efforts to make South Korea's foreign policy more independent.

The reason why the Roh Moo Hyun Initiative was possible and got materialized through the Peace Initiative and the improved inter-Korean relationship is because Roh himself, as a direct participant in the pro-democracy movement in the 1980s, could be relatively free from the Cold War "outside-in" approach that was dominant during the past authoritarian regimes. Unlike the "outside-in" approach, the "inside-out" approach I propose to be the foundation for South Korea's new foreign policy does not belittle all the sacrifices made during the past decades for democracy and peaceful reunification. Rather, the "inside-out" approach argues that those sacrifices must affect and change foreign policy of Korea. Now, through specific theoretical, organizational, policy efforts, the ideals of democracy must be reflected in South Korea's foreign policy too.

In the long run, the transformation of South Korea's foreign policy is intimately related with the process of democratization of international politics itself. How to closely associate South Korea's democratization and foreign policy is inseparable from the problem of how to make global civil society and global governance, which have been dominated so far by superpowers including the US, more democratic. This is also connected to the question of how various countries small and big, weak and strong can live together peacefully. In this respect, the main research question for South Korea's IR and IP community should not be how to interpret the existing world order dominated by superpowers and how to adjust effectively and speedily to the existing order. Rather, it behooves South Korean IR specialists to design, form, develop, and deepen a more democratic world order and international institutions. South Korea's new foreign policy is the first step and the basic instrument for such a global project.

No doubt, South Korea's foreign policy is at a crossroads. Whether the Roh Moo Hyun Initiative can fundamentally change the nature and direction of South Korea's foreign policy and evolve into the "Roh Moo Hyun Process" leading to the establishment of a peace regime in the Korean peninsula or fizzle out as another attempt at building peaceful Korea frustrated by the "reality" created by the US and its "neorealist" supporters is yet to be seen. A lot will depend on how those policy makers, politicians, intellectuals, journalists, movement activists, and ordinary citizens who are more sympathetic to South Korea's democratization can generate a change in the "mainstream" and conservative IR academic community in South Korea and make such a change institutionalized and irreversible.

In this regard, South Korea's democratization is far from being over. As far as South Korea is unable to get rid of its last authoritarian enclave i.e., the foreign policy making community and the "mainstream" IR intellectual community and able to create a new foreign policy that matches the changed

national identity, which would be more independent, participatory, and democratic, South Korea's democracy remains incomplete.

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JAE-JUNG SUH

Beyond Alliance and toward a Community: To Embed Bilateral Relationships in a Pacific Asia

Abstract

Korea stands at a critical juncture in charting its position in Northeast Asia and the world in the 21st century. Many conceive of the juncture as a fork with two diverging paths, one of which leads to security and prosperity and the other of which to disaster: South Korea has to choose, according to them, between the alliance with the U.S. and nationalist cooperation with the North, between the United States and China, or between China and Japan. The debate rages on whether it can or should move away from its alliance with the U.S. to embrace its northern brethren or its mainland neighbor.

Rejecting the either-or framework within which the debates is carried on about which side is better, this paper argues for a third course that synthesizes the seemingly divergent paths to chart a new road where South Korea plays a key role in bringing the various, and even antagonistic, regional actors together in a regional security community. The choice, seen from this perspective, is not between two antagonistic countries but about moving beyond a regional system of bilateral relationships that is predicated on division and reproduces security dilemma, and toward a regional community that promotes peaceful coexistence and regional integration. The choice is between siding with a country in a kill-or-be-killed system and working with everyone to create a live-and-let-live society.

In order to develop the argument, the paper first critically analyzes the U.S.-ROK alliance that is predicated upon division. The alliance was created at the conclusion of the armistice agreement of the Korean War to maintain the fragile division of the Korean peninsula. Not only is it reproducing and reinforcing the division but also it serves as a stumbling block that impedes South-South reconciliation within South Korea by protecting the Cold War block. Furthermore it is, by pursuing the policy of adapting the U.S. alliances with South Korea and Japan, nudging the region in the direction of intensified security dilemma and an accelerating arms race. The alliance, which had been created to guard Korea's division, is now turning the Cold War containment line into new fault lines across the region, exacerbating the multiple divisions in the 21st century.

Korea can move beyond her alliance with the U.S. without walking away from it. Indeed it must because Seoul cannot afford to alienate Washington as much as it cannot antagonize Tokyo or Beijing. Rather than exclusively allying with one or trying to play a balancer role, Seoul can initiate a community building effort that involves all the regional actors. This can start with a nuclear weapons free Korea that North and South Korea commits themselves to and that the surrounding regional powers pledge to honor and support. No less critical to the project of a security community building is an effort to carve out a regional public sphere within which the region's state and non-state actors debate their current positions as well as future directions and negotiate regional norms and identity, laying a communicative basis for the community.

요약

동맹을 넘어 공동체로: 아시아 태평양 지역의 양자관계를 강화하기 위하여

한국은 지금 21세기의 동북아시아와 세계에서의 입지를 세워야하는 중요한 기로에 서 있다. 많은 사람들이 이 갈림길이 안보와 번영으로 가는 길과 실패로 가는 두 갈래로 나뉘어져 있다고 생각한다. 한국은, 한국인들에 의하면, 둘 중 하나를 선택해야 한다. 미국과의 동맹이나 북한과의 민족주의적 협력이나, 미국이나 중국이나, 또는 중국이나 일본이나를 두고, 한국이 형제국 북한 또는 이웃국가 중국을 받아들이기 위해서 미국과의 동맹 관계를 변화시킬 수 있을지, 변화시켜야 하는지에 대해 논쟁은 심화된다.

이 글은 어느 편이 더 나은가에 대한 논쟁이 이어지는 양자택일의 구도를 거부하고, 대신 여러 갈래로 분산되어 보이는 길들을 하나로 통합하는 제 3의 방법을 선택한다. 이는 다양하고, 반목적이기도 한 지역 내 행위자들을 역내 안보 커뮤니티로 이끌어내는 데 한국이 주요 역할을 할 수 있도록 하는 새로운 길이다. 이러한 관점에서 보자면, 선택은 대립적인 두 국가 사이에 있는 것이 아니라 분단을 전제로 한 안보 딜레마를 재생산하는 양자 관계의 지역 체제를 넘어 평화적 공존과 지역 통합을 추구하는 지역 공동체로 나아가는 데 있다. 즉, 선택은 서로 죽고 죽이는 체제 안에서 사느냐 아니면 모두 함께 살고 살리는 사회를 만들어가느냐 하는 것이다.

주장을 발전시키기 위해 이 글에서는 우선 분단을 전제로 하는 한미동맹을 비판적으로 분석한다. 한미동맹은 한국전쟁 휴전 협정 체결 시 한반도의 불안한 분단 상황을 지키기 위해 이루어졌다. 이 동맹은 분단을 재생산하고 강화할 뿐 아니라 냉전 구조를 보호함으로써 한국 내 남-남 화해를 지연시키는 장애물이기도 하다. 더욱이, 한국 및 일본과 미국의 동맹을 받아들이는 방침을 추구함으로써 이 지역의 안보 딜레마를 심화시키고 군비경쟁을 촉진하고 있다. 한반도의 분단을 지키기 위해 생성된 한미동맹은 이제 역내에 냉전시대의 견제선을 새로운 단층선으로 바꾸고 있으며, 21세기의 복합적 분열을 악화시키고 있다.

한국은 한미관계를 변질시키지 않으면서 동맹관계를 넘어설 수 있다. 당연히 그래야만 한다. 왜냐하면 한국 정부는 일본 중국을 적대시할 수 없는 것과 마찬가지로 미국과도 멀어질 수 없기 때문이다. 한 국가와 배타적 동맹을 맺거나 균형자 역할을 하려고 하기보다 한국 정부는 모든 지역 행위자들을 포함하는 지역공동체 건설 노력을 시작할 수 있다. 이는 주변국들의 존중과 지원 약속을 바탕으로 남북한이 합의하여 한반도 비핵화를 구현하는 것으로 시작될 수 있을 것이다. 안보 공동체 건설만큼이나 중요한 것은 지역의 국가 및 비국가 행위자들이 자신의 현재 입장과 앞으로의 향방을 토론하고 지역 규범과 정체성을 합의하여 공동체를 위한 소통의 기반이 될 수 있는 공동 영역을 개척하려는 노력이다.

Full Text

Korea stands at a critical juncture in charting its position in Northeast Asia and the world in the 21st century. Many conceive of the juncture as a fork with two diverging paths, one of which leads to security and prosperity and the other of which to disaster: South Korea has to choose, according to them, between the alliance with the U.S. and nationalist cooperation with the North, between the United States and China, or between China and Japan. The debate rages on whether it can or should move away from

its alliance with the U.S. to embrace its northern brethren or its mainland neighbor.

Rejecting the either-or framework within which the debates is carried on about which side is better, this paper argues for a third course that synthesizes the seemingly divergent paths to chart a new road where South Korea plays a key role in bringing the various, and even antagonistic, regional actors together in a regional security community. The choice, seen from this perspective, is not between two antagonistic countries but about moving beyond a regional system of bilateral relationships that is predicated on division and reproduces security dilemma, and toward a regional community that promotes peaceful coexistence and regional integration. The choice is between siding with a country in a kill-or-be-killed system and working with everyone to create a live-and-let-live society.

In order to develop the argument, the paper first critically analyzes the U.S.-ROK alliance that is predicated upon division. The alliance was created at the conclusion of the armistice agreement of the Korean War to maintain the fragile division of the Korean peninsula. Not only is it reproducing and reinforcing the division but also it serves as a stumbling block that impedes South-South reconciliation within South Korea by protecting the Cold War block. Furthermore it is, by pursuing the policy of adapting the U.S. alliances with South Korea and Japan, nudging the region in the direction of intensified security dilemma and an accelerating arms race. The alliance, which had been created to guard Korea's division, is now turning the Cold War containment line into new fault lines across the region, exacerbating the multiple divisions in the 21st century.

Korea can move beyond her alliance with the U.S. without walking away from it. Indeed it must because Seoul cannot afford to alienate Washington as much as it cannot antagonize Tokyo or Beijing. Rather than exclusively allying with one or trying to play a balancer role, Seoul can initiate a community building effort that involves all the regional actors. This can start with a nuclear weapons free Korea that North and South Korea commits themselves to and that the surrounding regional powers pledge to honor and support. No less critical to the project of a security community building is an effort to carve out a regional public sphere within which the region's state and non-state actors debate their current positions as well as future directions and negotiate regional norms and identity, laying a communicative basis for the community.

U.S. Alliances: From Containment to Preemptive Rollback

The U.S.-ROK (Republic of Korea) alliance is rapidly transforming. Not only is the United States Armed Forces in Korea (USFK) reducing its size and relocating south of Seoul but it is also in the process of transferring a large share of frontline responsibilities to the ROKA. Furthermore the USFK and ROKA have dispatched some of its units to Iraq while expanding the area scope of the logistics support agreement to a global level. Although changes in the U.S.-ROK alliance have been a topic of much discussion, this discussion has primarily focused on the decrease in the size of the USFK and phased changes in the U.S.-ROK alliance. The discussion has thus far paid inadequate attention to the transformative changes of the U.S.-ROK relations, their structural causes or implications for Northeast Asia. The transformation in the U.S.-ROK alliance is the result of three apparent structural changes: 1) South Korean democratization; 2) gradual dismantling of Cold War structure in Northeast Asia; and 3) America's changed strategies initiated after the events of 9-11. The changes in U.S. strategy represent an active American response to the first two structural changes as well as to the post-9/11 world. The U.S.

response in turn affects the first two, constraining them and exerting pressures on South Korea and Northeast Asia to evolve in a way consistent with U.S. moves.

Northeast Asia is one of the four regions where the U.S. plans to station troops on the front-line to deter war according to the Bush administration's strategy. The U.S. has also stressed the strategic necessity in pursuing rapid victory in two of the four regions. The decision whether the Korean Peninsula or some other area becomes the pivotal theater for a "decisive victory" is one decided by the U.S. president. At the same time, the Pentagon's long-term strategic plan seems to forward deploy U.S. troops in all the four regions and thus in effect surround China in a semi-circle.

To execute this strategy, adopted in 2001 and formalized as the "1-4-2-1 strategy" in 2002, the United States is in the midst of transforming its military into a 21st century fighting force of the future while pushing forward with a global realignment of its military force. Military transformation and the Global Posture Review(GPR) represent the two main tools with which to implement the U.S. strategic change. Not only does the restructuring of the U. S. forces drive the base realignments and transformation of U.S. forces in Korea, but it also enmeshes South Korea and Japan more deeply in the U.S. alliance system. In the short run, the series of transformations undertaken by the U.S. will create a more unstable security environment on the Korean Peninsula by intensifying military pressure against North Korea. In the long run, increased U.S. intervention in the entire Pacific Asia region will exacerbate the military imbalance between the U.S. and Asia, running the risk to fuel an arms race. The current process of U.S. military transformation, designed to bring to reality the concept of a 21st century *Pax Americana* through overwhelming military strength based on advanced science and technology, will therefore have serious security implications for the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia in the 21st century.

Changes in U.S. Post-Cold War Strategy

After the Cold War, the United States changed its global strategy away from the containment that sought to contain a fixed set of countries as its adversaries within their zone while keeping the other zone under its influence. Its post-Cold War strategy began to focus on keeping "regional rogues" in check while enlarging its zone of influence on a global scale. After 9-11, the regional defense and the global enlargement seemed to merge into what might be called a preemptive rollback, a policy of occupation and regime change using, if necessary, preemptive strikes. What began as a two-theater war strategy in the early 1990s was expanded to an ambitious "1-4-2-1 strategy" under the Bush administration.

The changes began in July 1989 with the passage of the Nunn-Warner Amendment whereby Congress requested a report from the Department of Defense stipulating how "to reduce and restructure troops stationed in East Asia in order to increase the security and participation of allied countries in Asia."The Department of Defense responded, in the East Asia Strategic Initiative(EASI) presented to Congress in April 1990, by declaring that Far East Russia and North Korea still remained a "Cold War-type threat" despite the end of the Cold War and by defining the "maintenance of regional stability" as part of the United States' national interest. While it made clear that the continual presence of U.S. troops in East Asia "guarantee[d] U.S. economic activity within the region,"the report acknowledged that these objectives could be achieved even with a reduced level of U.S. troops in the post-Cold War Asia.

Looming behind the backdrop of the United States' strategy in East Asia was the transformation

of U.S. global strategy. Abandoning the containment strategy that focused on thwarting the threat of Communism, centered around the Soviet Union, the Bush Administration adopted instead a "Regional Defense Strategy" to confront such regional threats as Iraq and North Korea. In order to implement the strategy, Colin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, presented what was known as the "Base Force" plan that would scale back the U.S. defense budget and force size by 25%, forcing a comparable reduction of the troops stationed in East Asia.

The *East Asia Strategic Initiative* presented a three-phase plan to reduce the ground troops and air power stationed in South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. According to the first of the three phased reduction plan, around 7,000 U.S. troops in Korea, 4,800 troops in Japan, and 11,000 troops in the Philippines were reduced by 1992. The ROK military began to assume a greater role in defense as the U.S.-ROK Field Army Command was dismantled and the Ground Component Command(GCC), which used to be directly under the ROK-US Combined Forces Command(CFC), was placed under the command of a Korean general. By late 1991, however, the second phase of reduction was already running into setbacks. With the North Korean nuclear issue beginning to sink in, the Korean Minister of Defense and the U.S. Secretary of Defense agreed at the annual U.S.-ROK Security Cooperative Meeting in November 1991, to "*delay* the second phase of the Nunn-Warner USFK troop withdrawals until the uncertainty and threat of North Korea's nuclear development disappears, and our internal security is absolutely safeguarded."¹ Reflecting these changes, the U.S. Department of Defense decided in July 1992 to delay the second phase of troop reduction plans that the *East Asia Strategic Initiative* had originally planned to implement in 1993.

The plan to withdraw U.S. troop from Asia, postponed by the Bush Administration, was officially terminated in 1993 when the Clinton administration adopted the "win-win"two-theater war strategy. Succeeding the previous administration's "Regional Defense Strategy", the Clinton administration adopted the two-theater war strategy, which identified the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula as two existing security hot spots, after the Persian Gulf War in 1991 and the North Korean nuclear crisis in the early 1990s. The two-theater war strategy, seeking to win two major wars simultaneously, subsequently remained the central focus of its post-Cold War global strategy until the second Bush administration built on it to develop a more expansive and aggressive strategy after 9-11.

Appearing in the 1994 fiscal year defense budget allocation proposal, the two-theater war strategy was formally revealed in the "Bottom-Up Review", the first official document outlining the strategy. On October 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin quoted that the Bottom-Up Review would "organize the U.S. military such that it could decisively win conflicts in two major theaters simultaneously". The two-theater war strategy demanded a much greater level of commitment in terms of military manpower and defense budget than required by the "win-hold-win" concept, which had emerged as a more efficient tool with which to implement the "Regional Defense Strategy". Therefore, the adoption of the Bottom-Up Review had a large influence on U.S. troop reduction plans. Afterwards, the two front major war strategy was again reaffirmed in the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review.

In February 1995, the Clinton Administration announced the East Asia Strategy Review (otherwise known as the Nye Report). The Nye Report stated that the U.S. would maintain 10,000

1 23rd U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting , Official Public Statement; Seoul, November 21, 1991. Italics are mine.

military troops in Asia and Europe respectively, ending further discussions on plans for U.S. global troop reductions. Thus the 10,000 troops stationed in Europe could deal with insecure strategic positions such as Iraq, while the 10,000 troops stationed in Asia could confront threats such as North Korea. During the third phase of reduction, the plans for additional troop withdrawals in Korea from the second and third phases were again put on hold.² After the formalization of the two-theater major war strategy on November 1993, both South Korea and the United States decided to adjust the preparation of their joint military operations to fit underneath the executing plans of the two-theater strategy.

Only twenty days after 9-11, the Bush administration released the aggressive 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review as the successor to the two front war strategy. The Bush Administration reaffirmed the two-theater major war strategy by stating "In an overlapping time period, the U.S. shall possess the strength necessary to *quickly* repel an attack against an allied nation on two battlefields." Moreover, the Administration argued that during a war, the U.S. would need the military strength necessary to "*occupy* [the enemy country's] *territory* or establish the conditions necessary for a *regime change*" (italics added). This new two theater strategy, which attempts to occupy and bring about regime change in enemy countries, is not only an offensive strategy; combined with rapid mobilization of military power on the battlefield, the strategy also aims to achieve a quick, decisive victory. The elements of preemption and regime change, absent in the Clinton Administration's version of the two front war strategy, became evident two years later in the Iraq war.

The Bush administration embraced preemption as one of the key pillars of its security policy. Even if a hostile nation does not attack, the U.S. can preemptively strike a country to contain what it deems security threats. This revolutionary change in security policy was brought about amidst the clamors to transform the U.S. into a "secure fortress" in the aftermath of 9-11 when the feeling of threat from potential terrorist attacks reached its peak. The necessity of preemptive strikes was first suggested by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld during his 2001 visits to NATO allies and followed by President Bush who, speaking at West Point's graduation ceremony, called on the military to prepare for preemptive strikes. The policy of preemptive strike became formalized in September 2002, a week after the first anniversary of the 9-11 attacks, when the Bush administration released the *National Security Strategy* that officially declared that "if necessary, the United States will act preemptively."

In May 2002, the Bush administration adopted the *National Defense Planning Guidance* as a guide for achieving national security objectives delineated in the Quadrennial Defense Review. Not only did the *Guidance* maintain the previous two theater war plans as "2" but it added new tasks in the form of "1-4-1", producing what is known as the "1-4-2-1" planning concept. The "1-4-2-1" concept formalized the national security objectives presented in the Quadrennial Review as follows:

- 1) "1" Defending the U.S. Mainland: First "defend the American people, U.S. territory, and vital defense infrastructures from attacks launched from outside the mainland." 9-11 dramatically raised the importance in defending the U.S. mainland. Organizations such as the North American Command and the Department of Homeland Security were newly established, and such programs as missile defense are being actively implemented.

² After the 1991 U.S.-ROK joint security statement posited the "postponement" of the second phase of U.S. troop withdrawals in Korea, from 1992 to 1994 the U.S. maintained that the second phase of reduction was "on reserve." However, since 1995, reference to the second phase of reductions has disappeared all together.

- 2) Deterring war in the "4" regions: "Deploying and stationing the appropriate level of troops in Europe, Northeast Asia, East Asian littorals, and Middle East-Southwest Asia to reassure allies and friends, to block coercion from enemies and to deter attacks against the U.S. and her allies."By forward stationing troops in these four regions, the U.S. seeks not only to contain a threat before it takes place but also to frustrate enemy intentions with force. Furthermore, the forward deployment serves, in return for a security guarantee for its allies, to keep allies and friendly countries under U.S. influence.³ Forward stationed troops in the four regions not only play the role of protecting U.S. interests in those regions, but also enables the U.S. to mobilize its military force to accomplish the following two objectives. Forward deployed forces also contributes to U.S. mainland defense.
- 3) Victory in "2" major wars: "To quickly repel an attack against U.S. allies and friendly nations in two operating regions in an overlapping time frame."In a situation in which war arises in two of the four regions where the U.S. has forward stationed troops, the U.S. will concentrate the forces on those two regions to achieve victory in a short span of time. The U.S. does no longer plan to execute a war with only the troops already stationed in the theater of operation. Rather, it seeks to transform the military into a rapid deployment force that can be quickly projected into any area of conflict regardless of the actual location of its deployment. The plan to disperse the troops but to quickly concentrate them in a theater of operation is a new development that dovetails with the military transformation (which is discussed in the next section), even if the objective to achieve simultaneous victories in two theaters is the same as before.
- 4) "1" Decisive victory: "In one of the two theaters where U.S. military is engaged in operation, we will decisively defeat its enemy. This includes the ability, if directed, to occupy territory and establish the conditions needed for a regime change."The U.S. is required to achieve the decisive victory with minimal additional troop deployment and to concentrate the force within a minimal time period.

Of particular concern here is the designation of Iraq and North Korea as the two regions of conflict. Specifically, from the time the two major theater war strategy was first established, North Korea and Iraq have been designated as the two enemies. Now with regime change and the occupation of Iraq achieved, only North Korea remains the target of the two wars. The *Quadrennial Defense Review* and the *National Defense Plan* require that the U.S. military maintain the capability to execute the decisive victory if directed by the President. Currently, because the U.S. military is deeply sunk in the "desert quagmire" of the Iraq War, it is stretched too thin to achieve the second "decisive victory" against North Korea, as called for by these documents. But as long as U.S. global military strategy takes aim at North Korea, the Korean Peninsula will always remain the theater implicitly designated by "1" and "2." In contrast, the U.S. recognizes that Russia is no longer a military threat while China is being seen as "a counterpart difficult to make plans against."

To execute the "1-4-2-1" strategy more efficiently, the U.S. is simultaneously pursuing military transformation and base restructuring. Through the military transformation which aims at using

³ For the dual nature of alliance, see Cumings, Bruce. 1991. Trilateralism and the New World Order. *World Policy Journal* 8 (2): 195-222.

sophisticated weapons systems in non-linear, high-tech military operations, the military strives to transform itself into a 21st century high-tech fighting force. Once this transformation is completed, the military will be able to execute the "1-4-2-1" strategy even if its size is reduced from its current level. It is also to effectively implement the "1-4-2-1" strategy that base restructuring and force realignment are being carried out on a global scale. Through the synergic effect of military transformation and realignment, the Bush administration strives to maximize the effectiveness of a military that is smaller in size but bigger in fighting power than the Cold War "legacy force".

U.S. Military Transformation

Putting forth quality over quantity in its military reform, the U.S. is forging ahead with serious efforts to replace its old style Cold War military into a 21st century high-tech force. Although the revolution in military affairs (RMA), pioneered by Andrew Marshall, an advisor to the Secretary of Defense, at first focused on developing advanced weapons technology, it soon expanded to a three-pillared concept that advanced weapons systems would be combined with a suitable military organization and new military tactics to boost military effectiveness in a revolutionary way. The current military transformation takes the RMA a step further to call for a change in military culture and way of thinking in order to create an entirely new form of military.⁴ According to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, "If the way of thinking, training, and the method of practice and fighting are not reformed, even the most advanced weapons would not change U.S. military power."⁵ The core components of the military transformation nonetheless seem the trinity of high-tech weapons, new military tactics, and new organizations that its proponents hope will strengthen the U.S. military's fighting power in a revolutionary way.

The ultimate goal of military transformation is to move "from slight advantage over adversaries during the Cold War period to a global supremacy in all fields of 21st century military operations" and "to possess the military operational capability to cover all contingencies from major wars to peace-keeping operations."⁶ The goal is nearly identical to the "Full Spectrum Dominance" that the Joint Chiefs of Staff set as the goal for the 21st century fighting force in its *Joint Vision* prepared under the Clinton administration. The similarity in the goals between the two administrations betrays the tacit consensus that exists between Republicans and Democrats that the U.S. should possess overwhelming military power that would ensure victory in all types of war and conflict including conventional large-scale wars as well as small scale terror attacks and an asymmetric strategy.

Not only does the military transformation seek for more efficient weapons systems but also aggressively adopts advanced scientific technology to develop weapons systems with higher precision,

4 The main feature of "Joint Vision 2020" is the adoption of the concept of "revolution in military affairs" to all fields of military advancement. In order to achieve the goal of the six agendas and four capabilities, innovation of military technology is not enough. Reforms must be achieved in all areas which deal with strategy, military organization, training, logistics, leadership, soldiers, bases, and military facilities.

5 Donald Rumsfeld, "Secretary Rumsfeld Speaks on '21st Century Transformation' of the U.S. Armed Forces (transcript of remarks and question and answer period)," January 31, 2002. <<http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s200020131-secdef.html>>.

6 Transformation Study Group. *Transformation Study Report: Transforming Military Operational Capabilities*. April 27, 2001, pp.5-7.

lethality, mobility and survivability.⁷ Together with the ongoing development of advanced weapons, operational concepts are changing: the conventional operation of fighting the enemy on the frontline is being replaced with a multi-dimensional operation where the U.S. military strikes the adversary's command centers, rear, and flank simultaneously. The Rapid Decisive Operation (RDO), successfully tested in the opening stage of the Iraq War, maximizes the superiority that U.S. military enjoys in intelligence, lethality, and maneuvering capability. The operational concept is currently being further revolutionized into that of Network Warfare that aims to strike the adversary simultaneously with multiple decentralized small units that are scattered and yet connected with each other through an intelligence network in order to bring about a rapid victory while minimizing the casualties from enemy counter-strike.

The U.S. Armed Forces is also going through restructuring in line with the military transformation. The best-known new unit is the Stryker Brigade that is marked by its lightweight and rapid projection capability that enables it to engage an adversary anywhere in the world within ninety-six hours.⁸ The Army plans to create six Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, first to fill in the gap between existing light and heavy forces and to use them as a stepping-stone in transforming the existing military into a futuristic "Objective Force".⁹ In the long run, the current military structure will

7 With a bomber flying eight times faster than the speed of sound and carrying 5.5 tons of weapons, the U.S. possesses the capability of departing from the U.S. mainland, and within two hours, lethally bomb any location around the world. Yoo Chae-Hoon. "U.S. Advancement in the Development of a Supersonic Bomber." *Hankyoreh*, November 28, 2003; Washington AFP. "Bush Signs the Passage of a Nuclear Weapons Research Bill," *Yonhap News*, December 2, 2003.

8 The Army's existing [vehicles] such as the M1 Abram Tank and the Bradley Armored Vehicle are being divided between a heavy armament unit and a light infantry unit. However, rapid deployment of the heavy armored unit is impossible. And while rapid deployment of the light armored unit is possible, on the other hand, the light armored division's weak point is its frail firepower. Therefore, making its entry as the Stryker Brigade Combat Team, in addition to the possibility of rapid deployment, this unit also possesses the firepower to overpower the enemy. Since the armored vehicle of the Stryker Unit's primary armaments system is lightweight, the unit is loaded onto a C-17 transport plane or high speed transport vessel so that rapid deployment is possible. This is because the Striker Armored Vehicle is only nineteen tons compared with the seventy ton M1 Abram Tanks or the thirty ton Bradley Armored Vehicles. With the possibility of deploying a combat brigade team anywhere in the world within ninety-six hours, the U.S. is making plans so that it can dispatch one division in 120 hours, or five divisions [anywhere in the world] in thirty days. (Globalsecurity.org. "Stryker Brigade Combat Team," <<http://www.globalsecurit.org/military/agency/army/brigade-ibct.htm>>.

9 The U.S. Army already began this transformation at the beginning of 2002 at Fort Lewis, Washington. Through this process, two Stryker teams have formed and a part of this team is being tested in actual combat [situations] in Iraq. Plans exist for organizing four additional brigades by 2008. Part of this brigade will be stationed in Hawaii and Alaska, and it appears that [another part] will be active in the Asia Pacific region. On December 4, 2002, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld approved the formation of the Stryker Brigade, and after further review of two brigades, in December 2003, Rumsfeld approved the formation of those two brigades. At Fort Lewis in Washington, the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd [Infantry] Division and the 1st Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division are currently reorganizing into Stryker Brigades. Plans have also been made to reorganize Alaska's 172nd Infantry Brigade. The 2nd Armored Regiment in Louisiana will begin reorganization on return from Iraq with plans for complete reorganization by 2006. The 2nd Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division (Schofield Barracks, Hawaii) and the 56th Brigade of the Pennsylvania Army National Guard's 28th Infantry Division are planned for reorganization into Stryker Brigades by 2008-2010. Following the recommendation of the Quadrennial Defense Review, the U.S. Army plans to station one Stryker Brigade in Europe by 2007. (Globalsecurity.org. "Stryker

be replaced with the Objective Force that will maintain overwhelming superiority in all types of operations and that will be capable of rapid deployment. For this purpose, the U.S. is in the midst of developing new weapons systems such as the Comanche Helicopter and the Future Combat System(FCS) that will equip the Objective Force.

In order to implement the "1-4-2-1" strategy, the U.S. Navy is developing its "global operational concept" under which it is reorganizing its existing naval structure into thirty-seven "independent strike groups". The Navy plans to expand its deployment strategy by rotating twelve aircraft carrier groups every six months in three regions. According to the new plan, forward deployed aircraft carrier groups will return to home port and immediately undergo six months of maintenance, and six months of training. After this period, the fleet will maintain a battle ready posture for the remaining six month period. Thus, the Navy will possess the capability to deploy, if necessary, six aircraft carrier fleets to a battle front at all times. Existing naval capabilities are currently being revamped into twelve aircraft carrier fleets and twelve "mobile strike" groups. The restructuring of the U.S. Navy centers around four strategic concepts: 1) naval sea bases; 2) naval sea strike; 3) a naval shield; 4) networked military power.

An important aspect of military transformation lies in its emphasis on jointness. In order to maximize military effectiveness through increased joint operation, the military is pushing forward with joint-operability between the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines, but also plans to increase jointness between regular and special forces and the CIA. Also, the line separating nuclear from conventional strategy as two distinct military strategies is being blurred as the military is pursuing a combined nuclear and conventional strategy, increasing the likelihood that nuclear weapons will be used in real warfare. A report submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Defense pointed out, "strategic nuclear weapons are not distinct from conventional force, but is merely one component of our broader strategy confronting the capabilities of global terrorists and rogue states."¹⁰

Military transformation is being rapidly implemented under Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld's Defense Department provided a blueprint for the purpose and basic concepts of the transformation in the Military Transformation Report and the Quadrennial Defense Review in 2001. Arguing that several war games and live combat experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq confirmed the need and appropriateness of the military transformation, Rumsfeld and other transformation advocates have been strongly pushing for transformation. But with its critics pointing out that the Iraq war show limits of the military transformation, the Iraq war has intensified the transformation debate. While early stages of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars strengthened the case for transformation, later stages show the U.S. military, despite its early success, stuck in a quagmire, dramatically demonstrating the limitations of its heavy reliance on science and technology to dominate enemy forces with overwhelming force. The Iraq war has thus accelerated debates concerning the need for overseas military bases and finding the appropriate level of ground forces.

How this debate will be resolved is yet unclear. Yet the limits of the American debate are betrayed by the fact the fault line of the debate runs between transformation proponents who push for high-tech warfare and traditionalists who emphasize the enduring importance of conventional warfare. In other words, a difference in opinion exists only about the appropriate form of military force; but there

Brigade Combat Team," <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/brigade-ibct.htm>>
 10 William M. Arkin, "U.S. Military: War Plans Meaner, no Leaner," *LA Times*, April 21, 2004.

is no serious dissension about the need to maintain an overwhelming military power. It should be borne in mind that U.S. troop withdrawal in Asia was suspended under Clinton's Democratic administration in the early 1990s. It was then Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye, considered a leading liberal even within the Democratic administration, who proclaimed "A strong forward presence in Asia is necessary in order to maintain America's vital interests." One can surmise that widespread agreement can be found between Republicans and Democrats concerning the use of military power as a major foreign policy tool. Moreover, increases in defense spending after 9-11 have not been seriously challenged by Democrats.

Even if the U.S. does not produce revolutionary advances in military power in its drive for transformation, the U.S. already possesses the world's most advanced military capabilities. As the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute noted in 2004, the U.S. spent on its military as much as the rest of the world did. What, then, is the reason behind continual increases in U.S. defense spending?

First, the ideological foundation of U.S. foreign policy is embedded in realism and its emphasis on power. U.S. foreign policy developed between the opposing forces of liberalism, traditionally centered around international law and international institutions, and realism, which hinged upon nationalism and military power. However, after 9/11, the deliberation over U.S. foreign policy decision-making has evolved into a debate centered around offensive and defensive realism. Simply stated, realism and the centrality of power is becoming the foundation behind U.S. foreign policy with salient questions being how power will be used. The shift towards neoliberal economic policy and realist foreign policy began taking place under the Clinton Administration. This trend has become even more obvious after 9-11. The initial shift towards the promotion of liberal policies and an "interventionist and expansionist" national security strategy was not only attested from the previous quote from Assistant Secretary of State Nye, but also present in the *East Asia Strategic Initiative* (EASI). The EASI concluded that the number of U.S. troops stationed in the Asia-Pacific would be set at 100,000 troops, reaffirming that no further troop reductions would be made. The key elements of the Clinton Administration's nuclear strategy can also be summarized in the following statement: "Our overall nuclear policy is that we must possess the ability to threaten the critical assets and capabilities potential enemies value the most; U.S. nuclear policy must indicate to potential enemies that they possess such capabilities."¹¹

To strengthen its current military power, the U.S. is spending over four hundred billion dollars. The reason behind such massive budget expenditures is clearly summarized in the Quadrennial Defense Review:

first, "ensuring U.S. security and freedom of action"

second, "precluding hostile domination of critical areas, particularly Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asia littoral, and the Middle East and Southwest Asia"

and third, "contributing to economic well-being," including: 1) protecting "the vitality and productivity of the global economy; 2) security of international sea, air, space, and information line of communications; 3) access to key markets and strategic resources."¹²

Democrats and Republicans seem to have few fundamental differences regarding the security

¹¹ Walt Slocum, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Senate Armed Service Committee Hearing on U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Washington DC, 5/23/00.

¹² U.S. Department of Defense. *Quadrennial Defense Review, 2001*, p.2.

policy that pursues an "armored globalization," an American-centered globalization backed by an overwhelming military capability. While the two parties share a tacit consensus on "1-4-2" out of the "1-4-2-1" strategy, they disagree only on the tactic of preemption as well as the final "1" that calls for occupation and regime change. They also agree in principle that the development, proliferation, and use of weapons of mass destruction must be checked, differing only about the means, about whether preemptive strikes, or other offensive military tactics, should be employed to restrain the use and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The difference is one of means, not ends.

U.S. Troop Realignment

On November 25, 2003, President Bush announced that U.S. global troop realignment would begin, formally launching the last of the trinity of strategic change, military transformation and force redeployment. To effectively implement the "1-4-2-1" strategy by restructuring its stationed forces, the U.S. Army adopted the "Integrated Global Base and Deployment". Rather than relying on a "fixed force" that is permanently stationed and tasked to operate in a specific region, the army wants to transform its forces so that troops can be rapidly deployed to different regions and execute a wide array of operations. The new global basing strategy also envisions expanding the radius of military operations beyond the deployed region to the world. Furthermore, despite reductions in base size and the number of overseas troops, the U.S. military will maximize mobility and flexibility to develop the capability to rapidly concentrate its military power in a target theater.

The primary emphasis in the troop realignment, as outlined in the "Global Posture Review," is on military capabilities rather than troop numbers. Its goal is to strengthen the force effectiveness with a smaller military by enhancing military tactics, mobility, speed, readiness, jointness, and capabilities. For instance, the U.S. navy seeks to improve its operational plans so it can maintain the ability to simultaneously mobilize a minimum of six "aircraft carrier strike groups" without increasing the actual number of ships.¹³ Likewise, the Army hopes that the transformation will increase its fighting power by thirty percent even if troop levels grow on by six percent.¹⁴

The base relocations and realignment of United States Forces in Korea (USFK) are being carried out as part of the overall realignment and restructuring programs taking place around the globe in accordance with U.S. strategy change and military transformation. The military transformation and force realignment will have short-term and long-term consequences in Northeast Asia. In the short term, they will increase U.S. military's offensive strike capabilities against the North Korea that is the target of the "2" and "1" of the "1-4-2-1" strategy, destabilizing the security environment on the Korean Peninsula in. In the long term, the U.S. will strengthen its ability to intervene in an unspecified threat that may arise in anywhere in the entire Asia-Pacific region, including China.

¹³ To test this capability, in summer 2004, the Pentagon executed simultaneous military operations training exercises with seven groups of aircraft carrier strike groups in all parts of the world. In the Pacific, the *Kittyhawk*, *Stennis*, and *Regan* aircraft carriers were simultaneously mobilized. The *Kittyhawk* and *Stennis* participated in joint training exercises for the very first time.

¹⁴ Rather than establish a new division with the additional troops, the Army plans to reorganize forces into independent brigades which can be invested in a wide array military operations.

A. Strengthening Military Capabilities against North Korea

Currently, most of USFK on the frontline, including the US-ROK Combined Forces Command stationed in Yongsan, is slated to relocate to the Osan-Pyeongtaek region. Negotiations concerning the timing and burden-share transfer costs are proceeding, but the relocation itself is an established fact. One point to bear in mind is that the shift towards rapid, mobile forces is not only aimed at overseas targets such as Southeast Asia. The stationing of rapid, mobile forces south of the Han River also strengthens military capabilities against North Korea. How, then does the U.S. military's rear deployment paradoxically strengthen the ability to strike the North?

First of all, U.S. troops' deployment to the rear enhances their survivability. At the height of the nuclear crisis with Pyongyang in 1994, Washington considered the option to use military force, only to give it up because massive casualties were predicted. U.S. troops currently deployed on the front as a tripwire are as they were in 1994 held hostage to the 10,000 pieces of North Korean long-range artillery on the frontline, forestalling Washington's use of military force. Under these circumstances, the best way to protect the U.S. troops is to relocate U.S. troops to the rear, keeping them out of reach from the North's long-range artillery. If USFK are relocated further south, this would "put them out of range of the 'enormous investment' North Korea has made in artillery," as Douglas Feith, the Assistant Secretary of Defense of Policy, noted.¹⁵ For this reason, Osan-Pyeongtaek (located fifty miles south of Seoul) drew attention as a new home for the U.S. Second Infantry Division. Just as in nuclear strategy the defensive capability against the adversary's retaliation would give the defender the ability to strike first, so in the Korean peninsula the Bush administration's preemptive strike doctrine can be executed without worrying about the North's retaliatory strikes if the U.S. forces are kept out of the North's retaliation range.¹⁶

In addition to an increase in survival capability, another important reason for the relocation is found in the more offensive posture that the U.S. military assumes. The Bush administration embraces preemptive strikes as an official policy, under which it is, if deemed necessary, willing to preemptively strike an adversary. It is also willing to occupy the adversary's territory and force a regime change. Even the tactics used to implement the Bush administration's strategies became more aggressive. The U.S. will first destroy the adversary's top government leadership and its central network system, thereby paralyzing the military. Then, rather than facing enemy troops in an all out frontal war, U.S. military will use its superior mobility and information capabilities to seize hold of core strategic positions. Such operations concepts require a mobile, networked force that can be projected by airplanes and ships, which necessitates an operational base from which such a force can launch a multi-dimensional strike. Osan-Pyeongtaek, with access to both an air base and a naval port, appears an ideal base from which to launch a simultaneous strike against North Korea's front and rear in mobile and network warfare.

Granted that the role of the U.S.-ROK alliance is not just limited to the Korean Peninsular region

15 Kathleen T. Rhem. "Policy makers 'Plan to be Surprised' in New Global Posture." *American Forces Information Services*, 6/30/04. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun20004/n06302004_200406308.html.

16 This line of reasoning needs to be modified after Pyongyang declared in February 2005 that it possessed nuclear weapons. Now it is not just the North's long-range artillery but also its nuclear tipped missiles that the U.S. military has to protect itself against in any contingencies. Although missile defense systems are deployed and will be strengthened, they do not guarantee a foolproof shield, complicating Washington's war plans. It is quite plausible that Pyongyang decided to go nuclear precisely to complicate and forestall what it perceived as Washington's looming preemptive strike.

but the alliance is fundamentally transforming to take on global missions. But to focus only on the global aspect runs the risk of missing other aspects of the current U.S. military strategy. Even if the military must prepare for future threats, its highest priority lies in the execution of current strategy. Since the United States' current military strategy designates North Korea as the "main enemy" and demands a "quick and decisive" victory, the U.S. military's greatest duty is to achieve the capabilities and preparedness necessary to carry out such a strategy. After all, the current restructuring of USFK is taking place to first fulfill the demands of the "1-4-2-1" strategy.

The above statement is also confirmed by the Annual US-ROK Security Consultative Meeting. At the 2003 Annual Meeting, the U.S. and South Korean defense ministers indicated that in accordance with "strategic flexibility," the U.S.-ROK alliance would respond with an enlarged global role. Furthermore, the two sides agreed to reinforce military capabilities and promote the revolution in military affairs. These two goals are clearly stated in the following paragraph:

"The U.S. reaffirmed their \$11 billion public commitment in three years to increase military capabilities for *South Korean security*... To improve the joint capabilities of the US-ROK Combined Force Command, the U.S. and ROK reaffirmed their support in promoting the development and transformation of South Korean military capabilities in light of U.S. military transformation.¹⁷

Not only is North Korea one of the two targeted theaters of the "1-4-2-1" strategy, but is also the primary target of the Nuclear Posture Review and the Nonproliferation policy. The fact that it is situated at the intersection of Washington's two-theater war strategy and WMD non-proliferation strategy is the most urgent, serious issue that affects the security on the Korean Peninsula as well as in East Asia. The Nuclear Posture Review, made public in early 2002, presented concrete scenarios pertaining to North Korea and its use of nuclear weapons. The report makes vividly clear the possibility of a North Korean nuclear war. Moreover, the *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction*, announced in December 2002, and the National Security Presidential Directive #17 signed in May 2002 approved the use of preemptive strikes against states and terrorist organizations that were deemed "close to" acquiring weapons of mass destruction or long-range missiles.¹⁸ In fact, because North Korea remains the top priority in the WMD non-proliferation policy, which the Bush administration considers a critical security issue, Washington has mobilized a wide array of measures to deal with the "North Korean threat," including the use of nuclear weapons, conventional preemptive strikes, military blockades, and diplomatic pressure.

B. Converting U.S. Alliances into a Regional Fighting Force

Even if U.S. strategic plans are changing, and the U.S. military is undergoing transformation, this should not be interpreted as negligence of allied countries. Despite its unilateralism, the Bush administration seeks to work in close cooperation with allied countries to smoothly implement the "1-4-2-1" strategy and military transformation. One main point distinguishing *Joint Vision 2020* from the

¹⁷ 35th Annual US-ROK Security Consultative Meeting joint communiqué. Seoul, South Korea. 11/17/2003. Emphasis is mine.

¹⁸ Michael Allen and Barton Gellman. "Preemptive Strikes Part of U.S. Strategic Doctrine: 'All Options' Open for Countering Unconventional Arms." *The Washington Post*. 12/11/02.

previous *Joint Vision 2010* is the emphasis that the latest version places on military alliances and multinational operations with allied partners. *Joint Vision 2020* stresses interoperability in joint and combined forces operations, expanding the reach of interoperability not only to conventional technological issues of weapons systems but also to such areas as military organization, process, and specialized areas.¹⁹ This creates pressure for alliance partners to purchase the most advanced weapons systems and to carry out their own military transformation in order to create high-tech forces that will be interoperable with U.S. forces. In other words, U.S. military transformation and realignment serve as a driver of arms race in the 21st century as U.S. allies are pressured to "transform" their militaries and as U.S. adversaries are forced to react to these changes.

Furthermore, the U.S. is vigorously promoting the expansion of its alliances' scope of activity to the extent that allied countries are helping promote U.S. strategy and keeping pace with U.S. military transformation. Washington would like allied militaries to take part in regional operations to advance its strategy even if such an operation is not stipulated in any formal alliance agreement. Thus through the "New Defense Guideline" and other related documents, the U.S.-Japan alliance's sphere of activity has expanded in line with the Armitage Report's suggestion that Japan play the role of "Great Britain in Asia." Likewise, NATO's sphere of activity has expanded beyond the region stipulated in the formal treaty to the point where "out of area" operations have become routine and central to its missions.²⁰

Herein lies the reason why negotiations on Yongsan Garrison's relocation should not be limited to the issue of cost. The base relocation is being carried out as part of Washington's overall plan that will leave a deep impact on the basic orientation of the US-ROK alliance, the roles of the U.S. and ROK military, and Seoul's plans to introduce new weapons systems, leading to a fundamental transformation of South Korea's national security posture. Japan, by increasing her defense role in line with Washington's wishes, is striving to achieve the long-term goal to become a "normal nation" while NATO is expanding its area of operation to provide for the security of the areas bordering Europe. In South Korea's case, these changes will not only incorporate South Korea deeper into U.S. military system, but also creates serious consequences by heightening tension on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia.

The "Future of the Alliance"(FOTA) process, following the decisions of the 2002 Annual U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting, seems to proceed to clarify the division of labor between the U.S. and ROK forces and implement their respective tasks under the tacit, mutual agreement to enlarge the operational range of the alliance. According to the division of labor, the USFK is transferring ten frontline operational missions to the Korean military, increasing the role of South Korean forces near the DMZ while concentrating its own role on launching from a safe rear area long-distance strikes against North Korea. This move is also consistent with the plan initiated in the early 1990s that in Peninsula security South Korea would take the lead with the U.S. playing a supporting role while on regional security issues the U.S. forces would take the initiative with South Korean forces taking on a supportive role.

The Pentagon is planning to invest about \$11 billion on improving the USFK for the next three

19 General Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Vision 2020*. U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000. pp. 6, 16-17.

20 Donald Rumsefeld. "News Conference with NATO Security-General." 4/6/04. [http://www.defenselink.mil/transformation/what_is_transformation.html].

years, as a way to apply the overall military transformation to the forces deployed in Korea. It is worthwhile to note that the military transformation is not just limited to the USFK but also exerts pressure on the South Korean military to improve its own military preparedness. Recognizing "the need to utilize scientific development and military technologies to enhance combined defense posture," defense ministers agreed already in 2002 that the ROK military must transform into an advanced, high-tech force. As Minister of Defense Cho Young-Kil stated in 2003, "To improve combined operations capabilities of the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command, the ROK will develop and transform its own military capabilities in reference to U.S. military transformation."²¹ The Roh administration's so-called "cooperative, independent defense" policy has in effect led to an increase of its defense budget, military modernization, expanded role of ROK forces on the front-line, all of which despite the rhetoric of "independent defense" serve U.S strategic change and military transformation.

All in all the trinity of U.S. strategy change, military transformation and force realignment is, by placing North Korea at the crossroad of its conventional and nuclear strategies, heightening the tension on the Korean peninsula while in the long run deepening potential fault lines in the region by enhancing its projection capabilities and reshaping its alliances accordingly. Tokyo is riding on the crest of the sea change initiated by Washington to expand its operational area and to enhance its force capability while Seoul is going along with the trinity, despite what appears a disunity of the Roh administration. Pyongyang is reacting in the most vociferous manner, agreeing to the six party talk but at the same time increasing its "nuclear deterrent capability." Beijing's reaction has been muted and multifaceted but it is not neglecting to prepare for long-term potential fault lines.

Toward a Security Community

If the U.S.-led alliance system is leading to more tension, should South Korea walk away from it to find a new partner in the North or China? Or would it serve the South and the regional better if she plays a regional balancer role, as some in the Roh administration suggested? I argue these are false choices because they all draw on the same paradigm of realism that emphasizes power as the ultimate arbiter and power balancing (or maximization) as the best guarantor of survival. Because of their common real politik orientation, they do not solve the problem of security dilemma but merely push the security burden on someone else or move the dilemma to the next level. I submit a better solution can be built on the basis of the concept of security community, the concept, pioneered by Deutch, that has recently been brought back by scholars and practitioners alike as an alternative to realist paradigms of international system and as an extension of international society.

How do we move toward a security community? I propose a dual track: to build a multilateral institutional framework that would mitigate the divisive tendencies and arms race pressure of the current system and that would provide a political momentum toward the security community; and to carve out a regional public sphere that would lay a communicative basis of the community and that would lead to the emergence of a set of regionally shared norms.

To Create a Regional Institutional Framework: From Nuclear Crisis to a Nuclear Weapons Free

²¹ Public statement reference at the 35th Annual US-ROK Security Consultative Meeting.

Zone

Nuclear proliferation concerns drove the Clinton administration to the negotiating table at which the Agreed Framework was signed. But the potential for nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula will linger as long as Korea remains a dangerous tinderbox with a short fuse. In order for a nonproliferation regime on the peninsula to be effective and robust, a multilateral framework is needed that would create a nuclear weapons free zone where both Koreas give up nuclear weapons programs and surrounding powers provide the guarantee that they will not threaten the peninsula with nuclear weapons. It also needs to be complemented by a mechanism that will reduce the conventional military threat felt on both sides of the demilitarized zone(DMZ). This requires ending the Korean War, which was only suspended by the Armistice Agreement signed in 1953. To ensure nonproliferation and allay security concerns, both the North and the South must radically disarm, with support from the four surrounding powers. To defuse the Korean powder keg, Korea has to be peacefully reunified, and it has to be reunified in a form that will not upset the power balance among the four powers. I turn now to some specific issues that stand in the way of reaching these goals.

At the core of what is commonly called the "North Korean nuclear crisis" stands the head-on collision between Washington's proliferation concerns and Pyongyang's survival concerns. As the above section demonstrates, Washington has designated Pyongyang as one of the two key targets in the post-Cold War world and has pursued the military transformation and realignment to efficiently achieve its strategic goal. Pyongyang, seeing Washington's moves as a hostile act that aims to eliminate itself, has taken measures that would strengthen its military, including developing nuclear weapons, but that only ended up fueling Washington's suspicion and justifying its own moves. The two are caught in the classic security dilemma.

An excellent way to help them move out of the dilemma can be found in a regional regime that is built on the non-nuclear declaration that the North and South signed in 1991. In that declaration, the two parties pledged not to develop nuclear weapons, but no commitment was made by any of the four major powers to respect and support this pledge. This asymmetry, which subjected Korea's non-nuclear survival to the goodwill of the neighboring nuclear powers, was inherently unstable and constituted one of the main reasons for the current "North Korean nuclear crisis." In order to make the declaration less asymmetric and more effective, North and South Korea can add a protocol, which the four powers would then sign and ratify, that would transform the peninsula into a nuclear weapons free zone that will not engage in nuclear weapons production or related research and that will also be free of the introduction, use, or threat of the use of nuclear weapons by outsiders. This can pave the way toward a more ambitious demilitarization system that would prohibit the transfer of weapons or weapons-related technology to, or through, either Korea.²²

Key to the Agreed Framework's success lay in Washington's and Pyongyang's willingness to

22 In a more ambitious proposal, Umebayashi suggests that the two Koreas and Japan establish a regional nuclear-weapons-free zone, which should then be honored in a protocol by China, Russia, and the United States. Hiro Umebayashi, "A Northeast NWFZ: A Realistic and Attainable Goal," *INESAP Information Bulletin*, no. 10 (August 1996). See also Andrew Mack, "A Northeast Asia Nuclear-Free Zone: Problems and Prospects," in *Nuclear Policies in Northeast Asia*, UNIDIR/95/16 (New York: United Nations, 1995); and John E. Endicott and Alan G. Gorowitz, "Track II Cooperative Regional Security Efforts: Lessons from the Limited Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone for Northeast Asia," *Pacifica Review* 11, no. 3 (October 1999).

recognize the other side's core concerns and address them on the basis of the principle of reciprocity. The Bush and Kim Jong-Il governments, however, have thus far refused to do either. The two will be able to get out of the stalemate only when they are willing to move out their Manichean view of the other and to return to the principle of reciprocity. This process may be facilitated by relatively easy and tangible steps similar to the Kumchangri "inspection": as a way to address U.S. concerns about the North's HEU activities, Pyongyang invites U.S. officials to "visit" some of its facilities that are suspected of HEU activities; as a way to allay Pyongyang's concerns about its security, Washington resumes its supply of heavy oil as a concrete gesture of political goodwill.

The nuclear stalemate is further complicated by a clash over missile issues. If President Clinton made it clear that he would link progress in missile negotiations with lifting economic sanctions against the DPRK and improving U.S.-North Korean relations, President Bush has made this one of the cornerstones of his policies toward North Korea. Any substantial progress in the peace talks and any normalization of the North Korean diplomatic and economic relations with the West, therefore, depends on the two parties achieving a constructive compromise on the missile issues. Clinton began a series of negotiations on missile issues in Berlin in 1996. In September 1999 Kim Jong-Il agreed to a moratorium on missile testing, while the negotiations were still underway and he has since repeatedly confirmed his willingness to maintain this moratorium until 2003. Clinton appeared to be on the verge of making a breakthrough just before he left office in January 2001: he and Kim Jong-Il exchanged envoys at the highest level to arrange a summit where they would seal an agreement to shut down the North Korean missile program.²³ Currently, however, Bush and Kim are at a stalemate. Bush wants to prevent the development and export of missiles by the DPRK while Kim insists that the development and deployment of missiles inside North Korea is a matter of its sovereign right to self-defense.²⁴

The fundamental difference between Clinton's near-success and Bush's stalemate lies not in Bush's unwillingness to talk or in his proposal to expand the agenda for talks but in his refusal to end the enmity between the two nations. The most recent U.S.-North Korea joint statement, issued in October 2000, shows that it was precisely because the two governments made a commitment to end hostile policies toward each other that the North was ready to scrap its missile program:

Recognizing that improving ties is a natural goal in relations among states and that better relations would benefit both nations in the 21st century while helping ensure peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and in the Asia-Pacific region, the U.S. and the D.P.R.K. sides stated that they are prepared to undertake a new direction in their relations. As a crucial first step, the two sides stated that neither government would have hostile intent toward the other and confirmed the commitment of both governments to make every effort in the future to build a new relationship free from past enmity.

Building on the principles laid out in the June 11, 1993 U.S.-D.P.R.K. Joint Statement and reaffirmed in the October 21, 1994 Agreed Framework, the two sides agreed to work to remove mistrust,

23 Wendy R. Sherman, "Talking to the North Koreans," *The New York Times*, Section A;19, March 7, 2001 and Michael R. Gordon, "How Politics Sank Accord on Missiles With North Korea," *The New York Times*, Section A;1, March 6, 2001. <http://campusgw.library.cornell.edu/cgi-bin/manntom2.cgi?section=networked&URL=gateway.html> (retrieved on August 10, 2001).

24 For an inside account of the missile negotiations, see Gary Samore, "U.S.-DPRK Missile Negotiations," *Nonproliferation Review* vol. 9, no. 2 (2002), pp. 16-20.

build mutual confidence, and maintain an atmosphere in which they can deal constructively with issues of central concern. In this regard, the two sides reaffirmed that their relations should be based on the principles of respect for each other's sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs²⁵

It is precisely this commitment "to build a new relationship free from past enmity" that is required to peacefully defuse the missile issue. Pyongyang is not likely to give up the production and deployment of missiles unless Washington shows a willingness to address its security concerns. Hence a possible solution seems to lie in a set of reciprocal concessions whereby Bush provides a security guarantee in exchange for Pyongyang's termination of its missile program. Only when Bush comes to the realization that his nonproliferation policy is riddled with contradictions and that the U.S.-North Korea relationship is entrenched in a security dilemma will such a solution become possible. Given the North's deep economic problems, one might be tempted to think that it will give in to the American pressure only if the United States offers economic incentives such as the removal of sanctions. But this may well prove to be wishful thinking because Pyongyang is likely to argue that its military capabilities and missiles are the only guarantor of its survival. To treat what it considers to be a "life-or-death" issue as an economic bargaining chip is to put the cart before the horse. Such an approach ignores the stubborn reality that North Korea's missiles are a byproduct of the enmity between the two nations and that a solution to the missile issue can begin only with a reciprocal recognition that both sides of the DMZ share the common responsibility for the persistent military tension and arms build-up. Without this sense of reciprocity, hawks in the United States and South Korea, as well as in North Korea, will take every opportunity to halt and reverse a peace process and to maintain the military status quo.

In addition to its growing ballistic missile capabilities, North Korea's forward deployment of its infantry units and artillery forces near the DMZ represents a major source of concern for the United States and South Korea. South Korean and American militaries estimate that fifty-five percent to two-thirds of North Korea's 1.1 million military personnel are deployed within 100 kilometers of the DMZ.²⁶ In 1996 North Korea also redeployed its combat aircraft to locations near the DMZ that are only six minutes' flying time from the heart of Seoul. The North's conventional force is buttressed by greatly improved special forces that number 100,000 that are trained to filter rapidly into key political, industrial, and other sectors within the South. Most statistics on military balance show that the North maintains a quantitative advantage in the number of soldiers and various weapons systems whereas the South has a qualitative edge in its weapons and training. Accurately comparing their military capabilities, however, is extremely complicated.

Force comparisons may be difficult to make but the logic of the security dilemma is easy to see. Just as the United States and South Korea are concerned about North Korea's force deployment near the DMZ, so the North is equally concerned that 90 percent of ROK and USFK personnel are positioned within 50 kilometers of the DMZ.²⁷ Each side claims that its own forces are defensive and that the other's

25 U.S.-D.P.R.K. Joint Communique, Department of State, October 12, 2000.

26 For more information regarding North Korean force deployment, see *Defense White Paper 2000* (Seoul: The Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, 2000) at http://www.mnd.go.kr/mnden/sub_menu/w_book/2000. (Date accessed: June 21, 2001.)

27 Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History* (New York: Norton, 1997), 469.

are offensive; each justifies its own force posture on the basis of a perceived threat from the other's force posture. Now is the time for both sides to acknowledge that they are entrapped in a vicious security dilemma cycle. That acknowledgement would constitute the first step out of the dilemma. For just as the security dilemma is a byproduct of practices of enmity in which the United States and North Korea have long been engaged, so does its resolution begin with practices that replace enmity with amity. If either Pyongyang or Washington argues that its forces are purely defensive, then it should also be prepared to accept the other side's claim that its forces are also defensive. Given Seoul's growing military superiority over Pyongyang, by the same token, the South should be prepared to scrap its plans for weapons purchases and force modernization in exchange for Pyongyang's halting of its missile programs and limiting its arms purchases. Washington, the major weapons supplier to the South, should also be prepared to support Seoul's decision to stop arms imports and to stop reinforcement of the USFK in exchange for Pyongyang's pledge not to export or import weapons. Once arms limitation is agreed upon and implemented, the two Koreas can start the process of building-down their arms stockpiles.

Some of these steps were taken or at least they were in the works during the Clinton administration. The Agreed Framework of 1994 laid down the political framework that would allay in a step-by-step, reciprocal manner America's concerns about the North's nuclear program and the North's concerns about the U.S. military posture. The Clinton administration was apparently on the verge of negotiating away the missile problem in its final days precisely because it acknowledged the security dilemma dynamic on the Korean peninsula, as clearly reflected in Perry's admission that North's missiles might be a weapon of deterrence: "[North Korean missiles'] primary reason...is deterrence....They would be deterring the United States."²⁸ On the basis of this acknowledgement, the Clinton administration moved to give North Korea a guarantee of no nuclear threat and political normalization; the Kim Jong-Il administration reciprocated by freezing its nuclear and missile programs. The Bush administration halted these processes, allegedly for a review, and has thus far stubbornly refused to acknowledge that the United States and North Korea are entrapped in a vicious security dilemma cycle. Instead, it demonizes the DPRK and prefers unilateral measures. The Bush administration's insistence on taking unilateral steps rather than adopting reciprocal measures goes directly against the premises underlying the Agreed Framework and other joint statements, and could well undo the achievements made through negotiations.

Pyongyang has long demanded the replacement of the Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty with the United States and the normalization of relations between the two, but has in recent years shown interest in what it calls "an interim peace mechanism" in lieu of a peace treaty. It even indicated its willingness to consider dropping its long-standing demand that U.S. military withdraw from South Korea. After the historic summit in 2000, Kim Dae-Jung revealed that Kim Jong-Il expressed his "understanding" that U.S. military might remain on the Korean peninsula even after reunification. Washington, however, regards the Korean armistice as the cornerstone of the U.S. alliance system in Northeast Asia and therefore untouchable. It is "virtually heresy even to raise the issue, let alone discuss a detailed road plan toward ending the armistice," as two insightful observers have noted.²⁹ One possible way to resolve the differences seems to lie in a set of simultaneous nonaggression pacts between the

28 Selig S. Harrison, "Time to Leave Korea?" *Foreign Affairs* 80, no. 2 (2001): 64.

29 Peter Hayes and Stephen Noerper, "The Future of the U.S.-ROK Alliance," in *Peace and Security in Northeast Asia*, ed. Young Whan Kihl and Peter Hayes (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 266.

parties to the Korean War that would establish a new, truly peacekeeping function for UN forces.

Who is party to the war is a tricky question, and the answers vary.³⁰ Washington and Pyongyang are certainly parties, but there is little agreement on Seoul's and Beijing's status. Although China as one of the three signatories is still a de jure party to the armistice, I argue that China is not a de facto party because the de facto state of war that had existed between China and the United States and South Korea ended when Beijing opened diplomatic relations with both. Also, despite Pyongyang's insistence that Seoul is not a party, I argue that Seoul's de facto, if not de jure, status has to be reckoned with. A peace regime on the Korean peninsula cannot be built if the South is not involved as a full party. Therefore, Washington, Seoul, and Pyongyang should adopt a document that would lay out a comprehensive set of measures, perhaps in a form similar to the Agreed Framework, that each commits itself to taking in order to end the state of war. Seoul and Pyongyang have already made progress on this front: they signed a nonaggression pact in 1991 and held a summit in 2000. It is now up to Pyongyang and Washington to take meaningful measures to end the state of war.

On a regional level, Washington needs to recognize that Beijing and Moscow would find intolerable the idea of a reunified Korea in which the United States remains the sole foreign military presence, just as it would be unfathomable for Washington or Tokyo to accept a reunified Korea under Chinese or Russian influence. All four powers have a vital stake in peace on the peninsula, but they all prefer a divided Korea that no single power controls over a unified Korea under the lopsided influence of one of them. The international system in Northeast Asia, in other words, has an interest in maintaining the status quo even at the price of continued instability and the risk of conflagration. Furthermore, the United States, Russia, China, and, to a lesser degree, Japan, remain the major sources of weapons and their technology for the two Koreas, giving them further incentive to perpetuate the fragile division. A peace regime on the peninsula, therefore, needs an international component that would constrain arms transfers from the four and alleviate the concerns that each might have over upsetting the power balance on the Korean peninsula.

If the peace process is intensified through the successful implementation of these mechanisms, the two Koreas may be able to enter a qualitatively higher level of inter-Korean dialogue. That, in turn, may produce a confederal or federal form of political integration between the two Koreas. At this juncture, the multilateral peace talks, which began as a specific forum for peace on the Korean peninsula, can develop into a region-wide security forum for Northeast Asia. In this stage, the focus of the multilateral forum for Korea will be able to shift to a higher level of a peace mission for East Asia. For example, the non-nuclear declaration signed by the two Koreas and endorsed by the four surrounding powers can serve as a basis for building a regional nuclear weapons free zone that include not only the Korean peninsula but also Japan. The multilateral regional forum can perhaps start addressing regional security issues such as the potential arms race in Northeast Asia. As it expands its scope, it may develop into a multilateral common security organization similar to the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe(OSCE).

While I acknowledge a long and difficult process lies ahead, the process is already in motion in

30 See for example, Pat Norton, "Ending the Korean Armistice Agreement: The Legal Issues,"The Nautilus Institute, Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network, Policy Forum Online, March 1997 (http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet/fora/2a_armisticelegal_norton.html).

the form of the six party talks. The talks must squarely confront the core issue of the current crisis, the collision between Washington's security policy and Pyongyang's security needs, and move to defuse the collision by taking steps to create a nuclear weapons free zone that would address both sides' concerns in a mutually amicable manner. This will trigger the cascade of other measures, laid above, which will ultimately lead to a multilateral security institution in the region.

To Elevate Historical Contentions to a Regional Public Sphere

A regional institution can be an effective tool that helps its member states move out of a Pareto suboptimality, and when it is effectively maintained in security arena, it can mitigate negative consequences of anarchy, slow down security dilemma, reduce the likelihood of war, and help states feel secure overall. Yet not only does it have the potential problem of "democratic deficit,"but it is also riddled with risks of defection and suspicion, which may trigger a vicious cycle that ends up undoing the institution, as the Agreed Framework did. A multilateral political regime by itself therefore is not enough. The regime needs to be complemented and supported by a communicative process that would contribute to a better understanding of each other, the development of mutually shared norms, and even the emergence of "we-feeling."Noting that such a communicative process has been in place in Northeast Asia in the form of historical contentions among the regional actors, this section argues that conscious efforts must be made to develop the historical contentions into a regional public sphere within which regional issues, understandings, and norms can be debated among various regional actors. The creation of a Northeast Asia public sphere is essential to the project to secure a regional multilateral institution and to develop it into a regional security community.

Modern media such as newspapers, radio, and television have played, through the stories they tell, a central role in the construction of national identities, in the composition of an imagined community of people who believe that they resemble one another and are different from others who are not seen as belonging to the nation.³¹ There are two essential aspects of this process according to Anderson: the existence of national media institutions; and the dissemination of stories that encourage individuals to see themselves as belonging to a community of fate.

The significance of public space is not limited to the process of national identity construction. Such a process of public sphere formation is also crucial for the development of democracy, as Habermas argued.³² He developed the concept of the public sphere not simply to understand empirical communication flows but to contribute to a normative political theory of democracy. In his theory, a public sphere is conceived as a space for the communicative generation of public opinion, in ways that are supposed to assure a degree of moral-political legitimacy. In addition, a public sphere is supposed to be a vehicle for mobilizing public opinion as a political force. It should empower the citizenry vis-à-vis private powers and permit it to exercise influence over the state.

The public sphere that is constituted in part by mass media institutions and narratives is seen historically as a national space but not one that is necessarily restricted either empirically or

31 Anderson, B. R. O. G. (1991). *Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*. London; New York, Verso.

32 Habermas, J. (1989). *The structural transformation of the public sphere: an inquiry into a category of Bourgeois society*. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press c1989.

philosophically to the nation-state.³³ This gives rise to the possibility of a transnational public sphere that may help to engender transnational political identities in a changed technological and geopolitical environment. Some scholars have pointed to the existence of a regional public sphere, for example, in Middle East while others suggested the possibility even of a global public sphere.³⁴

That a regional public space is not only possible but also critical to a regional community is well illustrated by European experiences. While the European Union is commonly presented as the leading example of regional integration, it is also as commonly asserted that it is hampered by a 'democratic deficit' and the absence of a common European identity because system integration has greatly outpaced social integration. One way in which this democratic deficit might be addressed, it is claimed, is if media institutions could play a similar role in the development of the EU as they did in the development of nation-states.³⁵ The creation of a European public sphere is thus seen as essential in order to address the double deficit within the European Union: the democratic deficit and the common identity deficit.³⁶ Learning from this experience, Northeast Asia may as well begin to create a regional public sphere as it seeks to develop a multilateral regional institution.

Even if we acknowledge a regional public sphere is possible and necessary, realizing one is a difficult task because this project not only faces potential resistance by national public spheres but also lacks the kind of opportunity structure that enabled the emergence of national public spheres. Several studies on framing have shown that both the national institutional and cultural opportunity structure have serious consequences for the discourses that evolve within these structures.³⁷ For a long time, it has been argued that a common public sphere presupposes a preceding institutional setup.³⁸ Even if we drop the

33 Fraser, N. (2002). *Transnationalizing the Public Sphere*. Conference of 'Public Space'. Graduate Center, City University of New York.

34 For the former, see Lynch, M. (1999). *State interests and public spheres: the international politics of Jordan's identity*. New York, Columbia University Press. Barnett, M. N. (1998). *Dialogues in Arab politics: negotiations in regional order*. New York, Columbia University Press. For works on a global public sphere, see Buck-Morss, S. (2000). "A Global Public Sphere?" *Radical Philosophy*. Bohman, J. (1998). "The Globalization of the Public Sphere." *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 24(2/3): 199-216. Bohman, J. (1999). "International Regimes and Democratic Governance: Political Equality and Influence in Global Institutions." *International Affairs* 75(3): 499-513.

35 Kevin, Deirdre. 2003. *Europe in the Media: A Comparison of Reporting, Representation, and Rhetoric in National Media Systems in Europe*. Mahwah, N.J.: L. Erlbaum Associates.

36 There seems a consensus on the need for a European public sphere but scholars disagree on whether or not one exists. Some argue there is a fledgling European public sphere while others remain skeptical. For the former, see Schlesinger, Phillip. 1999. *Changing Spaces of Political Communication: The Case of the European Union*. *Political Communication* 16: 263-79, and Trenz, Hans-Jörg. 2004. *Media Coverage on European Governance: Exploring the European Public Sphere in National Quality Newspapers*. *European Journal of Communication* 19 (3): 291-319. For the latter, see Downey, John, and Thomas Koenig. "Nationalization Vs. Europeanization Vs. Globalization of Issues That Should Belong to the European Public Sphere: The Berlusconi-Schulz." In *ESA Conference "New Directions in European Media"*. Aristotle University Thessaloniki, 2004.

37 DiMaggio, P. and W. W. Powell (1983). "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields." *American Sociological Review* 48: 147-160. Ferree, M. M. (2002). *Shaping abortion discourse: democracy and the public sphere in Germany and the United States*. Cambridge; New York, Cambridge University Press. Koopmans, R. and P. Statham (1999). "Challenging the Liberal Nation-State? Postnationalism, Multiculturalism, and the Collective Claims Making of Migrants and Ethnic Minorities in Britain and Germany." *American Journal of Sociology* 105(2): 652-696.

assumption that such setup is a necessary precondition for a public sphere, we would expect that the absence of such structures would render the convergence of national public spheres difficult.³⁹

Then, where do we begin to create a regional public sphere in Northeast Asia? We begin with Risse and van De Steeg's counter-intuitive observation that "contestation is a crucial pre-condition for the emergence of a European public sphere rather than an indicator for its absence."⁴⁰ While they made the observation in the context of European politics, their insight is equally applicable to Northeast Asia. The more contentious a regional issue becomes and the more social mobilization occurs on the regional issue, the more we should observe Northeast Asian public debates. It is well possible that the increased salience of Northeast Asian issues in news media results from increased contestation of regional affairs. In order for a Northeast Asia public sphere to emerge, there must be an issue that all the regional actors deeply care about.

Risse and Van De Steeg argue a meaningful concept of a regional public sphere requires "three necessary ingredients": a high degree of salience of regional issues; similar frames of reference and meaning structures across national public spheres; mutual awareness of each other in a transnational space.⁴¹ A regional public sphere materializes when a transnational community of communication emerges in which speakers and listeners recognize each other as legitimate participants in a common discourse that frames the particular issues as common regional problems. A meaningful concept of public spheres requires that media communicate the same issues at the same time using the same criteria of relevance. The "same criteria of relevance" requires that issues are framed in similar ways across national public spheres and that we can observe similar meaning structures and interpretive reference points irrespective of national background or political standpoint of the respective media.

Are there in Northeast Asia issues of a high regional saliency that are hotly contested among actors and that the region's media communicate at the same time using the same criteria of relevance? Our answer must be in the affirmative if we recognize historical contentions as such issues. As the recent uproars about Japan's history textbooks in China and Korea illustrate, history remains a contentious regional issue in Northeast Asia. Japanese prime minister's apology about Japan's past has been a sore issue for China and Korea for over half a century. Last year witnessed a Chinese study of a local history become an object of concern for Koreans, quickly degenerating into a source of tension between the two countries. The fact that the East Asian countries so concerned about history of their neighbors as to make history a contentious regional issue provides for a basis for a Northeast Asia regional public sphere.

Some scholars argue that the long history of conflicts and recent contentious experiences make it difficult, if not impossible, for East Asian countries to maintain a peaceful relationship among themselves. They find lingering sources of suspicion, competition and contention likely to lead to a future tempered with a prospect of conflicts. Some of them point to the memory of war as a factor that hinders efforts to build peace. Some refer to the contentions history as an explanation for the glaring

38 Anderson, *op. cit.*

39 Downey, J. and T. Koenig (2004). Nationalization vs. Europeanization vs. Globalization of Issues that should Belong to the European Pubic Sphere: The Berlusconi-Schulz. ESA Conference "New Directions in European Media". Aristotle University Thessaloniki.

40 Risse, T. and M. Van de Steeg (2003). An Emerging European Public Sphere? Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Clarifications. Annual Meeting of the European Union Studies Association. Nashville, TN.

41 *Ibid.*, p. 16.

absence of a regional multilateral security organization that can ameliorate contention and facilitate cooperation. To this group of scholars, historical contentions both reflect and reinforce feelings of national difference and historical enmity.

Another group of scholars, however, finds in the region's history much that contributes to peace. Some in this group argue that Asian countries' historical pattern of bandwagoning behavior will be repeated, which is likely to lead the region away from conflict-prone anarchy. Some find ideational sources of peace in Asia's past culture whereas others focus on domestic culture and institution of more recent vintage as a source of peace. To the second group of scholars, East Asia inherits harmonious past, which blesses the region with a predisposition to cooperation and peace.

Despite their opposite interpretations of history and their divergent predictions of future, these two groups of scholars share a common epistemological stance. They treat history as a given fact whose discovery unproblematically reveals its true meaning. To them, history consists in one set of objective facts on which everybody sees eye to eye. Although some in the second group acknowledge the constitutive nature of history and culture, they tend to start with a history as constituted and use it to explain other political phenomenon rather than to analyze the constitutive process. Both groups agree history is an established fact, differing only about the fact's content.

I argue that both perspectives are not so much wrong as incomplete. History is not an objective fact that waits to be discovered. Nor can it adjudicate different claims to the truth. History is a memory socially constituted and politically institutionalized. As such, it is in a perpetual state of negotiation as much about past as about the present and future. History, when its institutionalized form is consensually accepted, constitutes a social reality that state actors share at an international level while at the same time providing a focal point around which their expectations converge. When an institutionalized history is questioned or disputed, it provides a medium through which state actors renegotiate who they are and what they want. What is interesting about historical contentions in Northeast Asia is that they not only "shap[e] the strategic alignments of the future"⁴² but they do so on a regional level. The contentions are not a battle over how one nation remembers its past but about how Chinese, Japanese and Koreans understand the past that affected all of them. They are concerned with the region's past, and how they remember it is tied to how they want to shape the region's strategic alignments of the future.

Realists argue that uncertainty or disagreement about relative power is settled in war⁴³; but I argue that history provides a cushion, a proxy over which power disputes can be negotiated without resorting to war. Historical disputes can, under a set of conditions help state actors reduce the level of uncertainty in each other's intention and establish a focal point around which normal diplomatic negotiations may be conducted. China, Japan and Korea operate under the condition of structural anarchy that generates conflictual tendency and in the absence of formal multilateral institutions that ameliorate conflictual pressures derived from the anarchy. But their relationships confound realist and liberal expectations because historical contentions serve as a shield that dampens brute power politics and because their disputes over history help reduce the level of uncertainty in the international system, the role that neoliberals expect formal institutions to play. History wars are, to paraphrase Clausewitz, an

42 Gong, G. W. (2001). "The Beginning of History: Remembering and Forgetting as Strategic Issues." *Washington Quarterly* 24(2), p. 45.

43 For example, Blainey, G. (1973). *The causes of war*. New York, Free Press.

extension of international institution by other means.

Once history is institutionalized, however, it may lag behind changes on the ground. There may be dissonance between the institutionalized history that reflects a particular political negotiation made at a given time and the actors' current power position, concerns and aspirations. The dissonance creates the desire to renegotiate history to bring it in accordance with the current reality or future desires. In such an instance, history serves as an object of communicative action, the stuff that political actors talk about as a way to negotiate a common understanding about the future and to communicate their future intentions. History is not just about unearthing a distant past but it is also engaged in constituting the present and creating a future through "an unending dialogue" with the past. History, disputed among countries, is communicative diplomacy carried out in an international public sphere where the disputing countries express their intentions, test others', and develop (or at least try to) a common understanding about a new focal point.

Seen from this perspective, Japanese textbook controversy has gone through three distinctive stages. In the first period of calm, which lasted up to 1982, Japanese history textbook embodied the political pact made between Washington and Tokyo in the immediate post-war period. The textbook served as a marker of Japanese identity as a defensive status quo power that denounced war and dispossessed military. Although Japan adopted many institutional arrangements Article 9 of the Constitution, the Self-Defense Force, etc. that established Japan's pacific identity, there still remained a degree of uncertainty about its future direction, particularly after the "reverse course" that encouraged Tokyo to adopt a more aggressive posture. Under such a condition of uncertainty, the textbook, together with Shigeru doctrine and Miki's three non-nuclear principles, provided a focal point around which state actors' expectations could converge.

With the emergence of what E.P. Thompson called "the second Cold War" in the early 1980s, however, Japan's identity as the defensive status quo power was increasingly called into question. Not only did Japan possess a substantial military capability by 1980 but its leadership, headed by Prime Minister Nakasone, seemed to begin the process of transforming Japan into a "normal state" with a regular military that would participate in collective defense missions. Washington too seemed to support, if not encourage, Japan's such transformation. China and Korea viewed the development as a challenge to the post-war consensus, an attempt to revise the rule of the game that had guided the relationships among the countries in the region. The "second Cold War" in East Asia increased the level of uncertainty about the social reality as Japan's identity increasingly lost its ability to serve as a focal point.

The period of history textbook controversy began in 1982 when the Chinese and Korean governments began to charge the Japanese Ministry of Education of "cleansing" its history textbook of war descriptions. While most studies of the first textbook controversy, and the subsequent ones, focus on Beijing's or Seoul's instrumental use of the issue to gain maximum concession in loan packages from Tokyo or to increase its legitimacy, I argue that the textbook controversy was a case of communicative act that the three countries were engaged in through which they negotiated their identities and the terms of their relationship. The history textbook controversy, and Nakasone's 1985 visit to the Yasukuni Shrine and subsequent Chinese/Korean protests, amounted to a delicate diplomatic dance where every step was negotiated. Whereas in Europe the "second Cold War" elicited a direct public challenge and ultimately led to formal institutional solutions such as INF and CFE treaties designed to address the increased

uncertainty and insecurity, in East Asia the "second Cold War" took a detour via history through which the countries negotiated the uncertainty and insecurity.

The communicative negotiations continued into the 21st century with new domestic and regional twists as the three East Asian countries sought to adapt their identities to the new reality of post-Cold War world and societal changes. Where Europe accelerated and expanded its process of formal institutional binding, East Asia continued its dialogical binding. History textbook controversy, despite the apparent conflictual postures and high emotions it prompted, drew on the contentious past to mitigate the hard impact of contentious contemporary realpolitik. Historical contentions mediated, rather than exacerbated, contemporary contentions in East Asia. All in all, historical contentions facilitated regional communication, laying a foundation for a regional public sphere.

Of course, more needs to be done in order for the nascent regional public sphere to grow into a fully functioning one that provides a basis of deliberative democracy and regional identity for a regional community. Two tasks call for immediate attention: one, for regional actors to recognize each other as legitimate speakers in their own public spheres; and two, to develop a regional common frame within which differences in opinion over regional issues are negotiated and hopefully resolved. It does not require an agreement on the issues, but it does require more than taking notice of each other in a common public sphere. The regional actors must learn to treat each other as legitimate speakers in one's own public sphere.

Historical contentions have heightened the saliency of issues that regional actors commonly share and deeply care about. They have been communicated by officials, media, and citizens almost simultaneously throughout Northeast Asia. The contentions have also been framed as common concerns about the future direction of the region, whether regional actors are moving along the path of stability and peace or a disastrous warpath. In the process, national public spheres have been interpenetrated, networked, complicated, producing what might be called a nascent regional public sphere. Some Japanese reporting of the history contentions as infringement of Japanese sovereignty goes against the spirit of the regional public sphere. It needs to be further intensified, deepened, and expanded in order for it to flourish a regional public sphere that anchors the Northeast Asia community.

Conclusion

E. H. Carr illuminates in his seminal work, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939*, a dialectical way in which realism and idealism interact.⁴⁴ Realism, Carr explains, emphasizes facts and their analysis, and tends to downplay the role of purpose. Realism tends to "emphasize the irresistible strength of existing forces and the inevitable character of existing tendencies, and to insist that the highest wisdom lies in accepting, and adapting oneself to, these forces and tendencies." Carr warns that this type of realism, though at times needed as a corrective to the excesses of utopianism, might result in "the sterilization of thought and the negation of action." He admits that there is also a period when "utopianism must be invoked to counteract the barrenness of realism." Thought without analysis is utopian; but thought without purpose is barren. In a final dialectical synthesis, therefore, Carr proposes that mature thought

44 Vendulka Kubalkova, "The Twenty Years' Catharsis: E. H. Carr and IR," chap. 2 in *International Relations in a Constructed World*, ed. Vendulka Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf, and Paul Kowert (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1998).

combines purpose with observation and analysis: "Utopia and reality are thus the two facets of political science. Sound political thought and sound political life will be found only where both have their place."⁴⁵

How do we find a place for reality and utopia in designing a course toward a peace regime on the Korean peninsula? A beginning lies in envisioning a creative synthesis of brute power politics and liberal institution-building, a step that is critically contingent on rising above the antagonistic self-other divide to imagine the other in a nonantagonistic way. In Northeast Asia, a simple acceptance of power politics provides no guarantee of peace, as I have argued. Tripartite militarization (by the United States, South Korea, and Japan) will only precipitate negative reactions from North Korea, China, and Russia, intensifying the already tense environment of the region, and possibly trigger an arms race and even a war. As long as the United States, South Korea, and Japan pursue the realist power strategy of strengthening and integrating their military alliances, the international system in the region will continue to be tense. At the same time, South Korea and Japan may become prisoners of their complacency, unable to develop their own vision of a new regional order one that would slow the arms race and promote a peaceful interaction among the nations of Northeast Asia. The vicious cycle was first broken by the Agreed Framework in which each side to the confrontation not only recognized its adversary's security concerns but also took measures to allay them. Further progress was made when Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Jong-Il held a summit in 2000, moving the two Koreas closer to amity. The final step in the peace offensive was to be Clinton's own summit meeting with the North Korean leader. Clinton's contradiction-ridden "congagement" policy was taking a decisive turn toward engagement, only to be stopped and reversed by Bush. The 2001 *Quadrennial Defense Review* has stifled debate within the Bush administration by reasserting the two-wars strategy. Thus, proponents of containment have gained an almost irreversible momentum and mortally crippled those who favor engagement, which will only exacerbate the tension that Clinton's "old" two-war strategy had created.

To resolve security dilemma and to build peace in the region, a new security framework is needed one that emphasizes less the centrality of power politics and more the importance of multilateral interactions among countries in Northeast Asia. A balance must be struck between alliance politics and multilateral peace endeavors. Continued arms transfers from the United States to South Korea, the accelerating arms build-up by South Korea, and joint efforts in arms production particularly of ballistic missile defense systems by Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo makes any peace proposal a barren gesture. An initiative for peace talks must be coupled with a blueprint for reducing the centrality of military transactions within the military alliances. To acknowledge the reality of security dilemma and the necessity of reciprocity is the first step toward a regional peace initiative. Such an initiative can build on the acknowledgement of the security dilemma to establish a regional multilateral institution and a regional public sphere, the synthesis of which will lead to a security community in Northeast Asia.

⁴⁵ Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 10.

TADASHI KIMIYA

Structural Change of South Korea-Japan Relation: Its Limits and Potentialities

Abstract

South Korea-Japan relation, as a *pseudo-alliance* mediated by the US, constrained by the Cold War, had promoted South Korea-Japan normalization by placing top priority on strengthening anti-communist bloc through economic cooperation while containing the emergence of problems concerning decolonization. It has changed particularly after the end of the Cold War regarding the following respects. First, South Korea and Japan share market democracy as their common political economic value. Secondly, South Korea and Japan have become relatively equal in terms of power. Thirdly, South Korea and Japan can narrow existing perception gaps by balancing their mutual perceptions. Fourthly, South Korea-Japan relations are perceived to be not only relations *between* themselves but also a collaborative one contributing to public goods. Finally, South Korea-Japan relations are now more active, two-directional, and multi-dimensional including civil society relations.

South Korea-Japan relation since the end of the Cold War has been unstable. The two countries cannot seem to encompass a clear moment that can contribute to connecting the two societies instead of moments as anticommunist countries under the Cold War. It is exactly such atmosphere that caused mutual frictions concerning territorial disputes and divergent views over their common history in early 2005. Some analysts assert that South Korea Japan relation cannot become amiable so far as different views concerning past history lie between the two nations. However, impacts of structural changes in South Korea-Japan relation gradually have made and will continue to make their interactions more collaborative, reliable, and productive. I suggest that South Korea and Japan play the role of providing public goods not as hegemony but as alliances of middle powers in Northeast Asia. What is desirable for South Korea and Japan is that they create a peaceful and non-hegemonic regional order. Japan cannot create such an order on its own, and neither can South Korea. Collaborative relations between South Korea and Japan, however, will make such peaceful and non-hegemonic order possible by overcoming prisoners' dilemma.

요약

한일관계의 구조 변화: 그 한계와 가능성

미국 중재의 유사동맹국으로서의 한일 관계는 냉전에 의해 규정된 것으로, 탈식민지화에 따른 문제들이 대두되는 와중에도 경제 협력을 통한 반공블록 강화에 초점을 두고 한일 관계 정상화를 촉진하였다. 한일관계는 냉전 이후 특히 다음과 같은 면에서 변화하였다. 첫째, 한국과 일본은 기본 정치경제적 가치로 시장민주주의를 공유한다. 둘째, 국력 면에 있어서 한국과 일본은

상대적으로 동등한 국가가 되었다. 셋째, 한국과 일본은 상호 이해를 보다 균형적으로 조화해 나감으로써 서로에 대한 인식의 차이를 좁혀나갈 수 있다. 넷째, 한일관계는 양국만의 관계에 한정되는 것이 아니라 국제적으로 기여하는 협력적 관계로 인식되어지고 있다. 끝으로, 한일 관계는 보다 활발하고, 양방향이며, 시민사회 간 관계를 포함하여 다면적 성격을 갖는다.

냉전 이후 한일관계는 양국이 냉전시대의 반공국가라는 사실 이외에는 양쪽 사회를 이어줄 만한 뚜렷한 계기를 갖지 못한다는 점에서 불안정했다. 2005년 초 독도문제를 둘러싼 마찰이나 역사 교과서에 관한 견해 차이는 모두 바로 이러한 상황에서 비롯된 것이다. 어떤 학자들은 양국 사이에 과거사에 대한 견해 차이가 존재하는 한 한일관계는 우호적일 수 없다고 말한다. 그러나 한일관계의 구조가 변화하면서 양국 교류는 점차 협력적이고, 신뢰할 만하며, 생산적인 관계로 바뀌어 왔고 또 그렇게 바뀌어 갈 것이다. 나는 한국과 일본이 패권국가로서가 아니라 동북아시아의 중간세력 동맹으로서 국제적으로 기여하는 역할을 해줄 것을 제안한다. 한일 양국에 있어 바람직한 바는 이들이 평화롭고 비패권주의적인 지역 질서를 확립하는 것이다. 일본도 한국도 혼자서는 그러한 질서를 이룩할 수 없다. 그러나 협력적인 한일관계는 최수의 딜레마를 극복함으로써 평화적이고 비패권주의적인 질서를 가능하게 할 것이다.

Full Text

Introduction

The year 2005 is an epoch making year of South Korea-Japan relation in several aspects. One is the 40th anniversary of South Korea-Japan normalization in 1965. Another is the centennial anniversary of the Ulsa Treaty which was decisive in incorporating Korea into the Japanese protectorate. The other is 60th anniversary of the liberation of Korea from the Japanese empire. Besides, since a few years ago, some Korean actors and actresses, Korean films and TV dramas, and Korean subcultures have been much popular among Japanese, not only among the younger people but also among the elder people. Those phenomena are called 'Han-Ryu', 'Han' means Korea and 'Ryu' means trendy. So far South Korea-Japan relations were concerned, 2004 was the year of the climax of good and friendly South Korea-Japan relations.

With regard to North Korea-Japan relations, however, 2004 was the year of the worst case, in which not only North Korea-Japan normalization talks came to a standstill but also the mutual hostility has been aggravated. In other words, on the one hand, Yon-Sama, which is the Japanese nickname of the very popular South Korean actor, Mr. Pae Yong Jun, has contributed to bridging the gap between South Korea and Japan, on the other hand, North Korean leader, Mr. Kim Jong Il has contributed to widening the gap between South Korea and Japan.

What is the prospect of South Korea-Japan relation in 2005? One of the political issues between South Korea and Japan is the territorial dispute with regard to the islands which are called Dokdo in Korea, but Takeshima in Japan. The problem of which country has the legal territorial rights of the islets, Korea or Japan, was not resolved by South Korea-Japan normalization in 1965. Since 1950s, it is South Korea that has taken effective territorial control. South Korean government has insisted that the islands are historically Korean proper territory, so that Korean people regard Japanese claim that the islets belong to Japan as the symptom that Japanese do not regard their past colonial and invasive history as bad. In other

words, for Koreans, the territorial problem is not purely a territorial one but associated with their past colonial history. Japanese government, however, insists that the problem is purely a territorial one.

In addition to this territorial problem, South Korean government and people are angry at the textbooks that have been approved as some of the textbooks which can be used as an official textbook by junior high school students. In the textbooks, there is not only such a description that Japanese colonial rule contributed to Korean modernization but also a description and a photograph that the islands belong to the Japanese proper territory. In contrast to a relatively good and friendly mood of South Korea-Japan relation at least for Japanese society in 2004, the 2005 South Korea-Japan relation seems to be ominous, unfriendly, and even possibly hostile. Was the good and friendly South Korea-Japanese relation in 2004 only a temporal phenomenon in the midst of the constant strained relations? In this paper I try to consider whether the structure of South Korea-Japan relation has been changed or not, and if changed, in which respects the structural relation has been changed.

1 The Structure of South Korea-Japan Relation under the Cold War: The Emergence of the 1965 Regime and Its Development

Korea was liberated from the Japanese colonial empire in 1945 just after the Japanese defeat, but could not have been an independent nation for three years, and at last was divided into the two separate regimes under the huge influences of the Cold War confrontation. Without any fundamental reflections on its own colonial rule, the post-war Japan established its relations with North and South Korea which were strongly constrained by the Cold War. For Japan, the former colony emerged as divided nations which had consisted of South Korea, a member of the liberal anticommunist bloc, and North Korea, a member of the communist bloc. Facing the North-South divided situation on the Korean Peninsula, the Japanese government normalized its diplomatic relations only with South Korea in 1965. In contrast, Japan's relation with North Korea was never friendly at all.

South Korea and Japan had to resolve various problems concerning decolonization. At first, although South Korean government claimed that Japan must make reparations for its thirty six year colonial rule, Japanese government refused it because Korea had not been a member of the United Nations during the war. Then South Korean government insisted that Korea had the rights to get compensation for the damages caused by the colonial rule, but Japanese government at first tried to counterbalance South Korean claims by insisting that Japan also had the legal rights to recover the property rights of Japanese living in Korea during the colonial period, and later demanded that South Korean government should provide the concrete proof materials validating how much South Korean government could demand as Korean property claims against Japanese government. South Korean government could not have enough proof materials because Japanese government, rather than Korean government, had much more proof materials and much of proof materials South Korean government had restored were lost during the Korean War. At last South Korean government, especially the Park Chung Hee administration established after the May 16 military coup d'etat in 1961, and the Japanese Ikeda administration agreed that the problem of Korean property claims against Japanese government should be resolved as the economic cooperation politically rather than legally. The volume of money, goods, and services Japanese government was obliged to transfer to South Korea was agreed as 300,000,000 dollars grant, 200,000,000 dollars soft official loan, and more than 300,000,000 dollars investment or commercial loan. That is the

content of the 'notorious'Kim-Ohira memorandum.

South Korea-Japan relation as the 'pseudo-alliance' mediated by USA, constrained by the Cold War¹, had promoted South Korea-Japan normalization. In fact the US government tried mediating the differences between both governments with regard to the form and the volume of transfer value from Japan to South Korea even though the US government defined its role not as mediator² but as catalyst³. This resolution means that South Korea-Japan normalization was achieved by putting top priority on strengthening anti-communist bloc through economic cooperation while containing the emergence of problems concerning decolonization. Such South Korea-Japan relation can be called 1965 regime⁴.

Even though 1965 regime was partially revised by changes of international and domestic factors, the basic structure of 1965 regime was continued until the end of the Cold War. The US-China rapprochement early in 1970s exerted huge influence on North-South relation because the North-South relation had been constrained by US-China or US-Soviet conflict. Early in 1970, North and South Korea began a dialogue promoting their interactions and exchanges, whether pushed by or taking advantage of the US-China rapprochement. But the dialogue was suspended without any meaningful advancement⁵. Influenced by the US-China rapprochement, Japanese government normalized its relation with PRC in 1972 and even tried to promote its economic relation with DPRK, but DPRK-Japan relation could not be advanced further partly because of South Korean government's objections.

Actually in 1970s, South Korea-Japan relation was much more consolidated than in 1960s. One of the reasons was that US tried to withdraw from Northeast Asia, even though partially, suffered from the defeat of the Vietnam War. As the US tried to disengage its military from South Korea, at first to some extent and later completely, both South Korean and Japanese governments were afraid of their own national security, so that both governments regarded each other as more important for their own national security.

In late 1970s, however, the US government policy toward South Korea changed again from disengagement to engagement, so that the triangle security 'alliance' was revived and South Korea-Japan bilateral relation was again embedded in such triangle security relation. The official loan which the

1 Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2000.

2 Telegram from American Embassy Tokyo(Reischauer) to Department of State(Rusk), 7/26/62, RG 59, CDF(Central Decimal Files), 694,95/7-2662, National Archives at College Park.

3 Telegram from Department of State(Rusk) to American Embassy Seoul(Berger) and American Embassy Tokyo(Reischauer), 7/13/62, NSF(National Security Files), Box 128, JFK Library.

4 With regard to the Korea-Japan normalization, see Tadashi Kimiya, "Three Types of South Korean Foreign Policy in 1960s: Korea-Japan Normalization, Sending Troops in the Vietnam War, and ASPAC(Asia-Pacific Councils)" Masao Okonogi and Chung-In Moon, eds., Market, State, International Regime, Series of Joint Study between South Korea and Japan vol. 4, Keio University Press, 2001, pp.91-145.(in Japanese), The Asiatic Research Institute Press, Korea University, 2001, pp.95-146.(in Korean).

5 With regard to the impact of the US-China rapprochement upon the Korean Peninsula, see Kimiya, "The Political Dynamics of South Korean Diplomacy: Focusing on the Changes early in 1970s," Okonogi and Dal-Jung Chang, eds., Title Undecided, Keio University Press, (in Japanese), The Asiatic Research Institute Press, Korea University,(in Korean). (Forthcoming, 2005).

Japanese government offered to South Korean government early in 1980s resembled the case of the normalization in 1965, in the meaning that the US government mediated the differences between South Korea and Japan with regard to the volume and the form of the official loans⁶. South Korea-Japan relation embedded in the trilateral relation among USA, South Korea, and Japan was revived early in 1980s and such a structure was continued during 1980s. Even when the problem of the Japanese history textbooks was raised by South Korean government and mass media in 1982, the problem was not fatal enough to make South Korea-Japan relation irreversibly worse. The structure of South Korea Japan relation which was established in 1965 and was continued until 1990 during the Cold War was that, mediated by the US government, both governments put top priority on achieving economic development, political stability, and solid anti-communism in Northeast Asia by economic cooperation and division of labor, while preventing the problems caused by differences concerning the historical recognitions of the Japanese colonial rule from making South Korea-Japan relation decisively hostile.

2 The End of the Cold War and Its Impacts on South Korea-Japan relation

Until 1990 during the Cold War period, it is the Cold War structure that had connected South Korea and Japan as 'pseudo-alliance', which was not initially so friendly enough. Early in 1990s, however, the global Cold War ended. In Europe, Germany was reunited. In Asia, the problem of the ideological regime competition was no more seriously considered. So far as Korea was concerned, the regime competition between North and South had been resolved as the result of South Korea's better performances in terms of economic development and political democratization even before the end of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War was also decisive in terms of the regime superiority of South over North, even though North Korea had insisted that North Korea was superior to South Korea in terms of the legitimacy of anti-colonialism.

What were the impacts of the end of the cold war on South Korea-Japan relation? Because it was the Cold War that mediated South Korea and Japan, the end of the Cold War means that South Korea-Japan relation might be attenuated. In fact, various problems associated with the differences concerning the historical recognition of the Japanese colonial rule were paid much more attention, liberated from the constraints by the Cold War, and South Korean government and society tried blaming the Japanese policies.

Then, was South Korea-Japan relation aggravated in 1990s after the end of the Cold War? It is true that the historical problems was more important than ever, such as the compensation problems of comfort women conscripted by the Japanese military, but South Korea-Japan relation was not so aggravated than expected. Why was not the relation so aggravated?

It was related to the problem of how the end of the Cold War appeared in Northeast Asia, especially in the Korean peninsula. The end of the Cold War gave tremendous impacts on the Korean peninsula affecting the North Korean behavior. Early in 1990, North Korean government agreed with Japanese

6 With regard to the process of the official loan negotiation, Chong Sik Lee, Japan and Korea: The Political Dimensions, Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1985., Okonogi, "The US-Korea-Japan Regime Under the New Cold War: The Korea-Japan Official Loan Negotiation and The Formation of the Triangle Strategic Collaboration Regime, " Okonogi and Moon, eds.op.cit., pp.189-212.(in Japanese), pp.191-214(in Korean).

government that both governments began normalization talks after agreeing to return the Japanese crews who had been captured by North Korea in the name of espionage. North and South Korean governments also started the North-South High-Level Negotiations and held the meetings eight times both in Pyongyang and in Seoul in turn. At last both governments agreed to 'the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation', which was also called 'the North-South Basic Agreement' saying that both governments recognized each other government's legitimacy and abstained from rebuking each other, and 'the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,' saying that both governments promised not to have and develop nuclear weapons through strict verification by organizing the North-South Joint Nuclear Control Commission in 1991. The end of global Cold War might be expected to contribute to the peaceful reconciliation of the Korean peninsula.

The positive effects of the end of the Cold War, however, could not be sustained so long. North Korea-Japan talks were soon be suspended because of the problem of kidnapped Japanese and North Korean nuclear crisis without any visible achievements. Even though the North-South High-Level Negotiations could bring such visible achievements as the Basic Agreement and the Joint Declaration, the North-South dialogue could not produce even more positive products. One of the reasons was that Kim Il Sung died after he met former US President Jimmy Carter and promised to have the North-South summit. Even more important was that North Korean government seemed to decide that it put more priority on its direct bilateral talks with USA rather than the North-South talks, in order to make its existing regime sustainable. In other words, North Korean government tried the US government to guarantee the security of Kim Jong Il regime while bypassing South Korean government. Therefore, North Korean government tried developing its own nuclear weapons, whether to defense itself or to make the US government come out to the direct talks with North Korea. The so-called first North Korean nuclear crisis was temporarily resolved in the form of the Agreed Framework between US and DPRK in 1994⁷. But in October 2002, when the Deputy Secretary Jim Kelly visited Pyongyang, North Korean government officials admitted that North Korea did not abandon developing nuclear weapons. This is the second North Korean nuclear crisis which is continuing now.

Paradoxically enough, the North Korean nuclear crisis has made South Korea and Japan collaborate with each other in order to prevent North Korea from developing their nuclear arsenals by peaceful means. Even during the Cold War period, South Korean government and society had insisted that Japan should not interfere with North-South relation. After the end of the Cold War, however, TCOG(Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group) which consisted of US, South Korea, and Japan was established to resolve the North Korea nuclear crisis. This means that both governments fully understand that the both countries had common interest with respect to resolving the problem by peaceful means. It is because of the existence of North Korea that South Korea and Japan regarded each other as an important partner in resolving the nuclear crisis. Therefore both governments tried not to regard the past history-related problem lying between them as fatal to South Korea-Japan relation.

3 Five Aspects of Structural Changes of Korea-Japan Relations

7 With regard to the first North Korean nuclear crisis, see Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis, Washington D.C., The Brookings Institution Press, 2004.

The structural changes of South Korea-Japan relation were also contributive to preventing both countries from decisively hostile after the Cold War.

Firstly, South Korean sustainable economic development since 1960s, its political democratization after 1987, and its diplomatic normalization with Soviet Union, China, and other former communist countries have enabled South Korea and Japan share a very similar value, market democracy as their common political economic ideology. This value sharing between South Korea and Japan has enabled both countries to understand each other's similarity and differences reasonably.

Second, South Korea has never been less developed countries depending on US or Japan, so that South Korean people are more confident that South Korea and Japan are equal partners than ever. It is true that in terms of per capita GDP South Korea is less than half of Japan, but regarding the trend of South Korean economic and human resource development, we can easily imagine that South Korea and Japan will really be equal partners sooner. This is the first time in modern history that Japan has such a contiguous country like South Korea that has similar power and values. This gives Japan the chance that Japan will overcome the isolation in Asia and provide public goods by equal collaboration.

The third factor regarding the structural changes is related not only with the parity of power relation between South Korea and Japan, but also with narrowing the perception gaps. Until now there have been huge gaps regarding each other's volume of perception toward each other. During the Cold War, for South Korea, Japan was strategically one of the most important countries next to USA even though Japan was the most disgusting country. For Japan, however, South Korea was not regarded as so much important. That was perception gap between South Korea and Japan. The gap has been diminished and relatively equalized especially since 1990s. As South Korea has shared the similar values and has become a country of similar power, Japanese government and society can no longer regard South Korea as a junior partner but has to regard it as more and more vital for avoiding isolation in Asia and achieving its own national interest.

As for South Korea, Korea-Japan relation had been conventionally regarded as good and evil, of course Korea as good and Japan as evil. As South Korea has widened its diplomatic relations with such other countries like China and Russia, its historical recognition concerning Japan is possibly made more relative. The differences concerning the question of the title of Koguryo between China and Korea show that the problems concerning historical recognition are not exclusively ones between Korea and Japan. And domestically, South Korean society begins to face a very difficult problem. That is how they should describe and teach their own contemporary history especially with regard to their authoritarian period. I think that the very similar problem with the problems of Japanese history textbooks will be proposed also in South Korea even though there is a big difference between the problems in Korea and ones in Japan. The problem in Korea will exclusively domestic, but we cannot avoid that Japanese problem has been international, especially between China, Korea and Japan. I hope such changes will give impacts on the way South Korean society views the problems concerning the historical recognition between Korean and Japan.

Fourth, South Korea-Japan relations are perceived to be not only the relations *between* them but also the collaborative ones supplying public goods. Korea-Japan relation had been regarded as the relation *between* them, especially from the viewpoint of Korea. When we see such a contemporary situation that most of the summit meeting between President Roh and PM Koizumi in June 20, 2005 was spent in

debating the Yasukuni problem, Korea-Japan relation is regarded only as one *between* them as ever at least by both leaders. When we remembered the Joint Declaration of Korea-Japan Partnership between President Kim Dae Jung and PM Obuchi in 1998, however, we can pay attention to the new trend. That is the necessity of the mutual collaboration resolving such global problems as environment, security, and economic development. We should pay more attention to the point that Korea-Japan relation is not exclusively one *between* them but includes one collaborating with each other for providing public goods to the others.

Lastly, the fifth factor contributing to the structural changes is diversification of South Korea-Japan relations⁸. During the Cold War period, South Korea-Japan relation was limited to governmental or business level. There were very little non-governmental or civil society relations. That was because South Korean government could not permit the breathing space by which South Korean civil society could interact with Japanese civil society in order to suppress the opposition movements. Actually there were some exceptional cases of the interaction between both societies such as the articles of 'Kankoku karano Tsushin⁹', which meant 'the correspondence from South Korea,' but most of them were not interactive but one directional from Japan toward South Korea. Since 1987, however, South Korean political regime has been democratized and South Korean civil society has been revived. South Korea-Japan relation includes not only inter-governmental relation but also such multi-dimensions as economic, civil movements, sightseeing, academic, subculture, and so on. The interaction between South Korean and Japanese civil society has been more active, two directional, and multi-dimensional.

4 The Impacts of the Structural Changes of South Korea-Japan Relation upon the 'Han Ryu' Trend

It is 'Han Ryu' trend that such structural changes have reflected at the level of civil society. Some analysts say that the political effects of 'Han Ryu' are so limited that South Korea-Japan relation is not so transformed. It is too naïve if we think that those Japanese who like Korean cultures regard South Korea-Japan relation as important therefore South Korea-Japan relation will be much friendlier. Cultural dimensions and political dimensions between South Korea and Japan might not be so interdependent. Even though South Korean society has been relatively tolerant to the infiltration of Japanese cultures, Korean images toward Japan have never been much better. 'Han Ryu' trend should not be overestimated, especially as far as the political relation or the past history-related problems is concerned.

But the importance of 'Han Ryu' should not be underestimated. It is not only a temporal boom but based on the structural changes of South Korea-Japan relation. The reason why Korean cultures are so popular in Japan is related to its attractiveness. But the background on which Korea cultures have been absorbed in Japanese society is related to the fact that South Korea is perceived to be more and more important for Japan. The increasing importance of South Korea for Japan has affected the Japanese images toward South Korea. When the background of 'Han Ryu' is regarded into full consideration,

8 See Kimiya, "Conditions of Making the Relations between Civil Society of Japan and South Korea More Mutually Understandable," Yeong-Sun, Ha eds., Korea and Japan : Historical Perspectives to Make Mutual Understandings More Meaningful, Seoul, Nanam Publishers, 1997, pp.226-249(in Korean).

9 TK Sei, Kankoku Karano Tsushin 3vols, Tokyo, Iwanami, 1974~1977.

however, not only the changes of the Japanese images of South Korea but also the changes of the Korean images of Japan can be recognized. As South Korean society has been democratized, the meaningful interactions between both societies have been increased and the Korean images of Japan have transformed to more pluralistic one. 'Han Ryu' which has reflected democratic, market-oriented South Korean society can be welcomed to Japanese society because both societies can share the similar value. Cultural interactions between both societies are so natural that cultural borders are really becoming lower and lower.

On the one hand, South Korea-Japan relation after the end of the Cold War is unstable in terms of the fact that there is not yet a clear momentum which can contribute to connecting both societies instead of a momentum as anticommunist countries under the Cold War. South Korean and Japanese governments and societies have been trying to find a momentum which can contribute to connecting both societies, but at least now the achievement might be unsatisfactory. On the other hand, the dynamic necessity of the mutual connection between both societies is increasing more and more, especially at commercial, societal, and grass roots level. The problem is that we can find only few actors who play positively finding the momentum and we do not agree to the common principle which necessary to advance and deepen the relations. It is exactly in such an situation that the territorial dispute was exploded.

5 What is the problem now?

After the Shimane prefectural assembly passed the ordinance that Takeshima, which is called Dokto in Korea, belongs to Japan, South Korea-Japan relation has been rapidly aggravated. President Roh, who had said that at least during his term he would never take the past history-related problem as a political issue between South Korea and Japan, has suddenly begun to blame fiercely Japanese government for the fact that Japanese government did nothing to prevent the assembly from passing the ordinance. For South Korean government the inaction is considered to be a sign that Japanese government does not take its past colonial rule as bad and even more is beginning its conspiracy of the territorial invasion. Japanese government officially said that because such an action was not the business of the national government the government could not prevent it. What is more troublesome was that the Japanese ambassador Takano answered that Takeshima belongs to Japanese territory in English to the question raised by the foreign press club in Seoul and only such a short phrase without any consideration of its context was transmitted to the Korean audience on TV. As for South Korea, these incidents are perceived to be Japanese government's policy change. This is the reason why President Roh decided to take the past history-related problem as a political issue contrary to his remarks.

Moreover, in April, the Japanese textbook published by Fusosha, which is a publishing company managed by Fuji Sankei group, one of the powerful right wing ideologue, are admitted to be one of the candidates which would be used as textbooks of Japanese junior high schools. The textbook includes a photograph of Takeshima with a phrase that Takeshima is initially a Japanese territory but South Korea has illegally occupied and controlled. As for Japan, the problem of Takeshima is perceived to be a pure territorial one, but as for South Korea, the problem of Dokto is never a pure territorial one but a symbol of the past history-related problems. The fact that the Japanese insist that Dokto belongs to Japan symbolically means that the Japanese never regard its colonial rule as wrong, sinful, and unrepeatable.

Even though South Korean government and society are still very critical of Japan, violent protests in

China stimulated by the conflicts between China and Japan in terms of the past history-related problems, territorial problems, and the problem concerning the possibility of Japanese permanent membership in the UN Secretary Council, are paid more attention so that South Korea-Japan relation seems to be a kind of truce. The Japanese government is managing not to aggravate South Korea-Japan relations any more in order to prevent its isolation among East Asian countries.

In fact, even before the territorial problem erupted, some analysts said that South Korea-Japan relation was not so friendly in terms of the differences concerning their policy toward North Korea. Even though Prime Minister Koizumi has an ambition that he will achieve the normalization with North Korea for his personal historical esteem, the fact that North Korean government committed kidnapping some Japanese, has stimulated anti-North Korean sentiments among Japanese people. As the result, in Japanese society, there is a kind of curious and fragile coexistence between friendly atmosphere toward South Korea and fierce disgust against North Korea. South Korean people regard the fact that South Korean cultures are so popular among Japanese people as pleasant, but especially in terms of their views of North Korea, many South Korean people have been afraid that the Japanese views of North Korea are too harsh, inflexible, and discriminating even though the impacts of the kidnapping incidents are sympathized.

What do these recent events mean? Some analysts say that South Korea Japan relation cannot be friendly so far as the unresolved past history-related problem lies between the two countries. According to this discourse, 'Han Ryu' boom is only a temporal phenomenon rapidly passing away. The impacts of the structural changes of South Korea-Japan relation might not be so conspicuous than expected. The disbelief system embedded in the relation might be too tenacious to be transformed to a stable, reliable, and productive one in spite of the structural changes. One of my American friends said that South Korea-Japan relation was so fragile that it would be easily aggravated only if one of the Japanese ministers said something of legitimizing the Japanese colonial rule.

When we look into the consequences of the problem in detail, the impacts of the structural changes are discernable, even though not necessarily promotional in constructing the productive relation. When we look at President Roh's confident attitude contesting against Japanese government by appealing toward the international society based on the universal norm and logic, we can discern it from the behavior of the past leaders who depended only on parochial nationalism. When we listened to the eloquent, impressive, and attentive speech of the former President Kim Dae Jung at the National Diet in Japan, 1998, saying that he took highly of the postwar Japanese peaceful development based on the constitution, large Japanese audience including the conservative who are suspicious of his politically radical ideology were surprised, impressed, and instructed. Regarding the ongoing problem, in both societies, both governments will not have an intention that they will make the problem decisively fatal for South Korea-Japan relation and both societies should have a kind of stabilizing brake not to aggravate the relation. One of the reasons is that the accumulations of two directional interactions and exchanges at various levels promoted by these structural changes, however gradually, have made and will make their interactions collaborative, reliable, and productive.

Conclusion

What kind of structure of South Korea-Japan relation is desirable in the post Cold War period? Which momentum should connect South Korea and Japan instead of the Cold War? Which momentum is the

most reflective of these structural changes? I suggest that South Korea and Japan should play the role of providing public goods not as hegemons but as the alliance of *middle powers* in Northeast Asia¹⁰. Hegemony in Northeast Asia has been exercised by USA, and according to the Chinese rising up, the prospect of Northeast Asia depends on how the US-China relation will be. It is uncertain whether the US-China relation will be collaborative or conflicting. But what is certain is that South Korea and Japan have the common interest in avoiding both of such scenarios as, one that US and China will be more collaborative in sharing hegemony while containing the voices of other non-hegemon countries, and the other that US and China will be more and more hostile and deprive the regional order of peaceful environment. What is desirable for South Korea and Japan is that they will create a peaceful and non-hegemonic regional order. Japan cannot create such order by itself alone, and neither South Korea. But only a collaborative relation between South Korea and Japan will make such a peaceful and non-hegemonic order possible.

The present situation in which South Korea and Japan is settled resembles the situation of the game of prisoners' dilemma. South Korea and Japan can achieve the best pay-off by trusting and collaborating with each other, but if one of them is deceived, its pay-off will be the worst, so that it is very difficult for them to trust and collaborate for fearing to be deceived. For South Korea, the historical experiences of the Japanese colonial rule mean that Korean people was deceived by Japanese once, so that Korean people think that they have to get the guarantee that Korea will never be deceived. I think that this is one of the reasons why the resolution of the past history-related problem is politically important for achieving national interest of Japan. From the past historical context, Japan has much more responsibility to overcome prisoners' dilemma by showing more resolute attitude reflecting its own behaviors more seriously.

In Northeast Asia, the most urgent problem is one concerning North Korea's nuclear. South Korea and Japan have common interest in terms of preventing North Korea from having nuclear arms and resolving this problem as peacefully as possible. That is because South Korea and Japan are common members of Northeast Asia as a country of very similar scale, capacity, and values. Whether such reliable, interactive, and productive relations mentioned above can be settled between South Korea and Japan will depend on how South Korea and Japan will resolve the North Korea's denuclearization by collaborative behaviors which are also collaborative with US and China, but which are qualitatively different from those of US and China.

¹⁰ With regard to the concept of the middle power, see Yoshihide Soeya, "Middle Power" Diplomacy of Japan: The Choices and Visions of the Postwar Japan, Tokyo, Chikuma Shoten, 2005.

JONG WON LEE

Korean-Japanese Relations and the East Asian Community

Abstract

1. South Korea and Japan: From a quasi-alliance to where?
 - 1) "Alignment despite Antagonism": Security triangle as a quasi-alliance
 - 2) Korea-Japan relations under the U.S. Cold War strategy
 - 3) Centrifugal forces in the Cold War endgame
 - 4) Peculiar ambiguity in the bilateral relations
 - 5) What future?: Four cultures/images
 - Hobbesian(realist) enemies
 - Lockean(liberal) rivals
 - Kantian(idealist) friends
 - Wendtian(constructivist) neighbors

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 - 1) Socio-economic interdependence: Growing trans-border transactions
 - 2) Changing geopolitical balances: "Rising China"
 - 3) Emerging regional rivalries/ cleavages
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 - 6) "Parallax visions" on North Korea
 - 7) "The past as the present/ future": Common future

3. Trends in the Japanese diplomacy
 - 1) Double movements: Asianism and *Nichibei*
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 - 7) Diplomatic initiatives toward North Korea
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 - 9) Two competing forces/ views: Politico-military interests vs trading interests
 - Neo-cons vs realist-liberals

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 - 1) New multilateralism: EAC/ six-party conference
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요약

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YIZHOU WANG

The Issue of Korean Peninsular from a Chinese's Perspective

Abstract

This paper presents a Chinese perspective on the current relationship between Korea Peninsular (the two Koreas?) and China. The author, a notable researcher and professor at Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, concluded his major arguments withinsix related parts based on his extensive study at the field as well as recent visit to North Korea. The six elements of the paper are: (1) Cold War Legacy; (2) New geo-politics; (3) US accountability; (4) DPRK and PRC; (5) ROK and China; (6) China goes onward. Though some criticize Bush's tough policy, professor Wang strived to show sort of a balanced position on the Peninsular, especially for peaceful solution over the nuke issue at stance.

요약

중국의 관점에서 바라본 한반도 문제

우선 이 논문이 한반도 문제에 관한 중국의 공식적인 입장은 아니라는 점을 밝혀둔다. 컨퍼런스의 논의를 보다 효율적으로 하기 위해 나는 세부 사항들을 생략했다. 요점을 간단명료히 하기 위해, 나는 한반도에 대한 나의 관점을 아래와 같이 정리했다.

1. 냉전시대의 유산

한반도의 현 분단 상황이나 북핵 문제, 그 이면의 이해관계는 한반도가 여전히 가장 심각한 냉전시대의 유산으로 남아있음을 보여준다. 이러한 상황이 역사적 원인에 의한 유산이니만큼, 그 해결방법 또한 역사적 과정으로 진행될 것이다. 지난 반세기 동안, 역사는 미-소간, 동-서간, 자본주의-사회주의의 대립, 바로 "양극 체제"를 목격해왔다. 따라서 현 분단상황을 현재의 정책 탓으로만 돌리는 것은 옳지도 않을 뿐더러 실용적이지 못하다. 양극적인 사고방식과 행동양식이 세계 곳곳의 발전과 구성에 심대한 영향을 미쳤고, 또 그것이 무거운 과제로 남아있다는 사실은 쉽게 이해할 수 있다. 한반도도 전혀 예외가 아니다. 한반도의 현실에서 일어나는 어려운 과제들을 다룰 때에 우리는, 비핵화 노력이 현재 정세 상대라 할지라도, 과거의 남북이나 피살, 군사공격 같은 부정적인 현상들을 극복하고, 인내심을 갖고 보다 넓은 시각에서 역사적 통찰력을 유지해야 한다. 이러한 이유에서 나는 몇 년 전 "한반도 통일은 결코 단시간에 이루어질 수 있는 것이 아니며, 적어도 20-30년은 족히 걸릴 것이다."라고 한 김대중 전 대통령의 판단을 높이 평가한다.

2. 신지정학(新地政學)

우리는 한반도가 특유의 지정학적 환경을 지니고 있음을 인식해야만 한다. 명백히, 유엔안보리의 다섯 영구회원국 중 셋은 핵무기를 보유하고 있으며, 한반도 관련 이해관계에 얽혀 있다. 만약 무력 충돌이 발생한다면, 세계에서 가장 군사적으로 강력한 여덟 국가 중 여섯 국가가 직간접적으로 연관될 것이다. 역사적인 고려를 차치하더라도, 바로 이러한 이유에서, 해결방법을

제시할 때 지정학적 상황이 충분히 고려되어야 한다. 지난 가을, 나는 중국 대표단과 함께 평양을 비롯 북한의 몇몇 지역을 방문했다. 북한 지역 주민들의 이야기와 나의 개인적 느낌으로, 나는 북한이 이라크와 다르다고 확신하게 되었다. 북한은 이라크처럼 쉽게 패배하지도 않을 것이고, 중국을 포함한 동북아시아 국가들은 이라크 전쟁 같은 상황이 일어나도록 하지도 않을 것이다. 게다가 우리는 이라크 문제를 다룬 미국의 경험으로부터 정치외교적 해법이 실패하면 군사적 이점을 갖고도 승리를 얻기가 어렵다는 사실을 배울 수 있었다. 그러므로, 한반도 관련 주요 쟁점들을 다룰 때는 동북아시아 국가들이 지정학적 형태에 마땅한 관심을 기울여주어야 한다.

3. 미국의 책임/의무

미국이 현재 세계 유일의 강대국이며, 향후 몇 십 년 어떤 국가도 미국을 따라잡을 수 없다는 사실은 아무도 부인할 수 없다. 또 냉전 이후 미국이 평화와 안정 및 아시아의 발전을 위해 얼마나 많은 노력과 기여를 했는지를 부정할 사람도 없다. 그러나 미국 또한 동북아시아로부터 상응하는 이익을 얻었다는 사실도 주목해야 한다. 내 생각에는, 미국이 동북아시아의 평화와 안정 및 발전을 위해 해야 할 일과 할 수 있는 일이 더 많이 있다. 적어도 다음의 몇몇 부분들은 고려해 볼만한 가치가 있다. 우선, 나는 미국이 신중한 언어 사용을 해줄 것을 제안한다. 강대국이 국제분쟁을 해결하는 데 보다 교양 있는 방법을 택한다면, 북한을 비롯한 다른 국가들도 그 선례를 따를 것이며, 이는 지역 정치환경 개선 및 국가 간 상호 존중에 이로울 것이다. 둘째로, 6자 회담에서 "제한적 협상"이라는 완고한 입장을 버리고 북미 간 양자 회의를 융통성 있게 진행하는 것이다. 셋째로, 북한에 핵 포기를 요구하는 한편, 미국은 첨단 대량살상무기 개발에 있어 분별력 있고 자제하는 태도를 유지해야 할 것이다.

4. 북한vs. 중국

북핵 문제와 북중 관계에 있어 나는 특히 두 가지 오해를 바로잡고 싶다. 우선, 많은 외부인들은 북한의 불안정한 상황의 주원인으로 심각한 혼란의 가능성이나, 식량 및 에너지 부족, 그리고 북한 주민들의 열렬한 지지의 결핍을 생각한다. 나는 그러한 이해가 잘못 되었으며 오해의 소지가 있다고 생각한다. 북한이 지난 십 년간 전에 없는 경제 위기를 겪은 것은 사실이나, 북한 주민이나 지도층 누구도 외부에서 생각하는 고통과 절망을 느끼지 않고 있으며, 따라서 현 정권 붕괴에의 요구는 말할 것도 없다. 나의 개인적 관찰에 따르면, 북한 주민들은 오히려 단결되어 있고 그러한 어려운 상황을 겁내지도 않는다. 북한의 단힌 체제는 구소련 국가들에서처럼 "색깔 혁명"으로 이어지지 않을 것이며, 따라서 근거없는 추측을 바탕으로 북핵 문제에 대한 해법을 도출하려는 국제사회의 노력은 부적절하다고 하겠다. 둘째로, 다양한 국제 문제에 있어 중국이 제 역할을 하지 못한다는 비난이 있어왔다. 즉, 중국이 북한 문제에 있어 결정적인 힘을 가졌고 따라서 북한이 중국의 충고를 따르도록 해야한다는 것이다. 나는 이것 또한 잘못된 주장이라고 말하고 싶다. 중국이 과거의 "혈맹" 국가로서, 또 현재 많은 지원을 아끼지 않음으로써 북한에 대해 발언권을 갖는 것은 사실이다. 그러나 중국이 북한에 미칠 수 있는 영향은 매우 제한적이다. 적어도 세계 최강대국인 미국의 힘과 비교했을 때 그렇다. 북핵 문제에 있어서는, 미국과 북한이 주요 상대국이며 중국은 조정자의 역할을 할 수 있을 뿐이다. 여기서 나는 중국이 결코 한반도의 핵보유를 지지하지 않으며, 이는 어떠한 경우에도 흔들리지 않을 것임을 밝혀야 하겠다.

5. 한국 vs. 중국

상이한 사회체제와 이데올로기에도 불구하고, 한국은 중국의 최고 이웃국가 중 하나이다. 한

중 관계는 평화적 공존과 상호협력의 전형이 되어왔다. 양국 모두 북핵 문제뿐 아니라 지역 및 세계의 주요 안보 문제에 있어 상대방의 이해관계에 대한 깊은 이해와 공감을 갖는다. 나는 지난 베이징 6자 회담에서 중국과 한국의 입장이 가장 비슷하다는 것을 발견했다. 양국 모두 한반도 비핵화를 평화적으로, 그리고 무엇보다 최대한 빠른 시일 내에 이루고 싶어하며, 여타 국가들이 북한의 체제 인정과 안전 보장, 경제적 보상을 제공하도록 촉구하는 데 최선을 다하고자 한다. 내 생각에 중국과 한국이 취해야 할 다음 단계는 외교적 기지와 중재능력을 발휘하여 빠른 시일 내에 북한과 미국을 협상테이블로 복귀시키고 보다 진보적이고 효과적인 합의를 도출하는 내는 것이다.

6. 중국: 미래 전망

마지막으로, 한반도에 대한 중국의 기본 입장과 주요 관심사에 대해 이야기하겠다. 전반적으로, 지난 반세기 동안 한반도와 중국의 관계는 역사적 변화들을 겪어왔다. 특히 한반도 문제에 있어 중국은 남북한 양측 모두와 진정한 협력과 상호 발전 관계를 만들어내고 싶어한다. 국익과 현 국제정세에 대한 이해를 기반으로 중국은 한반도에 평화와 안정, 비핵화를 실현하는 데 건설적 역할을 담당할 것이다. 우리는 다음과 같은 면에서 중국의 미래지향적인 정책을 보다 잘 이해할 수 있을 것이다. 먼저, 중국은 지금 덩샤오핑이 시작한 개혁과 개방 노선을 전진하고 있으며, 후진타오를 위시한 새 지도부는 "모든 면에서 잘 사는 사회 건설"이라는 목표를 내걸고 있다. 이는 중국이 국제 사회와 우호적 협력관계를 유지하기를 요구한다. 이러한 면에서, 한반도의 안정은 중국에 있어 중요한 국외적 보장 요인이다. 둘째로, 현 세계화 추세와 관련한 국익과 일반 이해는 중국 정부가 한반도 문제에 있어 냉전시대 이데올로기를 넘어선 해법을 찾아내기를 요구한다. 중국은 한반도에서 냉전의 그늘을 걷어내는 일을 혼자 할 수도 없고 그래서도 안 된다. 대신, 정치적 지혜와 외교적 중재를 바탕으로 적극적인 역할을 할 수 있을 것이다. 셋째로, 중국 또한 국내적으로 발전과 개혁, 안정, 외교 정책 및 전략 등에 있어 많은 어려움과 논쟁에 부딪혔음을 인식해야 한다. 중국은 광대한 국가로 내부의 의견이 다양하기 때문에, 중국의 외교 정책 수립과 관련한 문제가 외부 요인들에 의해 단순화되어서는 안 되는 것이다. 그러므로, 나의 결론은 이러하다: 한반도의 비핵화와 평화통일을 실현하는 일은 남북한이나 중국, 다른 어떤 국가도 겪어보지 않은 만만치 않은 도전이 될 것이다. 그럼에도 불구하고, 다양한 요인들을 두루 살펴보면, 중국인들이 이 문제에 대해 신중한 낙관론을 가지고 있음을 알 수 있는데, 최종 결과가 이러한 중국인들의 전망을 확인시켜줄 수 있기를 바란다.

Full Text

First of all, I should make clear that this paper does not represent the official stance on this issue. In order to make the conference discussion more efficient, I specially omitted various data, details and notes. To be concise and to the point, I simply summarized my points of view on the Korean Peninsular as following:

1. Heritage of the Cold War

The present divide between the North and the South on the Korean Peninsular, as well as the nuclear issue of North Korea and the conflict of interests staying behind, clearly shows that the Korean Peninsular

is still one of the greatest and the most serious heritages of the Cold War. China has an old saying that "it takes more than one cold day for the river to freeze three *chi* deep", which means the trouble has been brewing for quite some time instead of a short time. Since this heritage was caused by historical reasons, its resolving will also be a historical process that can't be realized in one step no matter you like it or not. The sharp distinctions existing now between North and South Korea, in terms of political system, economic level, ideology, culture, education, military system, social atmosphere, foreign alliance, international treaty and even the words and ideas of the ordinary people, were cultivated and strengthened within the past half century. During this period, the history has witnessed overall confrontations and mutual containment between the Soviet Union and the US, the East and the West, and the Capitalist Camp and the Socialist Camp, or what we called the "bipolar world pattern". Thus, it will be neither fair nor useful to attribute the current divide completely to their present policies. It's not difficult to understand that the bipolar way of thinking and the logic of action had profoundly influenced the development and structure of each corner of the world, and had left heavy baggage and set deep traps. The peninsular is certainly no exception. For example, the influence of the US neo-liberalism on South Korea is as deeply rooted as that of the Soviet Union's Stalinism on North Korea. Therefore, it will be unfair or of no avail to simply blame one side for its rigid clinging to old things while saying the other side totally right and irresponsible. When dealing with any difficulties arise from the peninsular realities, despite the current stalled denuclearization process or the negative phenomena such as kidnapping, assassination or mutual military penetration occurred before, we should have a broad historical vision with patience and calm that the old man of history has taught us all along. Here, it should be particularly noted that, according to the tradition of the oriental culture, people always respect those who act on the basis of historical knowledge and visions. People tend to believe that hastiness and impertinence can't help resolving any issues, and the proper way of handling should be based on equality and mutual respect, "save the face" of all sides, and benefit all. Even for such sensitive issues as national security, Chinese people have echoed since the ancient times that the optimal policy is resolving the problems with wisdom (Qi Shang Fa Mou) while the worst thing to do is by using force (Qi Xia Gong Cheng). For this reason, I really appreciate a judgment President Kim Dae Jung made several years ago at Cheong Wa Dae, where I was greatly honored to be one of his audience, that "the reunification of the Korean Peninsular will by no means be realized within a short time, it will possibly take as long as 20 or 30 years."

2. Neo-geopolitics

Back to the reality from history, we must recognize that the Korean Peninsular has its own unique geopolitical environment. Any major events happened on the Peninsular may affect the whole situation. Therefore, we need to be especially careful in handling this issue. Obviously, there are three of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, with nuclear weapons, involved in the interests on the Korean Peninsular. And if military conflicts occurred, among the eight most powerful armed forces in the world, six might be directly or indirectly involved in. For this reason, besides historical considerations, the geopolitical pattern and feature should also be fully evaluated in making resolutions to any current issues. Take the North Korean nuclear issue as an example. Since the Iraq war, a small number of hawks in a few countries have always clamored to mobilize military strikes, no matter big strike, medium strike or small strike, and no matter a full-scale war or surgical strikes. Whether they are swashbuckling to

generate terrorist effects on purpose, or it's the real targets and design of certain warmonger, personally, I believe it's really absurd. Once such occasion truly occurred, the consequences would be disastrous. Last autumn, I visited Pyongyang and some other regions in North Korea along with a Chinese delegation. From the talks of the local people and my personal feelings, I was convinced that North Korea was not another Iraq, and even facing the super powers, North Korea would not be defeated as easily as Iraq, that the Korean Peninsular is of no comparison with the Middle East and Gulf Region, and the Northeast Asian countries including China would not allow such state of affairs as the Iraq war. In addition, we can learn a lesson from the US experience in handling the Iraq issue that if political and diplomatic solution failed, it would be also difficult to achieve expected victory even with great military advantage. After the Cold War, the global geopolitics show the following characteristics: the Cold War was ended in Europe and the bipolar system has become a historical past; as the only superpower in the world, the US has changed its careful attitude towards using force; Russia and China, the big powers of the previous oriental camp, have established a kind of strategic cooperative partnership with the US; while In the Islamic world, the modernization transition has become a major issue. By launching terrorist attacks, the anti-US Muslim extremists are strongly against the US penetration and occupation in this region through Israel and possibly the transformed Iraq. The conflict between the US and the Islamic extremist forces has become the focus of contradictions. In my point of view, this conflict---not only the reconstruction of Iraq---might be a prolonged one, and will greatly restrict the strategic orientation of the US. Thus, when dealing with various major differences and conflicts of the Korean Peninsular, countries in the Northeast Asia should pay due consideration to the above tendencies of the global geopolitical pattern as a whole.

3. Responsibility of the United States

No one can deny that the US is the only one superpower now in the world and no country can catch up with its hard and soft power within several decades. Nor people can deny that since the end of Cold War the Americans have made great effort and contributions to the peace, stability and development of the northeast Asia and even to the whole Asia. However, it should be noted that the US has also gained relevant benefits from the Northeast Asia, which tied it closely with the honor and disgrace of this region. Trade with this region constitutes one of the largest parts of its total foreign trade, and the US enterprises, investors and consumers all have benefited a great deal. And the purchase of American financial bonds by Japan, China and North Korea has played a positive role in making up the huge "dual deficits" (budge and trade) and even in stabilizing the whole national economy of the US. Since the September 11 attacks, countries in the northeast Asia have well coordinated and supported the US-dominated international anti-terrorism campaign either in the UN, the Middle East, the Gulf or other regions. Rights and interests should accord with its responsibilities. In my view, the US should and could have more things to do in promoting the peace, stability and development of the northeast Asia, especially can make some adjustments in correcting the shortcomings and mistakes that have received wide questioning. At least the following several points are worth to be considered. Firstly, following the way of acting and the thinking logic of social groups, if the side in the advantageous position of the disputes could actively make a concession, it would get twice the results with half the efforts. Therefore, I suggest that the US carefully manipulate its language in the international exchanges and avoid the terms discarded in the normal international relations. (According to my observations, not only most countries strongly disapproved of

such action but the Koreans hated it even more and felt extremely terrified with it, therefore, they decided to answer the tough policy of the US with a super-tough measure.) If the superpower can take the lead in resolving international disputes in a civilized way, I believe, other countries including North Korea might follow its example, which will be greatly conducive to the improvement of regional political environment and the mutual respect among countries. Secondly, abandon the rigid stand of "bounded negotiation" and hold flexible bilateral meetings between North Korea and the US in the Six-Party talks. As Chinese people describe it, "hold small-scale talks while attending a large-scale meeting", and try to make progress in denuclearization negotiations. Likewise, nor do I agree to the Korean way of maintaining contacts only with the US. After all, the North Korean nuclear issue affects the peace and stability of the whole northeast Asia and the security interests of other related countries. Thus, Beijing Six-Party talks or other multilateral mechanisms should in no way be neglected as long as they help to improve the situation. Thirdly, while demanding North Korea abandon its nuclear plan, the US should also keep a prudential and controlled attitude towards developing hi-tech weapons of mass destruction. At present, there has been wide discussion and criticism in the international society, especially at a review conference of the parties to the Treaty on Nuclear Non-proliferation held recently, at some dangerous tendencies of the US military system. For example, speeding up the research of space-based laser weapon system, preparing to resume nuclear tests, and putting forward the guideline of military action, the so-called "striking first to gain the initiative" strategy. Other than any other countries, whether the US acting as the world police can appropriately refrain its behavior will directly affect the international social order and produce significant demonstrative effect. Therefore, on the North Korean nuclear issue and other major regional security issues, the careless statements and actions of the US might cause a chain reaction of other countries being same irresponsible.

4. DPRK vs. PRC

Concerning the North Korean nuclear issue and the relations between China and North Korea, here I want to clarify two misunderstandings in particular. First, many outsiders believe that the major causes for such instability of North Korea are the possible advent of grave turmoil, the food and energy shortage, and lacking ardent support of the people. However, according to my long-time studies on the Stalinist system (I have written three books on socialist systems, i.e., *The Road of Hungary* (1986), *The Crisis of Poland* (1988), and *The Experiment of Yugoslavia* (1989)) and the one-week visit of North Korea last September, I think the above understanding is incorrect and misleading. It's true that the North Korea has experienced unprecedented economic difficulties for the past decade, especially the shortage of food and fuel, and I could clearly feel the existence of such difficulties. Nevertheless, neither the North Korean people nor the intellectuals and decision-making elites have the sense of sufferings and despair as the outside people expected, let alone the asking for overturning the current regime. On the contrary, based on my own observations, the Korean people are united closely and not afraid of the hard situations at all, and are well prepared for meeting such challenges in the long run. This country is highly militarized, and the Songun policy has stricken root in the hearts of the people and was fully implemented. Such situation in North Korea, in my opinion, has very complex causes. But no matter how people explain and criticize it, the closed system of North Korea will never lead to "color revolution" as happened in some republicans of former Soviet Union. Therefore, it's inappropriate for the international society to work out

a solution of North Korean nuclear issue based on a totally untenable assumption. Second, on various international occasions, we have heard the blames of China for its "ineffective supervision" as the "old big brother", in other words, China in effect had decisive powers on this matter and should have made North Korea follow its advice. I contend that this is also a wrong, at least a one-sided point of view. As one of the chief neighbors of North Korea, China has shared a long boundary line with North Korea and many residents with Korean nationality nationally. Once being the "blood ally" with North Korea in history, China still gives the latter as much supports as it can afford. In this regard, China undoubtedly has a say in the Korean affairs. However, unlike being "omnipotent" as certain outsiders imagined, China's ability to push North Korea is very limited, at least compared with the real power of the US, the only superpower in the world. For this point, I was deeply impressed during my Pyongyang trip. In the hearts of the Korean people, China is a friendly and trustful partner, but whatever China would do, it could never take the place of the US in terms of its recognition of this regime, its security commitment and economic compensation. In the North Korean nuclear issue, the US and North Korea constitutes the key pair of contradictions, and China at most is only a mediator or a fire fighter. As an idiom goes, "let him who tied the bell on the tiger take it off", which means whoever started the trouble should end it. Here, I must make it clear that China will never favor the nuclearization of the Korean Peninsular for either side. Even to the "comrades" of North Korea, China's stance on this issue would not waver in the least. From China's own national interests, and in order to maintain the strategic balance and stability of the world, we neither want to see the Northeast Asia becoming a dangerous region of nuclear proliferation, nor see it accelerate the potential confrontations and conflicts, especially the existing troubles between the North Korea and the US. What my personal feelings is that the North Korean friends are quite understand and have given special consideration to China's policy. On June 17 2005, Chairman Kim Jong Il delivered a speech when receiving the South Korean Unification Minister. It shows that North Korea might adopt a constructive attitude towards the Six-Party talks. I'm convinced that he had seriously considered China's attitude and proposal.

5. ROK vs. PRC

Despite different social systems and ideologies, South Korea is one of the best neighbors of China. Sino-South Korean relationship has been a typical example of peaceful coexistence and mutual cooperation on an equal footing between different kinds of countries in the international relations. Of the nearly 160 countries that have diplomatic relations with China, South Korea is the one with the fastest development and the highest level of mutual benefits with China. Now, China is the first largest trade partner of South Korea, and South Korea is the fourth or the fifth largest of China. In terms of trade volume, cooperation among enterprises and personnel exchanges, China and South Korea have developed a close relationship of "sharing both honor and disgrace" and "pulling together in times of trouble". Among the 80 thousand foreign students China has received, more than 45% (about 35 thousand) are from South Korea. At my institute, the Institute of World Economics and Politics, the South Korean visiting scholars and students account more than 75% of the total foreign visiting scholars and students (16 out of 21). And the most valuable point is that, between these two countries with dramatically different social systems and ideologies, China and South Korea have established a high-level relationship based on mutual respect, coordination, understanding and trust even when dealing with the most complex

and sensitive security affairs. Both sides have a deep understanding and compassion towards the core interests of each other, not only on the North Korean nuclear issue but on almost all of the major regional and global security issues. For example, China will definitely play a positive role in the peace and development process of the Korean Peninsular in the future. On one hand, China will fully concern the views and interests of South Korea; on the other hand, South Korea will also help China realize peaceful rise and unification when China faces difficulties such as the Taiwan issue. In a word, since China and South Korea established diplomatic relations 13 years ago, there have been some conflicts and problems occurred, but they never fundamentally hinder the growth of the bilateral relations. It shows that the relations between China and South Korea are stepping towards maturity. Now, among the issues of common concern, the most important and urgent one is the Korean Peninsular nuclear issue. Whether it could be resolved properly would affect the whole situation and have a far-reaching influence. For example, it will directly affect the adjustment of US-South Korea alliance, the tendency of Japanese conservatism, the trend of Taiwan issue as well as the role of Northeast Asia in the future world. I noticed that during the previous three rounds of "Beijing Six-Party" talks on North Korean nuclear issue, the stands of China and South Korea were most close. Both countries wish to realize the goal of non-nuclearization of the Peninsular (thirdly) peacefully (secondly) as early as possible (firstly), and do their best to urge different sides to provide the North with regime recognition, security guarantee and economic compensation. Both sides have shown their greater patience, consideration and faith in resolving this complicated historical issue. Resolving the North Korean nuclear issue peacefully serves the national interests of both China and South Korea, and is conducive to the peace and stability of the region and even the whole world. As far as I'm concerned, for China and South Korea, the next step should be to exert super-high-level diplomatic wisdom and international mediation ability, prevent the advent of various "acute diseases", push North Korea and the US to return to the negotiation table as soon as possible, and try to reach a progressive but effective agreement in the next round of six-party talks.

6. China: Forward Looking

Finally, please allow me to say something about China's basic stand and major concern on the Korean Peninsular. Overall, in the past half century, the relations between China and the Korean Peninsular have undergone historic changes. Given the constraints of the Cold War pattern, China had stood by North Korea in the first thirty years while opposing the US-supported South Korea. After the reform and opening-up, in the past quarter of the century, China has gradually turned to a more balanced and neutral position, from "helping world revolution" to "peace and development". On the issue of Korean Peninsular in particular, China wishes to develop sincere cooperation and mutual development with both North and South Korea especially after China established diplomatic relationship with South Korea in 1993. Regrettably, the Cold-War shadow still exists, and the north-south separation on the Peninsular also continues. I believe that, being deeply touched by the separation and its serious consequences, the Chinese people wholly understand and firmly support the unification wishes of the public on both sides of the peninsular. Based on the understandings of national interests and the current world situation, China will play a constructive role in realizing the peace, stability and non-nuclearization on the Korean Peninsular. We can better understand the forward-looking policy of China from the following aspects. First, China now is advancing along the course of reform and opening-up initiated by Deng Xiaoping, and

the new leading group of China led by Hu Jintao has put forward a goal of "building a well-off society in an all-round way". It requires China maintain good-neighborly relations and cooperative attitudes with the international society. Recently, the Chinese central government has even advanced a grand program of "rejuvenating the northeast China", namely, to speed-up the pace of development in the northeast provinces neighboring the Korean Peninsular to catch up with the developed coastal areas of China, and revitalize this old industrial base with more than 100 million population. The program of "revitalizing the northeast China" constitutes an important part of the government's overall plan to reduce the economic development gap among different areas and realize balanced development. In this regard, the stability of Korean Peninsular is not only an important external guarantee but also provides favorable opportunities for mutual support and development with the northeast China. Second, the national interests and the public understandings on contemporary globalization trends require the foreign affairs departments of the government to explore a solution to the Korean Peninsular beyond the Cold War ideology. This is a great program as well as a difficult task. But China has no other way but to meet the difficulties head-on and move forward step by step. The "Beijing Six-Party" talks on North Korean nuclear issue is only one of the various platforms and one of the major steps China will possibly put forward in the next few years. It means the Korean Peninsular not only should be free of nuclear weapons and wars but also should become a region of hope and a source of development. The former is the low-level objective while the latter is the high-level one. China can't and shouldn't fight for removing the Cold-War shadow from the Korean Peninsular alone. Instead, China can play its active role with political wisdom and diplomatic mediation. I persist that the future of the Taiwan straits and the Korean Peninsular will be essential to judge whether "China's peaceful rise" can come true. Third, it should be recognized that China itself has faced lots of difficulties and disputes either concerning the domestic development, reform and stability or in the field of foreign policy and international strategies. Take the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsular as an example. Although most public opinion and researchers are for the current policies of government, like other countries, there are still some different voices, criticisms and suggestions. Many show sympathy to North Korea and criticize the US; some even contend that China should give up mediation efforts; and some oppose the "tough" and "rigid" stance of North Korea. We must see that the Chinese society has been increasingly pluralized, and there could be conflicts on any major political and foreign affairs among different regions, departments and even peoples of different ages. It would be very difficult to reach a unanimous agreement throughout such a large country, and the government has borne great pressure from different sides on the North Korean nuclear issue. Thus, the formation of Chinese foreign policy making should not be over-simplified by the outside world. Therefore, my conclusion is: to realize the non-nuclearization and peaceful unification on the Korean Peninsular will be a formidable challenge that has never appeared before both for North and South Korea and for China and other countries. Nevertheless, take a broad view of various factors, I think most Chinese are cautiously optimistic about the future of this issue, and I do hope that the final result could confirm the forecast by Chinese people.

JANG-JIP CHOI**Ideational Base for the East Asian Community****요약****동아시아 평화공동체를 위한 관념적 토대****1. 들어가며**

최근 들어, 북한 관련 문제 및 북핵 문제는 국제정치에서 가장 위험한 사안이 되었다. 한반도 뿐 아니라 동북아시아 전체의 안정적 평화를 확립하는 문제에 관한 한 현재 동아시아에서 진행되고 있는 국제정치 현상을 긍정적으로 평가하기는 매우 어렵다. 북한 및 북핵 문제를 어떻게 해결하고 남북한의 평화적 공존을 어떻게 이룩할 것인가 하는 문제는 한반도와 동아시아, 나아가 세계의 평화를 위해 다루어져야 할 국제정치의 중요한 도전과제로 떠올랐다.

이 논문은 갈등의 진원지인 한반도의 시각에서 상황을 바라보고, 동아시아에서 평화를 확립할 수 있는 방법을 논해보고자 한다. 그러기 위해서는 논쟁의 세가지 주요 단계가 필요하다. 첫째 가장 광범위한 단계는 북한과 동아시아 전체에 대한 미국의 정책방향과 관련된 부분이다. 두번째는 한국 정부와 사회가 한반도와 동아시아의 평화를 위해 기여할 수 있는 문제에 대한 부분이다. 세번째는 역내 국가들이 동아시아에 안정적으로 평화를 확립하기 위해 어떤 노력을 할 수 있을지에 대한 것이다.

2. 평화에 대한 접근법의 중요성

미국이 북한 및 북핵 문제에 대해 어떤 정책을 취하느냐 하는 문제는 결정적인 중요성을 지닌다. 북핵 문제에 대한 미국의 강경 대응책을 비판적으로 검토하는 것이 북한이 주장하는 논리를 옳다고 받아들인다는 뜻은 아니다. 중요한 것은 미국이 초강대국이며, 따라서 미국이 가지는 선택권의 범위는 북한과 비교할 수 없게 넓다는 것과, 미국의 정책은 단순히 현실적인 힘의 논리에 기반하는 것으로 만족될 수 없다는 사실이다. 그러므로 강대국이 정치적 도덕적 책임을 행하지 않는 것은 매우 잘못된 일인 것이다.

북한 및 북핵 문제에 대한 미국의 정책이 순수하게 평화지향적인지에 대해서는 진지하게 의심이 든다. 북한 문제는 큰 부분 부시 행정부의 고위 정책결정자들의 북한에 대해 가지는 기본 인식에서 기인한다. 북한의 체제 붕괴나 완전한 고립을 노리는 정책 조치들은 냉전 구조 대립의 연장선상에서 북한 체제를 인정하지 않는 미국의 정책 결과인 것이다. 한반도의 평화를 위한 관점에서 보았을 때, 현실적인 대안은 대북 포용정책이다. 이는 곧 북한이 동아시아에서 일반적 주체가 될 수 있도록, 북한의 경제적 생존을 위한 원조를 제공하는 한편 북한을 정치적 측면에서 인식하는 것이다. 미국의 정책은 전자적 성격에 고정되어 있어 문제 해결을 어렵게 한다. 이 부분이 해결되지 않는 한 북핵 문제는 계속될 것이며, 따라서 한반도의 위기가 지속될 가능성이 매우 커진다. 대북 강경책은 북한 및 북핵 문제에 대한 정의의 내리는 것으로 시작한다. 이것은 북한을 주요문제 국가, 세계 평화에 대한 위협으로 인식하는 것을 포함하며, 따라서 미국의 대테러전쟁의 대상국가로 규정하게 되는 것이다.

탈냉전기 동아시아의 미해결 문제인 북한 문제는 고립으로부터 기인한 체제의 존속과 관련되어 있다. 비교해보면, 북한 및 북핵 문제는 미국 주도의 동아시아 국제질서 속에서 주체로 인식

되지 못하고 있는 북한과 현 상태를 유지하고자 하는 국가들 사이에 심각한 불균형을 초래하고 있다. 이것은 생존을 위한극도의 저항, 이른바 핵 프로그램을 무기로 내세우는 '벼랑 끝 외교'로 이어지게 된다. 북한 문제는 고립을 끝내고, 북한 정권의 존재를 인정하고, 체제를 내부적으로 통합하는 것이 논리적이고 효율적으로 문제를 해결하는 방법이 된다. 짧게 말해, 미국의 대북강경책은 상황 판단력이 적절하지않을 뿐 아니라 경제적이지도 못하다.

한국 사회의 내부적 관점에서 북핵 문제를 생각하자면, 또 하나의 근본적인 모순을 추가할 필요가 있을 것 같다. 그것은 바로 미국이 평화적 도덕적 가치와 상충되는 외교 정책을 추구하며 힘의 논리를 악용한다는 사실이다. 이 점은 미국의헤게모니 문제와 연관되어 있다. 북한을 압박하고 무력 사용의 가능성을 이야기하는 미국의 현 대북정책 대신, 북한의 현대화를 지지하고 경제적 지원을 제공하는 것이 비폭력적이고 저비용 고효율 효과를 가능하게 할 것이다. 데탕트를 동반한 한국의 민주화 과정은 평화지향적 정책을 지지한다는의미에서 대북 및 대미 외교정책에 대한 대중의 여론과 지배의 영향력을 극적으로확장시켰다. 한국민들은 한국전쟁을 경험했기 때문에, 그들의 평화에 대한 이해와 존중은 특별하다. 남북관계에서, 극우파를 제외하면, 대부분의 한국민은 평화적 가치를 존중한다. 이는 한국 전쟁이 가지는 최고의 긍정적인 결과이다.

칸트의 이론은 국가의 평화실현 능력과 정부의 형태 간 상호관계를 정립하고 있다. 한국의 대북정책이 시종일관 화해 노력과 평화적 공존을 추구해온 방식은 공화적 또는민주적 헌법 체제를 기본 성격으로 하는 정부는 평화지향적이라는 칸트의 이론에 부합한다. 반면에 국제정치질서의 질적 변화와 미국 중심의 민주주의와 관련하여 칸트의 영구평화론은 다음의 세가지 유보조항을 지니고 있다. 우리는 민주주의 국가 사이에서는 전쟁이 일어나지 않는다는 칸트의 이론을 보다 깊이 살펴볼 필요가 있다.

첫번째 문제는 미드가 기본적 모순으로 지적한 초강대국과 그 외 약소국들 간 힘의 불균형이다. 민주주의 정부를 가졌을지라도, 강대국은 평화를 희생시켜가며 자신의 정책을 약소국에게 강요한다. 칸트의 평화론은 프랑스 혁명당시에 세워진 것으로, 그 당시 정치체제는 압도적 권력의 계몽된 전제정치였고, 국제관계가 유럽 몇몇 국가들간의 세력 경쟁을 통한힘의 균형을 이루는 것을 의미하던 때였다. 따라서 칸트의 평화론을 미국이 유일한 초강대국으로 존재하는 오늘날의 국제관계에 적용하기는 어렵다.

둘째, 오늘날 신보수주의자들의 이상은 칸트의 영구평화론에 반하는 형태로 보여질 수 있다. 칸트의 합리주의는 일방주의를 거부하고 평화를 그 목적과 수단으로 둔다. 그러나 차후 평화의 목적과 이상을 달성하기 위해 현재 평화를 파괴한다는 논리의 사용은 칸트 이론의반하는 것일 수 밖에 없다.

셋째로, 오늘날의 민주주의는 칸트가 그의 평화론을 내놓았을 당시의 공화주의적통치의 이상과 완전히 다르다.

3. 한반도 평화에 대한 두가지 견해

통일에 대한 maximalism 및 minimalism적 비전과 개념을 구분할 필요가 있을 것 같다. 전자는 북한에 대한한국의 사상과 체제를 강요하는 것을 의미하거나 또는 반대로 북한의 사상과 체제를 한국에 강요하는 것을 뜻한다. 후자는 장기적 평화공존의 과정을 통해 궁극적으로 통일에 도달하는 것을 의미한다. 전자는 강경책을 지지하고, 후자는 온건적이고 포괄적인 정책을 선호한다. 다시 말해, 통일에 대한 관념은존재하지만, 평화적 공존에 대한 관념은 아직 없다. 이 둘은 방법에 있어서는 차이를 보일지언정, 궁극적으로는 둘 다 통일을 목표로 한다. 나는 이제 남북한 관계를 다룰 때, 통일과 평화적 공존에 대한 관념을분명히 구분하고 장기적 목표를 세울 때가 되었다고

생각한다. 즉, 남북한 간에 평화적 관계를 이루기 위한 목표와 수단을 논의할 때, 가장 우선적으로 생각해야 할 가치는 공존이라는 것이다. 이는 통일에 대한 *minimalism*적 관념에서 평화적 공존의 관념으로의 전환을 요구한다.

다시 말해, 남북한 관계의 이상적 형태는 단일체제를 최종 목표로 하는 것이 아니라, 남북한 각자의 체제가 평화롭게 공존을 이룰 수 있는 방법을 우선 목표로 두는 것이다. 평화를 지속할 수 있는 최선책은 통일이 아니라 평화적 공존이다. 남북한의 평화적 공존을 얘기할 때, 민주주의는 중요한 의미를 갖지 못한다. 민주주의가 그 자체로 문제인 것이 아니라, 좌파와 우파 간 민주주의의 분열이 문제인 것이다. 한국전쟁의 경험으로 보아, 민주주의가 분단과 전쟁을 초래한 원인 중 하나인 것은 사실이다.

이러한 맥락에서, 또 다른 개념이 중요해진다. 우리가 민주통일을 남북관계의 이상적 형태로 세우는 것이 *maximalism* 접근법이라고 생각한다면, 평화적 공존을 목표로 두는 것은 *minimalism* 접근법으로 보여질 수 있을 것이다. 차이를 인식하고 차이와 공존을 가치와 규범으로 받아들이는 *minimalism* 접근법은 민주주의, 자유, 인권 등의 가치를 북한에 강요하려는 시도를 거부한다. 그렇지 않다면, 자국의 가치관을 북한의 그것보다 더 높게 평가하는 조직이나 그룹은 '인도주의적 간섭'과 '체제 변화'를 위한다는 명분으로 북한 내부 문제로의 개입을 정당화할 것이다. 하지만 이러한 주장이 북한이 민주주의 국가가 되는 것을 반대한다는 뜻은 아니다. 중요한 것은 북한이 스스로 변화하는 것이다.

4. 사회적 심상에 의한 동아시아 평화공동체

한국이 남북한 간 평화적 공존 관계를 발전시키려 한다 해도, 동아시아의 국제관계가 평화적 방향으로 발전하지 않는다면, 한반도에 평화가 확립되는 데 심각한 제한이 생길 것이다. 게다가, 1990년대 후반 이후 한국의 민주 정부가 북한과의 평화적 관계를 추구해온 오늘날의 조건들을 고려해보면, 동아시아의 국제관계가 평화지향적일 때 한반도에 평화질서를 확립하는 것에 대해 낙관적일 수 있다는 사실을 알 수 있다.

오늘날, 동아시아에서 지역 담론의 급작스런 부상은 다양한 경제 연합의 자연스러운 결과이다. 경제 연합의 발전은 분명히 평화 공동체 발전의 사회경제적 발판이 될 수 있다.

동아시아 평화 공동체는 허공에서 생겨나는 것이 아니다. 현실의 폭력과 지배권을 쟁취하려는 노력, 미래의 불확실성에도 불구하고 희생을 감수할 결의가 필요하다. 왜냐하면 이것은 정의와 윤리에 관한 문제이기 때문이다.

Full Text

1. Introduction

In recent years, the problem of North Korea and its associated nuclear problem (the North Korea / nuclear problem) have become, together with the issue of Iran's nuclear ambitions, one of the most dangerous issues in international politics. From the point of view of international politics, the Korean peninsula has become the most dangerous region, as a focus for world conflict, after the Middle East. It is a great tragedy that the Korean peninsula, which once before became the seismic center of world conflict in the course of the Cold War that followed the 2nd World War, with the Korean War, should now again be subjected to the threat of becoming the site of world conflict in this post-Cold War period. It is very

hard to evaluate positively the current international political scene developing in East Asia, so far as securing a stable peace not only in the Korean peninsula but in North East Asia as a whole is concerned. The problem of how to solve the North Korea / nuclear problem and achieve peaceful coexistence between North and South Korea has emerged as a vital challenge for international politics that has to be tackled for the sake of peace in the Korean peninsula, indeed for the sake of the peace not only of the East Asia region but of the whole world.

This paper intends to view the situation from the viewpoint of the local region, the Korean peninsula, in which this conflict has arisen and discuss in what ways peace can be established securely in the whole area. To do this, three main levels of discussion and debate will be needed. The first and broadest level is the dimension related to the direction of America's policy toward North Korea and East Asia as a whole. The second involves questions concerning the possible contribution that could be made by the South Korean government and society toward peace in the Korean peninsula and East Asia. The third concerns what efforts the various nations of the region should make to secure a stable peace in East Asia.

2. The importance of an approach directed toward peace

The question of what policy America adopts toward the North Korea / nuclear problem is of decisive importance. Because America is the only superpower, hard to challenge in every domain be it in military power, politically, economically, culturally or ideologically, worldwide, and particularly in East Asia it exercises the most significant influence on the behavior and policy choices of other nations. In the case of a confrontation of forces in the domain of international politics, or competitive relationships, those involved have a choice of policies, they have reasons and justifications corresponding to their own standards. In the momentum of a shift from competition and confrontation to dispute, from dispute to war, it is extremely rare to find a case in which one of the parties is clearly right and has justice on their side. To view critically the Americans' hard-line countermeasures to the North Korean nuclear program does not mean that one considers the reasoning put forward by North Korea to be right. What is important is the fact that America is a superpower, and that therefore the range of choices available to America is incomparably wider than those of North Korea, and that as a result America's policy cannot be content with being merely based on a realistic logic of force. Powerful states dispose of a wide range of choices that exercise direct influence on the conduct and policies of the rest, and since as powerful states they dispose of relatively superior power they can act with established authority toward others. Therefore, it would be very wrong for a powerful state not to exercise a political and moral responsibility as great as the outcome of the policies decided on by them.

Serious doubts arise as to whether America's policy toward the North Korea / nuclear problem is sincerely oriented toward peace. That is closely related to the ways in which the high-level policy makers in the Bush administration perceive North Korean issues. The North Korean problem has its origins for a large part in a fundamental perception; the policy measures based on it aiming at a collapse of the North Korean system or its total isolation, are the result of a policy whereby America does not recognize the existence of the North Korean system, in an extension of the Cold War's structures of confrontation. The realistic alternative, seen from the viewpoint of peace in the Korean peninsula, is a policy of acceptance toward the North. That means recognizing North Korea at the political level so that it can become a

normal player in East Asia, while providing aid to allow its economic survival. American policy does not opt for the latter alternative, but remains fixed on the former one, making it very difficult to solve the problem, and so long as that remains unclear, I think that the North's nuclear program will continue and there is a strong possibility that the crisis on the Korean peninsula will continue in a lasting manner. It may be that America is deliberately sabotaging any prospect of a negotiated settlement. Even if we set aside as irrelevant the claims of critics of Bush's diplomatic policy inside and outside of the United States, those people who either have been directly involved in diplomacy toward North Korea or have closely investigated that whole process openly say that in fact "America does not want a peaceful solution". The hardline policy toward North Korea has as its starting-point a way of defining the North Korea/ nuclear problem. That involves regarding North Korea as a key trouble-making nation, a threat to peace on a worldwide scale, therefore identifying North Korea with similar nations in the Middle East, and therefore as an enemy state in America's declared War Against Terror.

Obviously, the causes for the conflict America is confronting with the Islamic states of the Middle East and for the conflict with North Korea here in the Korean peninsula in East Asia are fundamentally different in character, and as a result the solutions are bound to be different too. While the Middle Eastern problem is deeply linked to the problem of Israel and to the problem of oil resources, the North Korea problem, an unsolved question of the post-Cold-War era in East Asia, involves the survival of a system resulting from isolation. In American eyes, the fundamental issue in the Middle East is how to assure lasting stability and peace for an Israel besieged in the midst of the vast Islamic region. What makes it so difficult to find a solution is that this besieged Israel is supported by an alliance with America and has an overwhelming superiority in military and economic terms, while on the other hand there is an extreme imbalance of power with the Islamic nations behind Palestine, that surrounds Israel, unable to modernize their military capabilities and kept in economic poverty. Such a situation serves as a hotbed for terrorism. In comparison, the North Korea / nuclear problem is giving rise to an extreme imbalance between a North Korea that is besieged militarily and alienated economically as one of the poorest nations, unable to gain recognition as a player in normal international politics in the East Asian international order under American leadership, and those states intent on maintaining the status quo. That in turn gives rise to an extreme resistance in order to survive, a so-called "brinkmanship diplomacy" using the nuclear program as a weapon. The Middle East situation and the North Korea problem are made similar by an imbalance of power. Yet compared with the problem of the Middle East, it is relatively easy to solve the Korean problem. Regarding North Korea, an end to isolation, a recognition of its right to exist, an internal unification of systems offers a way of solving the problem logically and at the least cost. It is possible to think that the North Korea problem is a far simpler one than the Middle East, unless the American policy-makers do not want a solution to the North Korean nuclear problem but a continuation of it, judging that to be more advantageous either because unstable security in East Asia can encourage a build-up of such strategic space defense systems as TMD or NMD, or because it allows the continuing existence of a strong political and strategic military leverage over the other states of the East Asian region. In short, America's hard-line policy toward North Korea, unwilling to take seriously the difference between the North Korea problem and the Middle East situation, makes it hard to accept the rightness of their diagnosis of the situation, while it is also not an economic one given the excessive costs it involves.

The countries included in the list of "rogue states" are some of the poorest and most backward in the

world. Once having assumed their existence, superpower America undertook the Iraq War, which has all the characteristics of a preventive war, while arming itself with weapons using the most advanced technology and planning a new space defensive system at astronomical expense. Walter Russell Mead, the international political theorist, has said that under the Bush administration the fundamental contradiction America is faced with is the tension between the rapid increase in American power by an acceleration in globalization and technological development and the demand that every state should have an equal voice on the basis of sovereign equality. He has also said that, by a loss of balance because of this contradiction, a "secession of élites" is occurring within these states, with the result that there has been a great loss of support from friendly nations. Speaking of Korea, he says that is reflected in a difference of outlook between the generations (Mead, *Power, Terror, Peace, and War: America's Grand Strategy in a World at Risk*, Alfred A. Knopf, 2004, 150; 160).

Despite Mead's acute observations, when we consider the North Korean nuclear problem from within South Korean society's viewpoint, it seems necessary to add one other fundamental contradiction. That is the fact that the excessive use America makes of the logic of ostentatious power in pursuing its foreign policy comes into collision with the values of peace and morality. That is linked to the problem of American hegemony. During the Cold War, as far as weaker nations such as South Korea were concerned America strove to show that its power went hand in hand with maintaining peace and democratic values, manifesting a moral effectiveness ensuring that it was always accepted freely and spontaneously. What is problematic today is the question why America, despite the fact that as superpower a diplomatic space is open for it to manipulate in favor of peace, is so intent on employing displays of overwhelming superior power. The cognitive discrepancy between this logic of power and state of crisis suggests that American foreign policy is domineering and aggressive, with no interest in peace. Instead of America's present policy toward North Korea, pressuring them and talking of the possible use of force including preemptive strikes, incentives supporting their modernization and providing economic aid would render them less inclined to violence and offer an effective course at lesser cost. Of course this does not only apply to North Korea, it applies to the American approach to all the rogue nations. Besides, this approach is supported by the "engagement policy toward North Korea" of the Americans in the post-Cold War period before the inauguration of Bush as president as well as the experience of détente with the North made by the South Korean government with its "Sunshine Policy." The process of democratization that accompanied détente in South Korea dramatically expanded the influence of popular opinion on and popular control over foreign policy including policy toward North Korea and that of relations with America, in the sense of supporting peace-oriented policies. Since the people of Korea have experienced the Korean War, their understanding of peace and veneration for the values of peace are especially deeply rooted. In South-North relations, with the exception of the extreme belligerence shown by extreme right-wing groups, veneration for the values of peace is shared by the majority of South Koreans, whether conservative or progressive. This can be considered the greatest positive outcome of the Korean War.

The concept of republicanism based on Kant's theory of perpetual peace pays tribute to a system that gives priority to public advantage and popular control of foreign policy (Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch" and "Appendix", ed. by Hans Reiss and translated by H.B. Nisbet, *Kant's Political Writings*, Cambridge U.P., 1991). In this respect, the theory of Kant the philosopher has much in common with the theory of democracy exposed by Robert A. Dahl the political scientist. Robert Dahl

used to consider that possessing an alternative source of information, being capable of an enlightened understanding and a rational judgment of issues, was an essential condition of democracy; likewise, Kant clearly understood that if such a condition is satisfied, democratic citizens are capable of controlling foreign policy and in such a case, it will be peace-oriented. (Dahl, *On Democracy*, 1998). Kant's theory establishes a mutual relationship between a nation's ability to realize peace and its internal forms of government. The way in which South Korea's policy toward North Korea has consistently pursued collaboration in reconciliation and peaceful coexistence, despite instances of conflict between the Korean governments after democratization and the fundamental American policy line toward North Korea, corresponds to Kant's thesis that the fundamental characteristic of a government possessing a republican (democratic) constitutional system will be peace-oriented. Whereas, regarding the qualitative change in the international political order and democracy centered on America, Kant's theory of perpetual peace makes the three following strong reservations. We need to consider further Kant's thesis that wars do not occur between democratic states.

First comes the problem of the imbalance of power between superpower and weaker nations that Meade pointed out as a basic contradiction. Even if its government is democratic in form, a superpower is able to impose its own policy on weaker states on a global scale exceeding even the difference in territorial size, and that at the possible expense of peace, contrary to the peaceful orientation hoped for by those states. Kant's theory of peace was constructed at the time of the French Revolution, when the political system was overwhelmingly one of enlightened despotism, and when international relations meant a limited number of European states of similar power establishing a balance of power by means of a power struggle. England's constitutional monarchy or America's and France's republican constitutions manifested the rationalism of the Enlightenment, and could be considered an institutionalization of it. It is therefore difficult to apply Kant's theory of peace to the present day's international relations when America stands as the only, central superpower.

Second, today the idealism of the Neoconservatives can be seen as an inverse form of Kant's notion of perpetual peace. The decrees of reason and the moral code within the human person are the source of the urge to put into practice that form of justice we are calling peace. With its rejection of utilitarianism, Kant's rationalism has peace as its goal and its means. The logic of Fukuyama's "end of history" comes into conflict with the idealistic foreign strategy of the "Neocon" with his active planning of a "regime change" toward democracy by using arms. According to Kant's thesis, if the world can at some point be unified as a single free, democratic state, the generalization of peace will follow automatically. In such a case, it is possible to argue logically that even the use of military power is justified to spread freedom and democracy across the whole world. That is what Emmanuel Kant called "democracy as threat" (Emmanuel Todd, *After Empire: the Breakdown of the American Order*, 2003, 45-47). But using the logic of destroying peace now in order to achieve the goal or ideal of peace later cannot but be the inverse of Kant's thought.

Third, today's democracy is utterly different from the ideal of republicanism reigning at the moment when Kant expounded his theory of peace. Kant defined a republic as a political order possessing a civil constitution embodying an inner morality and the rule of reason, and reckoned that when republics possessing that kind of constitutional system came together to form a federated system in support of peace, perpetual peace would be attained. There is obviously something idealistic about the notion that

reason can be materialized in the form of a constitution in the world of Realpolitik. As Dahl says, just as all modern democracies are incapable of attaining democracy in reality, so equally the functioning and practice of the democratic system are being perverted and weakened through the overwhelming influence of large-scale capital and mass media. In his "On Perpetual Peace," Kant says that probably "of the three powers within a state the power of the army, the powers of alliances and the power of money the third is probably the most reliable instrument of war" (Kant 1991, 95). The same is applicable to today's situation. Only today, the power capable of engaging in war is manifest in such a magnified form as to be capable of changing the very character of a democratic system. A number of American scholars stress that during the Cold War the fundamental character of the American state changed greatly in its quest for victory over the USSR. The increase in the American military budget and the resulting overinflation of the function of the Pentagon in the structures of the state, with the subsequent military Keynesianism, transformed America's state structures and its economy. The state-run sectors of security and technology produced the momentum for industrial development (Peter A. Gourevitch, "Reinventing the American State: Political Dynamics in the Post-Cold War Era", 2002). Today, America's industrial sector is closely linked to the military, and as Chalmers Johnson has said, the state has been transformed into a "Pentagonized presidency" (Johnson, *The Sorrows of Empire*, 2004, 285). After the fall of the USSR, the defense and industrial systems were obliged to reinvent themselves. This structural change indicates the importance of the problem of internal conditions in obliging America to select an aggressive foreign policy. For rather than a policy aimed at developing social security and the service sector, it suggests an increase in constraints from within American society rendering peace-oriented approaches difficult, a system demanding the prioritizing of an aggressive foreign policy.

3. Two notions of peace in Korea

When it comes to finding a solution to the North Korea / nuclear problem and establishing peace in the Korean peninsula, the role of the United States is decisive. But that does not mean that America should solve everything. Since South Korea is confronted with the North Korea crisis but is also on the other hand its partner, and is therefore most directly involved in the problem, it occupies a position just as important as that of the United States. South Korea is consistently insisting to America that there should be peace in the peninsula, and it would be very wrong if South Korea did not have such a North Korean policy in order to create the conditions needed for America's policy to turn in a peace-oriented direction. But what should be its contents? That is deeply linked to the sense of the word unification in the Korean peninsula. It can be claimed that the most recent statement concerning this problem or indication of a direction in North Korean-directed policy is to be found in the so-called "Four-stage unification" to which President Roh Mu-hyeon referred during his recent visit to Germany (2005/04/15). Prior to this, while the process of intellectual discourse planning peaceful coexistence was focused on the pending issues that the two Koreas had neglected, there was a tendency that meant this easily vanished from the foreground of the issues. From that point of view, President Roh's reference to a "four-stage unification" is highly significant in the light of the current ongoing crisis regarding North Korea's nuclear capabilities, and in a situation in which such hard-line policies such as "regime change" and "North Korean regime collapse" and an aggressive discourse are so influential, evoking once again as a topic the question as to how he plans to pursue long-term coexistence with North Korea.

There is a need to make a distinction between a maximalist vision / idea of unification and a minimalist vision / idea. The former signifies a South Korea intent on imposing its own ideology and system on the North, or on the contrary North Korea wishing to impose its own ways on the South. The latter involves establishing a process of long-term peaceful co-existence, while moving toward eventual unification. While the former supports a hard-line policy or goes well with it, the latter prefers a moderate or comprehensive policy. If we take a long-term view of events from the Cold War period until the Post-Cold-War present, attitudes toward unification in South Korea have shifted from maximalist notions of unification to minimalist ones. But even if we make a distinction between the two, notions of unification are still notions of unification. In other words, whereas there may exist a notion of unification, no notion of peaceful coexistence exists as yet. Maximalist or minimalist notions may differ in method, still the goal of both is unification. I believe that the time has come to distinguish clearly between notions of unification and notions of peaceful coexistence when it comes to dealing with relations between North and South Korea and establishing long-term goals. That is to say that when it comes to the goals and means required to establish peaceful relations between North and South Korea, overall priority has to be given to the value of coexistence. That requires a shift from minimalist notions of unification to notions of peaceful coexistence. One possible practical model for this is found in the "Ostpolitik" of West Germany's Chancellor Willy Brandt establishing the theory of "1 people 2 states" in the late 1960s. That established the special relationship within a single people of East and West Germany, which were not foreign countries for one another although each possessed sovereignty and existed independently.

The reason for speaking negatively of notions of unification is that fundamentally, be the approach maximalist or minimalist, at its core is an approach aiming ultimately to attain peace through a merging into a single system and set of values of two very different political entities. That is quite different from an approach based on notions of peaceful coexistence achieving peace by acknowledging those differences and coexisting with them. Moving toward unification, in the process of merging the two different realities the competing entities each try to come out on top and since the balance between the two is always unstable, it is very easy for the stronger entity to fall into the triumphalist temptation of trying to achieve a hierarchized merger with the weaker one. In the process of unification, violence can easily erupt, and unification can easily come to mean imposing order on differences by hierarchy. That does not only apply to unification by force. Today, East and West Germany have accomplished peaceful unification in a peaceful manner at the political and military levels, but it can be thought that at the economic level it has been at the cost of East Germans merging with West Germans as second-class citizens. By contrast, the approach with coexistence as the goal, not the merging of differences, may prove to be a more truly peaceful one, the process toward a goal of coexistence being shared by all concerned. Of course, once peaceful coexistence has become the goal and the means, there would be no need to reject unification if that should turn out to be the result of the long-drawn-out process of peaceful coexistence. The unification of the two Germanies, rather than being the intended goal or result of an eastward policy was the unanticipated outcome of a process of peaceful coexistence. In other words, the ideal form for relations between North and South Korea is not to have as ultimate goal a single system and to set out preparing for that to happen, but rather to concentrate every effort on establishing as the primary goal ways in which the systems of North and South Korea might peacefully establish coexistence, when for over fifty years since the Korean War they have developed hostile relations marked

by hatred and confrontation. If unification is taken as the goal, how on earth can there be a merging of the totally divergent histories South and North have experienced, including the ideological tensions and war of the past? If we make unification the central value, that will give rise to endless tensions. Because coexistence is possible while acknowledging the tense history of the past, the ideal and practice of peaceful coexistence is capable of reducing the cost of the discord caused by past history and differences, hard to anticipate in advance. It is peaceful coexistence, not unification, that is best able to maintain peace. When it comes to the peaceful coexistence between North and South Korea, democracy does not have much meaning. Not that democracy as such is a problem, but the segmentation of democracy between right and left is problematic. As the experience of the Korean War shows, it is a fact that democracy, far from being able to prevent the division of Korea and the war, constituted one of its causes.

In the light of this, another category of concept becomes necessary. If we consider that positing a democratic unification as the ideal form for relations between South and North Korea is a maximalist form for relations between the two, then taking peaceful coexistence as our goal can be seen as a minimalist form for those relations. Since this minimalist form of relations recognizes differences, takes difference and coexistence as value and norm, it rejects any temptation or attempt to impose on North Korea any such values as those termed Democracy, Freedom, or Human Rights. Otherwise, any system or group convinced of possessing superior values on a hierarchical scale will be able to justify intervening in North Korea's internal problems for the sake of "humanitarian interventions" or "regime change." But to say that is not to prevent North Korean society from becoming democratic in its own way, adopting a market economy, developing and changing into a system that takes seriously and respects human rights. The essential thing is that they should do this for themselves. Kant's theory of perpetual peace is potentially useful here too. Because, with an increasing number of states uniting their sovereign interests and becoming a republic with the result that they come to form a "universal community," the perpetual peace he referred to is a crystal forming through cumulative, lengthy and voluntary efforts. Peace, then, is not the result of any external force, but is something that sovereign states can achieve on their own. There lies the reason why today we should reject any form of vision, expression or policy that plans to achieve a change of system through the use of force and then impose democracy on top of that.

4. An East Asia Peace Community by Social Imaginaries

Even if South Korea sets about developing relations of peaceful coexistence between North and South, if international relations in East Asia do not develop in the direction of peace-oriented relations supportive of that, there will be serious limits to the extent to which peace can be implemented securely in the Korean peninsula. Moreover, when we consider today's conditions, where with South Korea's democratization the democratic governments have been consistently pursuing peace-oriented relations with North Korea since the later 1990s, we see that when East Asia's international relations have been peace-oriented, optimism has been possible about the construction of a peaceful order in the Korean peninsula. As I wrote earlier, I consider the North Korea / nuclear problem to be a residue left over from the Cold War. And I noted that the Post-Cold-War period's reinforcement of the American-Japanese alliance made it all the more difficult to contribute to developing the order of things in East Asia in a peace-oriented direction. That can be seen as the expression of a hegemonic project based on a reinforcement of power, and within that framework the North Korea / nuclear problem is approached

through the use of force or coercion. This approach reflects the standpoint of Thomas Hobbes who advocated the establishment of a strong authority, as represented in his *Leviathan*, capable of bestowing peace and order by means of a "war of all against all." Such an approach toward peace takes as its basis a Realpolitik founded on a kind of physical conception, establishing overwhelming power externally to restrain lesser powers by warfare or else intent on ensuring peace through a balance of existing powers. With the end of the Cold War, the possibility of any great dispute was removed and in its place a variety of new forms of small-scale disputes are arising world-wide; that is the reality of today's international politics. In such an environment, theories of "realism" or "neo-realism" can be considered a method of understanding international politics well suited to America's main view of the world order, with America performing the role of "the world's policeman" pursuing the war against terror or preventing nuclear proliferation even by means of "preventive war," intervening actively in local conflicts intent on dominating the world order. At the present time, there can be no denying that this is a dominant method of understanding the realities of world politics. But one of the biggest problems with this approach is the way in which the nations of East Asia, in order not to be placed in an inferior position in the power competition, are pursuing a Realpolitik, planning an expansion of militaristic strength while encouraging nationalism, and running an increasing risk of turning the region in an arena for a trial of strength. A situation where a build-up of strength on one side provokes a corresponding build-up of strength on the other side is bound to be a situation that most directly threatens peace.

To my own way of thinking, one of the main points in Kant's notion of perpetual peace is precisely, as he says, the need to create a peace that is lasting, secure. As he says, peace is "not a mere truce, a suspension of hostilities. Peace means an end to all hostilities . . ." (Kant 1991,93). Since a Realpolitik-style of approach assumes a balance in relation to an external power that is constantly in a state of perpetual flux and change, the peace obtained by such means will always be insecure and temporary. Kant's notion of perpetual peace involves a longing for peace, which discovers the source of peace in an inner craving that sets out to practice justice as a value originating from the reason and moral standards within us, functioning as a power making possible the institutionalizing of force in the service of peace. Therefore, since human reason exists, lasting peace is a practical possibility. That is why he was deeply skeptical about any diplomacy that relied on diplomatic intrigues and secret treaties, and stressed the importance of conscience and openness. People of a realistic frame of mind are going to reject as impossible any idea that so-called international politics can understand or solve problems by the use of reason or the imagination. That is right, but it is not always right. The founding of the League of Nations, mother to today's UN, can be seen as a practical application of his notion of enduring peace. Then, when Jean Monnet advocated the establishment of a federation of European states by a Federated European Constitution, that was at that point of time clearly a matter of "social imaginaries" (Charles Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries*, 2004). Today peace in East Asia, or an East Asia Community as an alternative to the American-Japanese alliance in support of a hegemonic project, can be seen as one of those "universal communities" that Kant conceived of. Because a union of republics capable of achieving perpetual peace would be a gradual, cumulative process, it can be considered an intermediate form leading to the constitution of a universal community on a world-wide scale.

Since the later 1980s, the East Asian region has rapidly developed relationships of economic union, investment, commerce etc., with rapid economic growth as the basis, and that has in turn become a

foundation calling out for discussion of an economic unification in this region. Today, in East Asia a sudden rise in regionalistic discourse is a very natural outcome related to various forms of economic union. Clearly the development of economic union is capable of becoming the socio-economic basis that can serve to develop a peace community of political significance.

It is worth drawing attention to recent debates among critical intellectuals from Korea and Japan concerning approaches to a regional union of East Asia centered on the North Korean problem and the question of peace on the Korean peninsula, as a starting point for the peace of East Asia. This has produced a variety of perceptions such as "North-East Asia a Shared house," "Discovering East Asia," "Ideas about an North-East-Asian Age." Broadly speaking, I share in these discussions and outcomes. But regarding these discussions, it is necessary to mention the problem of nationalism that is the main hindrance when it comes to the formation of any kind of East Asian Community. Most of the participants in these debates, estimating that nationalism is the gravest obstacle, in order to break it down show a great interest in discovering an "East Asia Community" or an "East Asian authenticity" either by the development of economic and commercial relations or by transcending the region's national frontiers by history through the Confucian culture that was once common to the whole region, or by developing a theory of Post-nationalism, which they then project into the future. This results in a logic moving in the direction of a wider-ranging community for the East Asia of the future, freed of tensions either by avoiding or transcending the tensions of the present.

Just as Germany's role was central in the process of constructing the European Union, so too, in order to build up any kind of community in Asia Japan's role is central. It is precisely because of the importance of the role of present-day Japan that it finds itself saddled with a moral responsibility for the question of its past history. In this process it is important to strive to create an "overlapping space of meaning." This overlapping space of meaning is going to have to abandon the Cold-War legacy of seeing regional international relations in terms of ideology, give up considering others as rivals or potential enemies, and take as its foundation a realistic appraisal of what are the dangers and interests common to all in the region. For then it will be possible to realize that peace, far from being an ideal, is in reality the value that most fully satisfies the interests of each and every state. It can be claimed that the creation of this overlapping space of meaning is primarily a task for political decision and leadership, rather than for society at large. For if the creation of a community for East Asia's defense and peace is not subject to a political decision, when enlarged relations occur at the level of the economy and society, of culture, East Asia being as it is, it will be hard to adapt a kind of functionalistic theory of union viewing that as the starting-point with a political promotion of relations following later. The relationships between South Korea and Japan, Japan and North Korea, are identical with those between Japan and South-East Asia, capable of focusing purely on economic relations (Sakamoto Yoshikazu, 2003). What makes a space of meaning important in the East Asian region is that, although there is a growing network across the region on account of the development of economic relations, with increasing cultural exchanges, South Korea, Japan and China need a separate dimension, capable of realizing that the region's community needs a collective solidarity for security and peace.

Personally speaking, I do not see the way in which Japan is striving to become a "normal" state through the legalization of a military capacity and rearmament, and the conservative rightward trend in Japanese society, as signs of a revival of an earlier Japanese militarism, as many people with a simple

nationalistic viewpoint do. Likewise I do not consider the conservatism of present-day Japan and the rearming of its military as being identical with the expansionist, imperialist militarism that claimed hegemony over East Asia, as the militarism of the past did, and neither do I think that it is moving in that direction. But in so far as the path of Japan's rearming combines with militarism through the framework of the American-Japanese alliance, I fear that there is a great possibility that it will have a negative effect when it comes to solving the North Korean nuclear problem, and, beyond that, building up peace and a common security throughout East Asia. Here again, we see the importance of a space of meaning. That demands action based on a know-how concerning the demands and value of peace, and at the same time means that all the nations involved in East Asia must show a readiness to shoulder the expenses involved in putting it into practice. In the present situation in East Asia, to permit a change of course in this direction Japan should be the first to indicate a readiness to shoulder expenses. Once it does that, efforts for the establishment of an East Asia Peace Community will not only be more justified, they will correspond better to today's Post-Cold-War reality and offer a realistic prospect of better corresponding to the demands of security and mutual prosperity. The East Asia Peace Community is not something created in a void; despite the violence of current reality and efforts to conquer a dominating position, and the uncertainties of the future, it requires a resolve ready to make sacrifices because it is a matter of justice and morality.

JOHN FEFFER

Grave Threats and Grand Bargains: The United States and Regional Order in East Asia

Abstract

Multilateral security structures depend on either grave threats or grand bargains. Although East Asia has no lack of perceived threats or proposals for grand bargains, it has yet to develop anything comparable to NATO or the CSCE.

In the last few years, however, multilateralism has been on the rise in the region. The Six Party Talks, while currently stalled, have brought all the principle powers to the negotiating table and prompted the Chinese to propose that the talks become institutionalized. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), with the participation of China, remains a viable forum for discussing security issues, and the ASEAN Plus Three (China, Japan, South Korea) is moving toward a regional economic system. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization brings together China, Russia, and Central Asia for colloquies on terrorism and border issues. The common element here has been China, which has redirected its foreign policy toward multilateralism.

The United States has traditionally been the chief obstacle to multilateralism in the region, favoring bilateral alliances and agreements instead. Recent policy statements from the Bush administration suggest that the "China threat" is once again assuming greater prominence in U.S. strategic planning. This "grave threat," rather than prompting a tighter multilateral U.S. alliance in the region, has instead strengthened the U.S.-Japanese relationship at the expense of the U.S.-South Korean relationship.

On the face of it, then, China and the United States are two suitors who are offering their prospective East Asian bride very different matrimonial inducements. But as I will argue in this essay, this picture of China as multilateralism's biggest fan and the United States as its biggest foe is not quite accurate. The two countries are battling over not *whether* a multilateral regional order emerges in East Asia, but *what kind*. Will it be a U.S.-dominated security system a la NATO, a revived Sino-centric system, an independent OSCE-like structure, or some other beast? This will depend, I will argue, on how threats are defined in the region and whether a path to a "grand bargain" can be found. East Asia's security future, then, lies somewhere between these perceived threats and these potential bargains.

요약

중대한 위협과 대타협(Grand Bargains): 미국과 동아시아 지역의 질서

다자안보구조는 중대한 위협 또는 대타협(grand bargains)에 의해 좌우된다. 동아시아는 위협에 대한 인식이나 대타협에 대한 제안이 없는 것이 아닌데도 아직 북대서양조약기구(NATO)나 유럽안보협력회의(CSCE)같은 다자안보구조를 구성하지 않았다.

그러나 지난 몇 년 동안, 동아시아 지역에서는 다자주의가 부상하였다. 현재 중단 상태이긴 하지

만, 6자 회담의 진행은 모든 주요 국가들을 타협테이블로 불러내었고, 중국으로 하여금 회담의 제도화를 제안하도록 촉진하였다. 중국이 함께 참여하는 아세안지역포럼(ARF)은 안보 문제 논의에 있어 실용적인 장으로 존재하고 있으며, 아세안+3(중국, 일본, 한국)는 지역경제체제로 발전해가고 있다. 상하이협력기구는 테러 및 국경 문제와 관련하여 중국과 러시아, 중앙아시아 국가들을 한 자리에 모은다. 여기에서 공통적인 사항은 외교정책의 방향을 다자주의로 전환한 중국의 참여이다.

동아시아 지역 다자주의의 가장 큰 걸림돌은 항상 미국이었다. 미국은 다자주의 대신 양자 동맹이나 양자 협약을 선호해왔다. 최근 부시 행정부의 정책 성명은 '중국위협론'이 미국의 전략계획에 있어 다시 한 번 중요한 문제로 부각되고 있다는 것을 시사하고 있다. 이 "중대한 위협"은 동아시아 지역에서 미국과의 다자 동맹을 촉진하는 대신 오히려 한미 관계를 희생시킴으로써 미일 관계를 강화시켰다.

그렇다면, 얼핏 보기에는, 중국과 미국이 동아시아라는 예비신부에게 전혀 다른 내용의 구혼 활동을 펼치고 있는 것처럼 보인다. 그러나 중국이 다자주의의 최대 선호자이고 미국이 최대 적이라는 생각은 그리 정확한 것이 아니다. 이 두 국가는 동아시아 지역에 다자지역질서가 확립될 것인가의 여부가 아니라, 어떤 종류의 질서를 확립할 것인지에 관해 경쟁하고 있는 것이다. NATO와 같은 미국 주도의 안보 체제가 될 것인가, 부활한 중국 중심의 체제가 될 것인가, 독자적인 유럽 안보협력기구(OSCE)와 같은 체제가 될 것인가, 아니면 또 다른 체제가 될 것인가? 나는 이것이 이 지역에서 위협이 어떻게 정의되느냐, 그리고 "대타협"으로의 길이 찾아지느냐에 달려있다고 주장한다. 그렇다면, 동아시아 안보의 미래는 이미 인지되고 있는 위협과 가능성 있는 타협의 가운데 어디쯤 놓여있다고 하겠다.

Full Text

Threat is the mother of multilateralism or so it seems at first blush.^a What else besides a grave threat could motivate countries to relinquish some small part of their sovereignty to band together in a security alliance? Some threats are so monumental Nazi Germany, for instance that they can bind together actors as wildly different as the Soviet Union and the United States. When such threats pass, though, the alliances founder. More enduring multilateral structures, as opposed to tactical military alliances, require more structured threats. A mere ten years after the end of World War II, NATO yoked together traditional adversaries France and Germany, along with the United States, against the perceived threat of the Soviet bloc. This transatlantic alliance has managed to outlive the Soviet Union's dissolution only through the articulation of new threats: Balkan nationalism, multiple crises in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and, more recently, global terrorism.

But surely threat is not the only binding force in geopolitics. In the case of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe(CSCE), threat played a rather minor role in drawing together 35 communist and capitalist nations in a loose negotiating framework that promoted exchanges at the military, economic, political, and cultural levels. Rather, at the heart of the CSCE was a "grand

a In this paper I will be discussing multilateral security arrangements more so than multilateral economic agreements. Given the trend toward a "multi-basket" approach, however, it can be difficult to separate the two strands.

bargain"that provided key participants certain benefits that they couldn't get from bilateral discussions or existing security arrangements. Threats, then, are the big stick of geopolitics used to herd donkeys despite their natural inclinations, while grand bargains are the little carrots that occasionally entice the stubborn beasts to huddle together for mutual gain.

So, let's reformulate the initial statement about the relationship between threat and multilateralism. According to the General Theory of Multilateralism, countries recalculate their national interest to join hands with friends and even foes only in the presence of a grave threat to all potential alliance members. But a Special Theory of Multilateralism also applies to exceptional cases such as the CSCE. Under unusual geopolitical conditions, such as the *détente* between East and West in the 1970s, countries of disparate systems and governing ideologies will forgo the articulation of an overarching threat, acknowledge mutual interest, and form multilateral institutions for resolving common problems.

Neither the General nor the Special Theory of Multilateralism seems to apply to East Asia. There has been no East Asia NATO. Nor has there been an East Asian equivalent of the CSCE. Why is this the case? After all, there has been no shortage of perceived threats in East Asia. Indeed, the United States has built its bilateral alliance system on communist or "rogue" threats of either an "expansionist" character (North Korea circa 1950) or an isolationist nature (North Korea today). U.S. allies in the region have largely concurred with these assessments. The United States has also claimed that, absent its large military presence in the Asia-Pacific, a regional power vacuum could lead to a recapitulation of the 1920s and the rise of a military hegemon. A strong United States, so the argument goes, not only keeps the status quo along the Cold War dividing lines of the DMZ and the Taiwan Straits, but has also kept Japan safely within its "peace constitution," South Korea from developing a nuclear program, and Russia from flexing its Far East muscle. Herein lies a more basic fear at the heart of modern geopolitics: the fear of anarchy.¹ These twin fears of the exercise of (rising) hegemonic power and the absence of (stabilizing) hegemonic power have led both Japan and South Korea to abridge their own sovereignty to accommodate strong alliances with the United States.

If threats abound in East Asia, why have they not given rise to an East Asian version of NATO? Scholars have exhaustively picked over the reasons for why East Asia has not followed the European example.² The United States has traditionally preferred bilateral agreements to avoid getting bogged down in difficult consensus building and to expedite military coordination. Bilateralism also provides a certain flexibility in handling the three very different statuses of its allies (Taiwan's lack of *de jure* sovereignty, Japan's lack of a "normal" military, the peculiar post-Korean War nature of the alliance with South Korea). Disagreements over history (Koguryo, Japan's World War II conduct) and geography (Tokdo/Takeshima, Senkaku/Diaoyu, Kurile Islands) remain persistent in the region in sharp contrast with Europe, for instance, where disagreements over history textbooks and borders have become, as Americans like to say, "history." With no regional economic agreement in place and few regional arrangements of any kind, multilateral norms have also been notably weak in the region, despite common adherence to Confucian values and a shared experience of Chinese high culture. Perhaps more critically, the United States does not share a cultural history with East Asia as it did, for example, with Europe.

The General Theory of Multilateralism, then, doesn't apply to East Asia. Grave threats have generated bilateral agreements, but have been insufficient to engender amore structured, NATO-like multilateral security arrangement.³ Nor have conditions been propitious for the Special Theory to come

into play. So far, at least, the countries of the region have not been motivated to transcend boundaries and ideologies to grope their way toward a "grand bargain" that might address not only the current nuclear crisis but other outstanding regional security issues. The key reason for this lack of an East Asian CSCE seems to lie with the status of North Korea. This putatively communist country remains a diplomatic outlier lacking normalized relations with the United States, Japan, and South Korea and has been generally reluctant to participate in multilateral security dialogues. The CSCE could proceed without marginal Albania; North Korea is too central to the future of East Asia to be left out of a similar negotiating framework.

And yet, theory aside, multilateralism paradoxically seems on the rise in East Asia. The Six Party Talks, while currently stalled, have brought all the principle powers to the negotiating table and prompted the Chinese to propose that the talks become institutionalized. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), with the participation of China, remains a viable forum for discussing security issues, and the ASEAN Plus Three (China, Japan, South Korea) is moving toward a regional economic system. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization brings together China, Russia, and four Central Asian states for colloquies on terrorism and border issues. The common denominator in this springtime of regional cooperation is Beijing. China has embraced multilateralism as both a norm of conduct (in the constructivist sense) and a tactic to advance its own interests (in the realist tradition).

For every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction. China's multilateralism, even when officially encouraged by the U.S. government in the case of the Six Party Talks, has occasioned much soul-searching in Washington. According to the more diplomatic articulation of Washington's fears, heard most often among think-tankers inside the Beltway, Beijing's new fondness for multilateralism is part of a "charm offensive" to disarm critics and distract attention from its great power ambitions.⁴ Further to the right, the considerably less diplomatic "China bashers" have finally recovered their voice in Washington policy circles to accuse China of building a military that will soon rival the Pentagon's and that will be used to seize not only Taiwan but other valuable real estate around the world.⁵ Such fears of China, expressed candidly or covertly, have pushed the United States to enhance its security relationship with Japan, effectively handcuffing the most important participant in any viable regional order for the region. Fear of China has also heightened U.S. commitment to regional missile defense and non-proliferation, effectively drawing an invisible line through the region that divides Japan and Taiwan from China, Russia, and the two Koreas.

China and the United States appear to be suitors offering their prospective East Asian bride very different matrimonial packages. But as I will argue in this essay, this picture of China as multilateralism's biggest fan and the United States as its biggest foe is not quite accurate. At issue here is not *whether* a multilateral regional order emerges in East Asia, but *what kind*. Will it be a U.S.-dominated security system a la NATO, a revived Sino-centric system, a quasi-independent structure like the OSCE, or some other manner of beast? This will depend, I will argue, on how threats are defined in the region and whether certain proto-grand bargains can develop into more region-wide negotiating frameworks. East Asia's security future, then, lies somewhere between these perceived threats and these potential bargains.

U.S. grand strategy

In testimony before Congress on May 26, 2005, new Assistant Secretary of State Christopher

Hill outlined U.S. policy for East Asia.⁶ It was not a dramatic speech, for it did not mark any major departure in U.S. policy. However, Hill's speech reflected some subtle but important changes in Bush's second-term approach to the region.

Hill placed emphasis, for instance, on "freedom," echoing Bush's second inaugural and implying political linkages between human rights and security issues not only with respect to China (for instance, opposition to lifting the ban on arms sales that the EU favors) but to North Korea as well (with human rights an increasingly important topic for the administration as well as for Congress). Hill devoted a good amount of space to U.S. relations with Japan and, despite South Korean and Chinese objections, supported Tokyo's bid for a UN Security Council seat. He not only stressed the importance of U.S. bilateral relations in the region but also the bilateral Chinese-Japanese and South Korean-Japanese relationships, implying that the countries of the region should take a page from the U.S. strategy book in thinking about their own security problems.

Perhaps the most striking part of Hill's speech, however, was the section on multilateralism. The remarks on "multilateral engagement" amounted to a mere three sentences acknowledging the importance of APEC, ARF, and ASEAN. By comparison, Hill lavished three full paragraphs on Mongolia. Even the paragraph on Mongolia's multilateral engagement was more detailed than the paragraph on U.S. multilateral engagement.

Hill's remarks thus conformed to the conventional narrative: the U.S. vision of the East Asian security order is a bilateral one. But in Bush's first term, an important counter-narrative emerged from the State Department. Former Secretary of State Colin Powell described this counter-narrative, somewhat disingenuously, in an early 2004 article in *Foreign Affairs*.⁷ The administration policy, Powell contended, was not unilateral but instead relied primarily on partnerships. In East Asia, for instance, the administration pushed for Six Party Talks against the advice of those calling for direct bilateral negotiations with Pyongyang. And the administration was also championing the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) as a multilateral non-proliferation strategy (with the Regional Maritime Security Initiative eventually slated for East Asia in particular). Powell might also have mentioned the trilateral coordination of policy with South Korea and Japan. Powell's views found echo in Francis Fukuyama's vision of a "neoconservative moment" in which the United States ceased to ignore regional arrangements proposed by China, Japan, Malaysia and others. "I believe that East Asia is under-institutionalized," Fukuyama wrote in 2004, "and ripe for some creative thinking by the United States."⁸

What Powell neglected to mention was that the administration chose a multilateral format for talks with North Korea to hobble negotiations not advance them. And the PSI, since it lacked participation from South Korea and China, more resembled the anemic "coalition of the willing" that backed the U.S. attack on Iraq; it is, to quote one scholar, an attempt to apply the administration's concept of "preemptive self-defense" in a way that "eschews both ad hoc unilateralism and institutionalized multilateralism."⁹ Powell also forgot to mention that the Bush administration had pushed one of the premier multilateral institutions the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) out of existence. Like the Clinton administration, the Bush administration has relied on "a la carte multilateralism," which means working in coalition with others if possible, working bilaterally as a matter of course, and working alone if necessary. As Ralph Hassig and Kongdan Oh argue, multilateralism is more often an obstacle than anything else to the Bush administration: "The risk in broadening any alliance

is that some members might not be sympathetic to U.S. foreign policy and might even work against it."¹⁰ This observation could also function as a generic rationale for bilateralism.

After Powell resigned in November 2004, the rhetoric of multilateralism has largely disappeared from administration policy statements about Asia, perhaps because multilateralism has become too associated with China's new foreign policy. Condoleezza Rice's decision not to attend the summer 2005 ARF summit is a potent symbol of Washington's lack of interest in regional security structures. Although Rice convened a one-day meeting with representatives of Japan and South Korea to discuss strategy in advance of the fourth round of the Six Party Talks, trilateralism has received scant attention from the Bush administration and the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) has fallen by the wayside. PSI is still viable and, indeed, there has been some mention of a PSI "plus" that would address counterfeiting and drugs. But with PSI's chief promoter John Bolton on the way to the United Nations, this initiative has taken a back seat to the unilateral reconfiguration of U.S. forces and the strengthening of the bilateral security relationship with Japan.

Washington's firmer bilateral relationship with Japan is directed against North Korea, is fashioned with an eye toward a perceived Chinese threat, and comes at the expense of U.S.-South Korean ties. In part, this change in emphasis reflects a change in political realities in the region: the election of Roh Moo Hyun, the victory of the Chen Shui Bian in Taiwan, the increasing public hostility in Japan toward North Korea and its effect on Japanese foreign policy. The Bush administration could have responded to these political developments in different ways. It chose the least multilateral option.

Let's consider the altered relationship with Japan in more detail. With full U.S. support and indeed pressure,¹¹ Japan has embarked on an ambitious reworking of its concept of national security. The U.S.-Japan security relationship has always been close, closer even than the nuclear umbrella or the number of troops and bases might otherwise suggest. But now, Japan is breaking out of its constitutional shackles to become, quite nearly, the "Great Britain of Asia."¹² It provided logistical support for the U.S. war against the Taliban, peacekeepers for the war in Iraq, and Marine Self Defense Forces for humanitarian operations after the recent tsunami disaster in Southeast Asia. In December 2004, the Diet passed new defense guidelines that modified a longstanding ban on arms exports so that the government could fully cooperate with the United States on missile defense. In February 2005, the United States and Japan updated their security agreement to include the area around Taiwan as a "common strategic objective," though without mentioning what specific military assistance Japan might provide the United States in case of war. In May 2005, Japan participated for the first time in Cobra Gold military exercises in Thailand.

Japan's security role is not simply supplemental to the United States. Japanese Self-Defense Forces have been more aggressive in pursuing and even attacking vessels. In 1999, using offensive force for the first time since World War II, the SDF fired on suspected North Korean spy ships. No longer limited to rhetorical force, Tokyo has felt more comfortable challenging Beijing over oil deposits in disputed waters.¹³ To reflect its new capacities, the SDF is about to be renamed, simply, the Japanese Army. More dramatic offensive capabilities are in the offing, as Japan is in the process of acquiring an in-flight refueling capability so that its air force can conduct retaliatory strikes (long-range surface-to-surface missiles, also on the wish list, have apparently become less of a priority). The broaching of this taboo topic of using offensive force has made it possible for Japanese officials to discuss even more

"unthinkable" options such as a first-strike capability and even, though an overwhelming percentage of the population remains opposed, a formal nuclear arsenal.

The new "normal" Japan is key to overall U.S. security plans, for Japan is needed to balance China. After a few years of apparent quiescence, the "Blue Team" has regrouped to advance once again its Clinton-era agenda. The "China bashers" argue for a more robust response to China's increased military spending and "expansionist" aims and for a greater commitment to arming Taiwan and boosting the island's international legitimacy. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's statements in June 2005 reflect the growing influence of this group.¹⁴ Pragmatists within the Bush administration, however, have been wary of foregrounding any China-bashing arguments at a time when they are putting pressure on Beijing to reel North Korea back into the Six Party Talks.¹⁵ This debate between neo-conservative idealism and *realpolitik* has been taking place behind the scenes of the Department of Defense assessment that will be presented to Congress in July.¹⁶ The discussions also prefigure the battle shaping up around the next Quadrennial Defense Review in February 2006, which is expected to place a greater focus on the Asia-Pacific region.¹⁷

Central to this renewed focus on Asia-Pacific after five years of devoting considerable money, military hardware, and manpower to Central Asia and the Middle East is the continued force modernization designed to maintain the U.S. maritime dominance in the region, beef up the rapid-response capability, and integrate the next generation of high-tech to counter asymmetrical threats. Rather than reducing its footprint in the region, the United States is simply shifting its weight, withdrawing troops from South Korea and marines from Okinawa, but upgrading military capacities across the board. Decision-making capabilities are shifting eastward to Hawaii, in order for the Pacific Command to better coordinate the different services and to give generals maximum flexibility in times of war. At the same, the U.S. Army 1 Corps is set to move from Washington State to Camp Zama near Tokyo, and the U.S. Navy wants to replace the Kitty Hawk carrier at Yokosuka with a nuclear-powered carrier over the objections of the Japanese.¹⁸

A major reason for the attenuation of the trilateral coordination of the 1990s, a key part of the Clinton administration security strategy and what might have served as the core of an East Asian NATO, is that one leg of the triangle has atrophied. Although force modernization dates back to Pentagon re-evaluations of the early 1990s and Japan's restructuring of its security philosophy began in earnest after 1998, U.S. disenchantment with South Korea is more recent, beginning with George W. Bush's first meeting with Kim Dae Jung in spring 2001. Since that time, the Bush administration has treated trilateral relations as a zero-sum game, with Japan's gains balancing South Korea's losses.

With the election of Roh Moo-Hyun in 2002, South Korea's threat perception in the region has diverged dramatically from that of Japan and the United States. The changes can't be understood in budget terms, for South Korea has continued to allocate a significant portion of the government budget to the military and has only increased that share in the last few years.¹⁹ Rather, South Korea has begun to transform its political view of North Korea and its economic understanding of China. North Korea no longer serves as a "main enemy."²⁰ Efforts to engage the country economically (through Kaesong), culturally (through exchanges), militarily (discussions on East Sea disputes), and even politically (raising the forbidden topics of POWs and South Korean abductees in the June 2005 ministerial) all add up to a bilateral "grand bargain" that could, in the absence of hard-line stances from Washington and Tokyo, serve

as the core of a regional grand bargain (more on this in the last section). China, meanwhile, has been a principle economic partner and a source of cultural interest, clearly for the 386 generation but also for the business community. China remains a "threat" in certain regards witness the garlic wars of 2000. But South Korea's decision not to join the United States and Japan in PSI or missile defense is as much to maintain good relations with Beijing as to curry favor with Pyongyang.

This reconfiguration of threat and movement toward a grand bargain with North Korea underlies recent statements from Roh Moo Hyun about his desire for South Korea to play a "balancing" role in East Asia, suggesting not so much neutrality (as the Voice of America reported)²¹ as a hope to regionalize the hard-won cooperation that characterizes North-South relations.²² It also figures in Seoul's decision to pull out of the U.S.-South Korea Combined Forces Command's Plan 5029, the coordinated effort to prepare for North Korea's collapse. More daringly, Seoul has opposed U.S. plans to bring "strategic flexibility" to military forces so that they can engage more easily in "out of area" operations. Quite simply, Seoul doesn't want to be caught between the United States and China or between Japan and China. In punishment for this independence, more so than as a response to civil society protests against U.S. army actions, the United States may well reduce the number of troops in Korea to fewer than 25,000. In addition, a four-star general's post will be transferred from Korea to Hawai'i.²³ Some U.S. conservatives are so provoked by South Korea's independent noises that they are urging an end to the alliance. They articulate strongly what some in the Bush administration believe but can't say publicly: Seoul is no longer a reliable ally.²⁴

The emergence of two opposed triangles in the 1990s China/North Korea/Russia versus the United States/South Korea/Japan has broken down as a result of China's adroit diplomacy but more so over South Korea's newfound independence. This is why the thin multilateralism of Powell and Armitage has given way to the turbocharged bilateralism of Rice and Hill and, unless Seoul changes its foreign policy, will persist until the end of George W. Bush's second term.

China's new multilateralism

If the United States were fully in control of the security dynamic in East Asia, this story of aborted multilateralism and a strengthened alliance with Japan at the expense of South Korea would be the end of the story. But the United States is not fully in control. And this bothers both the Bush administration and its mainstream critics (read: the Democratic Party shadow cabinet). While the United States has focused on other parts of the world, fumbled the North Korea issue, and alienated its South Korean ally, China has changed the reality on the ground. Since introducing its New Security Concept in 1997, China has identified a way of winning friends and gaining influence in East Asia through multilateralism.

Multilateralism functions in two important ways for China. On one hand, it is a method that better organizes Chinese interests in the region than the previous approaches of isolationism, hard-power confrontation, or intermittent bilateralism. Taking international institutions seriously, as opposed to simply paying lip service out of allegiance to communist internationalism, turns out to pay actual dividends. At the same time, multilateralism is a tactic that gives an asymmetrical advantage. If the United States eschews multilateralism in the region, China can win points in this relatively neglected arena. China's military is outclassed by the United States, so there can be no power advantage: the

Council on Foreign Relations estimates that the Chinese military is at least two decades behind the United States in terms of technology and capability.²⁵ Nor can China hope to woo Japan or South Korea away from the United States and into its own bilateral security alliances. Thus, multilateralism offers China a way of achieving power asymmetrically, much as insurgents will opt for guerrilla warfare to gain an asymmetric advantage against a larger military force.

As Samuel Kim points out, China's new foreign policy can be most easily seen in its divergent responses to the two nuclear crises on the Korean peninsula.²⁶ In 1994, Beijing largely ignored the problem. Eight years later, though, it worked hard to build a multilateral forum to defuse the confrontation. Similarly, in the South China Sea during the 1990s, China attempted to use military force or the threat thereof to advance its territorial claims. But in 2003, China signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) with ASEAN committing the parties to a non-aggression pact and raising the possibility of a more binding agreement on the South China Sea in the future.²⁷ This approach doesn't, of course, apply to areas that Beijing has already declared part of its territory: China is not interested in internationalizing the Taiwanese or Tibetan issues for these are not considered foreign policy questions. However, China is quietly repairing ties with former adversaries Russia and India, has concluded agreements with U.S. allies such as Pakistan and the Philippines, and is pursuing bilateral security dialogues with South Korea and Japan. Such energetic diplomacy suggests that the brokering abilities it has brought to the Six Party Talks could equally apply to the region as a whole if other conditions were more encouraging.

China's stock has risen in the region as a result of its diplomatic activity. Consider the difference between these two statements coming out of Singapore. In 1972, Singapore leader Lee Kuan Yew declared in an interview that expansionism was part of Chinese ideology: "They can never give it up. They want a string of fraternal Communist states around their borders."²⁸ Contrast this sentiment with that of Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, at a June 2005 conference, who stated that "China realizes that it needs to help other nations to benefit from China's growth, and has been doing so actively and intelligently. China is aware of the potential disruptions its growth may create, and has affirmed its determination to develop peacefully."²⁹ The transformation of attitudes in Singapore is by no means unique. In a poll conducted by Globescan, China's role in world politics was viewed more favourably than the United States, gathering particularly high marks in Indonesia (68 percent favourable) and India (66 percent), despite the troubled relations with these countries in the past.³⁰ In an Australian poll, China's foreign policy drew a more favourable assessment than that of the United States by a margin of 69 percent to 58 percent.³¹

It is important to note that a driving force behind China's new multilateralism and its positive reception around the world is economic. The growing Chinese economy depends on a stable security environment in the region, open markets for its exports, and reliable sources of energy. Multilateralism offers China a way to sustain its economic miracle by embedding it in a regional framework. This is a logical extension of China's embrace of globalization and engagement with the World Trade Organization.

China's multilateralism, while taking advantage of U.S. disinterest in alliance-building in the region (outside of Japan and Australia), is not put forward as an alternative to U.S. power. In fact, as Robert Sutter points out, China believes that the U.S. military "guarantees the sea lanes of communication

so important for oil imports coming to China, helps maintain stability on the Korean peninsula, and provides important leadership in the war on terrorism."³² In this sense, China views U.S. unilateralism much as the world views Microsoft's commanding market position: an aggravating system but a useful system nonetheless.³³ China's multilateralism is therefore a constructive asymmetrical response to U.S. unilateralism rather than an aggressive symmetrical opposition. While China has gotten the "religion" of multilateralism, it remains agnostic about what forms multilateralism can and should take. It is thus experimenting with various forms: SCO, ASEAN, Six Party Talks, ARF, and so forth.

To sum up thus far, the United States has defined threats in East Asia in such a way as to solidify bilateral relations with Japan and undermine any possibility of an East Asian NATO. Its own brand of multilateralism PSI, Six Party Talks has foundered on a fundamental refusal to negotiate give-and-takes, certainly with North Korea and increasingly with South Korea as well.^b China, meanwhile, has sought advantage through multilateral structures and has laid the foundation for a very different East Asian security system. The tipping factor in all this in the short term, barring unexpected political changes in Washington and Beijing, is North Korea.

North Korea as Pivot

The two Koreas are currently rebuilding their long-severed train link. Once the Korean train system has been reunified, a traveler will be able to get on in London and get off at the very tip of South Korea, in Busan. Japan is considering an underwater link, which would extend this Eurasian connection even further. More important than tourism, the train link will significantly cut the cost and time of shipping freight between Europe and Asia. Should the train link have a multiplier effect on trade, both China and Russia would revive their age-old roles as bridges between East and West. The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) would assume heightened importance. And North Korea would switch from being the hole at the heart of East Asia to its new crossroads.

While this scenario seems a win-win deal for all concerned, one major power is conspicuously absent: the United States. The Bush administration has claimed that integrating North Korea into the international system is a signal priority. Its actions, however, belie its rhetoric. The administration has not treated Pyongyang's economic reforms of 2002 and their follow-ons designed to bring the North Korean economy into greater harmony with the global economy as worthy of support, either rhetorical or financial. It has continued the Clinton administration policy of blocking North Korea's access to international and regional economic institutions. It has been cool to proposals such as Rep. Curt Weldon's (R-PA) that would offer North Korea a piece of a regional energy pipeline deal in exchange for shutting down its nuclear program. And, perhaps most significantly, the Bush administration has treated South Korea's engagement policy with the North as little more than appeasement and has put pressure on Seoul to cut back on economic assistance and joint projects.

For the Bush administration, North Korea has so far proven too useful a threat to consider any grand bargain that might integrate it into the regional and global economies. The North Korean "threat" serves as a justification for maintaining U.S. military presence in East Asia. North Korea's missiles, the threat of which figured prominently in the 1998 Rumsfeld Report, have made missile

b The fourth round of Six Party Talks is set for late July and it remains unclear whether these will suffer the same fate as the previous three rounds.

defense more politically feasible in Washington. Judging from its various national security documents, the Bush administration certainly considers China the more long-term threat. But given U.S. corporate ties to China and Beijing's willingness to join the war on terrorism, it has been more politically expedient to elevate the North Korean threat.

The administration's approach to North Korea, then, has been to treat it as a security problem rather than as a potential partner in economic engagement. Pyongyang's statements on economic reform serve as distractions from its real purpose: to prepare for an inevitable military confrontation with the United States. Kim Jong Il's "military first" doctrine, the secret HEU program, the issuance of the "Wartime Work Guidelines of April 2004," the open declaration of nuclear capability: U.S. hard-liners use this evidence to prove that their hard-line counterparts are in charge in Pyongyang, not the technocrat-reformers pushing for markets and free trade zones.³⁴

Rather than be saddled with an agreement with an "evil" power that would lose the administration crucial support from its conservative backers, the administration wants to see regime change in North Korea. It is difficult to piece together the long-term vision of Rumsfeld, Cheney or other key "regime change" advocates. Absorption by South Korea is, of course, one option. But the shift in political temperament in South Korea deeply concerns Washington. Like the united Germany that lies at the center of "old Europe," the two Koreas are at the center of what might well become "old Asia." Japan, like Great Britain, supports U.S. policies with few conditions. South Korea is a question mark. An even more integrated peninsula that combines the anti-Bush administration sentiment of the south with the genuine anti-American sentiment of the north would challenge U.S. influence in the region. Nationalism, the administration is finally coming to realize, is a more powerful source of anti-American sentiment than communism. A North Korea simply absorbed into South Korea, bereft of nuclear weapons but with chauvinism intact, could yield this "sum of two nationalisms" scenario. So instead of absorption, the administration might also be entertaining other options, including a regime change that transforms North Korea into a post-communist anchor, the Romania of Asia a country to be relied on in the containment of China, a country more dependable than the unpredictable South Korea, a country more grateful in the long run than Japan.

For the United States and Japan, a politically intact North Korea is the grave threat in East Asia. For China and South Korea, North Korea can certainly be a grave irritant but it also figures in any future grand bargain in the region. The Six Party Talks have failed not only over rhetoric (how Washington and Pyongyang talk about each other) or the details of CVID (the disbursement of rewards during the denuclearization process). The talks have failed because North Korea figures very differently in the regional plans of the principle negotiating parties.

The abovementioned train scenario demonstrates how gradual Korean reunification can provide a foundation for regional integration. Other attempts in the past have included the Tumen River project and the proposed regional pipeline deal. Some North-South economic deals have involved China. The Kaesong project, to succeed, will have to identify markets for products other than simply South Korea. The capital that North Korea needs to rehabilitate its economy will have to come in part from Japan and the Asian Development Bank. Unification is largely dependent on the region. And regional integration is largely dependent on Korean reunification.

Central to the gradualist approach is the notion that economic engagement will 1) help defuse

tensions between North Korea and its neighbors; and 2) encourage political and social changes within North Korea. The first is an old argument, that trade is the great softener of rough edges between countries. Trade with the United States and Japan will promote a thickening of relations, more points of contact, and, most importantly, a greater number of carrots that North Korea could lose if it returned to an aggressive posture. The Kaesong project is a good example of this philosophy. The fact that Kaesong lies along an invasion route to the South makes it into an even more potent symbol of the engagement versus containment trade-off. The second argument derives from the experience of China since its 1979 reforms. Economic engagement will strengthen reformists within the North Korean regime, empower a new class of entrepreneurs, produce a new middle class, and eventually stimulate some form of civil society that will demand greater representation. The North Korean military will buy into the reform process by setting up its own companies. Engagement with international financial institutions will force transparency upon North Korean financial (and political) institutions.

While it is true that both of these arguments have their flaws—trade has not eliminated all security conflicts and there have been limits to domestic change within China itself—economic engagement has certainly encouraged the trend of multilateralism in Chinese foreign policy. For North Korea to move from being chief obstacle to primary pivot, its regime must also perceive advantages in multilateralism, that proceeding down the multilateral path can lead to significant reduction in threat, that multilateral security initiatives are tied inextricably to the rewards associated with economic engagement. The United States has not yet applied the engagement arguments that worked for China to the North Korean situation. And yet, the core of such a "grand bargain" may well be taking shape in East Asia right now.

An East Asian Grand Bargain?

The CSCE was built on a grand bargain. In the early 1970s, the Soviet Union wanted its borders internationally recognized (particularly around the Baltics) and more economic trade with the West. West Germany wanted its Ostpolitik grounded in a Europe-wide process of reconciliation. The United States wanted arms control treaties that could reduce what it perceived as a growing Soviet military threat and certain negotiators also wanted to place human rights on the negotiating table for the first time. A deal ultimately could be reached according to the three-basket approach of security, economics, and human rights—because everyone got something out of the arrangement, even the "bad guys."

The CSCE also depended on a convergence of environmental factors. The United States and Soviet Union had embarked on the trajectory of détente built on a foundation of weak, reciprocal dependency.^c Germany was actively engaged in three successive waves of reconciliation: with East Germany, with Eastern Europe, and with the Soviet Union. The Eurocommunist movement in Western Europe promulgated East-West reconciliation; economic reform movements in Eastern Europe (Poland, Hungary) needed financial support from the West. The CSCE was by no means an inevitable agreement. It required skillful and patient diplomacy, and not just an unusual configuration of factors.

Numerous proposals have been made to apply the CSCE model to East Asia (from Eduard Shevardnadze and Gareth Evans to Kim Dae Jung and numerous academics). None of these proposals

^c The Soviet Union had made a decision after food riots in the early 1960s to provide its citizens with more meat and consumer goods. Hit by poor harvests in the early 1970s, the Soviets became dependent on Western grain. Meanwhile, after the first oil shock of 1973, the West turned to Russia for non-OPEC sources of energy.

has gathered enough support to make a difference. The United States has been satisfied with bilateralism; China has traditionally been concerned that a CSCE-like structure could interfere in its sovereign affairs.³⁵ And yet, more recently, there seems to be growing support not only within Asia but, as importantly, within the United States for the CSCE model for Asia.

What external factors might push the countries of East Asia toward a multilateral solution to the current security dilemmas in the region? And what rewards might attract the key players to recalculate their threat perceptions and negotiate an agreement in their own self-interest?

In terms of external factors, the core relationship is between the United States and China. Without a significant warming in the relationship between the two countries comparable to the Nixon-Brezhnev rapprochement, multilateralism is a dead issue for the region, at least in the short term. The lukewarm improvement in bilateral relations after September 11 did, after all, make the Six Party Talks possible. A more robust multilateral structure would require a more thoroughgoing détente. Such a détente would consist of a narrowing of difference concerning North Korea (the mixture of incentives and sanctions), military questions (arms sales, arms spending), and economic issues (exchange rate, investment abroad). It would require the return of the "China bashers" to the policy shadows. A positive sign is that the United States and China are far more interconnected economically than the United States and Soviet Union ever were. If anything, the relationship might be too dependent and has already stimulated a backlash.

Germany's Ostpolitik finds its parallel in the current "peace and prosperity" policy of Roh Moo-Hyun. But there are some important differences. First, unlike the consensus that Ostpolitik enjoyed across the political spectrum in West Germany, the pro-engagement policies of first Kim Dae Jung and now Roh Moo-Hyun have not garnered support from conservative political groups. This might not happen until and unless the conservatives take control and reshape the engagement policy so that it is palatable to their constituencies. Second, unlike Germany, South Korea cannot make dramatic changes in policies to its neighbors through "apology diplomacy." As a victim in the region (with the exception of military involvement in the Vietnam War), South Korea waits on Japan to make amends. Seoul's inability to control the pace through dramatic acts of reconciliation has frustrated South Korean efforts to, like Germany, regionalize its engagement process.

As these examples of US-China and inter-Korean relations suggest, multilateralism is founded on solid bilateral relationships. It is not an either-or situation. The question, here, is whether the bilateral relationships are inclusive or exclusive. Currently, the U.S. relationship with Japan is exclusive. It is self-contained, relies on threat to bind the two parties more closely, and increasingly comes at the expense of other bilateral relations in the region, namely U.S.-South Korean relations. For a multilateral system to become more likely, more inclusive bilateral relationships are necessary, particularly between the United States and North Korea, and between Japan and South Korea.

Relations between Washington and Pyongyang have teetered on the brink of exclusivity. For the last fifteen years, North Korea has preferred to negotiate directly with the United States. This *realpolitik* calculation is based on Washington's overwhelming military power and the lack of authority the United States has invested in multilateral structures. To alter Pyongyang's calculus, Washington must in effect take multilateralism seriously and not treat frameworks such as the Six Party Talks as mere instruments of U.S. foreign policy. If Washington takes multilateralism seriously, it is more likely that North Korea will

do the same. The Agreed Framework was largely a bilateral deal that was then expanded to include other actors. The parties currently negotiating the nuclear crisis have argued for a much more multilateral approach, not only in the financing of any agreement but in the negotiating of it as well. The Bush administration, to the extent that it supports any negotiations with North Korea, supports this multilateral approach. Normalization of bilateral relations, meanwhile, will eliminate obstacles that stand between North Korea and engagement regionally and internationally, particularly access to capital and membership in regional and international organizations.

In a similar vein, the kind of cooperation between France and Germany that anchored both the European Community and NATO can only be found in a more inclusive relationship between Japan and South Korea.³⁶ A more exclusive bilateral relationship focused on countering North Korean and Chinese threats is conceivable, but only if a more conservative government takes over in Seoul.^d It might well be the case that current disputes between Japan and South Korea (Tokdo, Yasukuni, textbooks) can only be resolved inclusively, in other words with the involvement of other negotiating parties such as China and the United States. As should become clear at this point, exclusive bilateralism revolves around grave threats while inclusive bilateralism points the way toward grand bargains.

The conditions for a multilateral security order in East Asia are not ideal but nor are they overwhelmingly prohibitive. The United States and China are wary interlocutors; the two Koreas are engaged in slow-motion reunification;³⁷ North Korea is desperate for capital to sustain its economic reforms, which requires engagement with Japan and the United States.

For an Asian CSCE to get off the ground, the various parties must perceive significant rewards for their participation. China has already signaled its interest in multilateralism: it needs a stable security environment and protected access to energy to sustain its economic growth. North Korea requires of any multilateral effort that it reaffirm the country's sovereignty and lead to access to international capital. South Korea is looking for a way to embed inter-Korea engagement in a larger regional framework to ensure political and even financial support for gradual reunification. Japan wants three things: territory, a seat on the UN Security Council, and acceptance of its "normal" military. Russia sees multilateralism largely through an economic lens: how to develop its Far East region. Given China's opposition, Taiwan is unlikely to participate in any regional multilateral framework.^e

All of the East Asian countries have a stake in a multilateral CSCE-like structure. But what of the United States? What could push the Bush administration, which has abandoned even the thin multilateralism of the Powell era, to move away from the propagation of grave threats to an embrace of grand bargains? Three overriding concerns are propelling the Bush administration, against its will, in this direction: terrorism, non-proliferation, and comparatively waning influence. The threat of terrorism has already strengthened U.S. relations with Russia and China. Since a CSCE-like arrangement would involve states, not non-state actors, the United States might become involved if it took a clear anti-terrorism stance. Second, the United States would embrace a proto-CSCE arrangement if it were

d Even then, given the economic benefits of engagement with Pyongyang and Beijing and the perils of anti-Japanese nationalist backlash among the population, South Korean conservatives would be wary of forming an exclusive relationship with Japan.

e However, a European-style compromise might be possible along the lines of an "Asia of regions" that would accord Taiwan the same status that the Basque region or Corsica has within the European Union.

built around the elimination of North Korea's nuclear program. Finally, the United States might endorse such a structure if, as the scenario of increased Europe-Asia cooperation suggested, it felt that it was being locked out of East Asian developments (in the same way that it pushed APEC in order not to miss out on Asian economic growth).

These three motivations are encouraged by an emerging liberal-conservative consensus in the United States in favor of a regional security mechanism in East Asia. On the "right," Francis Fukuyama has called for the institutionalization of a "Five Party Talks," that would counter growing nationalism in the region, "channel Chinese ambitions," and assuage fears of Japan's new assertive security policy.³⁸ Fukuyama takes issue with traditional U.S. indifference to multilateralism in Asia by presenting the best realist case.^f Even though Fukuyama's influence in the Bush administration is minimal he supported Kerry in the last presidential campaign his views represent an important strain of thinking among U.S. conservatives (and can be found as well in the work of Andrew Bacevich).

On the "left," meanwhile, James Goodby and Donald Gross make a more formal pitch for the CSCE structure of three baskets covering security, economics and humanitarian concerns.³⁹ They put the Korean peninsula at the center of their "grand bargain" by arguing that a peace agreement must replace the current armistice arrangement. Their rationale is based largely on the growing alienation of the United States from ongoing trends in the region, exemplified by Washington's non-invitation to the first East Asia Summit in Dec 2005 in Malaysia. Kurt Campbell has argued that multilateral security initiatives, to have the greatest chance of success in East Asia, must come from the region not from Washington.⁴⁰ Fortunately, China has already called for the institutionalization of the Six Party Talks, so the United States merely has to back the proposal rather than make one of its own.

Integral to the success of any regional structure is not only the benefit that countries get but what they give up as well in exchange. South Korea may well have to give up claims to Tokdo in exchange for gaining greater regional economic support for inter-Korean reconciliation. Or Japan might have to give up Takeshima in order to gain regional support for its seat on the UN Security Council. The United States will certainly have to get over its distaste for providing economic support to a human-rights abusing regime in North Korea if Pyongyang agrees, finally, to eliminate its nuclear program.

This intricate cost-benefit calculation can certainly take place bilaterally, and so far has done so though without any dramatic breakthroughs. What make CSCE scenarios attractive are, as negotiation theory predicts, the greater range of agreements make possible when more items are on the table.⁴¹ Indeed, the logjams that East Asia currently faces over contested territory, over North Korean nuclear aspirations, over history, over non-proliferation policy may only be resolvable when multiple levels of bargaining can take place.

At this point, a multilateral security framework in East Asia is likely in the coming years, but its form remains unclear. A structure that overcomes Chinese concerns over sovereignty issues will have to tread carefully on human rights and democratization issues. A structure that gains U.S. support can't undermine, at least initially, the existing bilateral alliance system. A structure that involves North Korea must include some form of economic engagement. For a three-basket approach to work, the United States and Japan will have to redefine the North Korean and Chinese threats. North Korea will have to

^f It is ironic that the promoter of the "end of history" argument now must support the very kind of institutions that he once derided in order to counter the very kind of threats that he once claimed were largely spent.

redefine the U.S. threat along the lines that China has already done. All the countries in the region will have to perceive concrete benefits from a regional agreement.

East Asia doesn't have to wait for the end of the Cold War to establish a CSCE-like structure. The Soviet Union and the United States did not declare in 1975 that they no longer posed a threat to one another. Rather, they transformed their understanding of grave threats and established a framework that eventually contributed to ending the Cold War. East Asian countries are on the verge of such a definition of threat. If they take the next step and bring a new sense of cooperation to the multiparty negotiating table, they too will be able to establish an organization that can undermine and eventually eliminate the Cold War that persists in the region.

1 Such a fear of anarchy has led some analysts to propose that only a unipolar system, presided over by the United States, can ensure stability. See William Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," *International Security* (Summer 1999), pp. 7-8.

2 For a recent overview, which includes South and Southeast Asia, see Amitav Acharya, "Why Is There No NATO in Asia?" May 2005; <http://www.iir.ubc.ca/Papers/Acharya-May05.pdf>

3 As Derek Chollet argues, without an overarching Soviet threat, "if Asian and U.S. leaders are intent on coming together, they must do more to answer the fundamental question for what?" See Derek Chollet, "Time for an Asian NATO" *Foreign Policy*, March/April 2001, p. 92.

4 Kurt Campbell is one of the more astute proponents of this view. See, for instance, Kurt Campbell, "China's New Prominence in Asia," Testimony to Senate Foreign Relations Committee on U.S.-China Relations, September 11, 2003.

5 Such "China bashers," also known as the "Blue Team," include Bill Gertz of *the Washington Times*, John Tkacik and Peter Brookes at the Heritage Foundation, and Robert Kagan at the Project for a New American Century. "Those Subtle Chinese," Kagan's *Washington Post* op-ed from March 10, 2005, is representative of the positions: "[T]here is nothing at all subtle about Chinese "diplomacy." The Chinese are indeed flexing their muscles, wielding their increasing economic and military clout to demand greater obedience from their neighbors. There is nothing surprising in this. The only surprise is the way the world, including the United States, has in recent years tried to ignore China's growing belligerence, mesmerized by its economic performance and dreaming of a reformed, postmodern China that can be "integrated" into the global liberal economic order. Some American analysts have even been calling for the erection of new collective security structures in East Asia that would include China. But that rather misses the point. New security structures are needed in East Asia, but they should involve America's democratic allies, all of whom now share an increasing fear of a China whose rise may or may not be entirely peaceful."

6 Christopher Hill, "North East Asia Vital to U.S. Regional and Global Interests," May 26, 2005; <http://hongkong.usconsulate.gov/uscn/state/2005/052602.htm>

7 Colin Powell, "A Strategy of Partnerships," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2004. Powell's essay

was a change from his confirmation hearings, when he conspicuously left out any mention of Asian multilateralism. See, e.g., Ralph Cossa, "Bush's Emerging Asia Policy: What's Still Missing," *PacNet 6*, Pacific Forum, CSIS, February 9, 2001.

8 Francis Fukuyama, "The Neoconservative Moment," *The National Interest*, Summer 2004.

9 Michael Byers, "Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation Security Initiative," *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 98, No. 3 (July 2004), p. 543.

10 Ralph Hassig and Kongdan Oh, "The Dilemma of Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia," *Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies*, Volume 15, 2005, p. 163.

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WONHYUK LIM**New Inter-Korean Relations and the East Asian Community****요약****새로운 남북관계와 동아시아 공동체**

지난 10여 년 간 통일논의는 과거에 비해 위축된 모습을 보여왔다. 그 이유는 크게 두 가지로 나눌 수 있다. 첫째, 독일통일 이후 통일비용 문제가 부각되면서 과연 남북통일을 이루는 것이 바람직한 것인가에 대한 근본적인 의문이 제기되었다. 둘째, 설령 통일이 반드시 이뤄야 할 민중적 과제라고 하더라도 남북 간의 불신이 깊은 상황에서 통일을 논하는 것은 비생산적이라는 인식이 있었다. 상호불신이 심한 상황에서 '통일'을 논하는 것은 상대방의 '소멸'을 기도하는 것으로 받아들여질 수 있으므로, '통일'보다는 '평화공존'을 중간목표로 설정하여 남북한의 공동발전을 추구하는 것이 바람직하다는 것이다. 무력도발 불용, 흡수통일 배제, 교류협력 증진을 3대 원칙으로 하여 추진된 햇볕정책은 이와 같은 인식을 반영했다고 볼 수 있다.

하지만, 최근 수년간 한반도 및 동아시아에서 일어난 변화를 감안할 때, 이제는 좀 더 적극적인 통일정책이 필요한 것으로 보인다. 우선 통일비용은 남북경제의 통합이 늦춰질수록 오히려 증가할 가능성이 높고, 남북 간의 불안정한 분단관계가 지속되는 한 이에 따른 분단비용도 크다는 점이 명확해졌다. 남북 간의 불신도 2000년 6월 정상회담을 계기로 상당 부분 완화되었으므로 통일방안에 대해 좀 더 구체적인 논의를 할 수 있게 되었다. 이처럼 한반도 내부에서는 남북통일의 진전을 가로막았던 요인들이 약화되고 있는 반면, 국제적으로는 중국을 견제하려는 미국과 일본의 움직임이 가시화됨에 따라 오히려 남과 북의 사이를 벌려놓는 방향으로 힘이 작용하고 있다. 국제역학에 의해 남과 북이 각각 다른 진영에 귀속되는 사태를 방지하기 위해서는, 제도적으로 남과 북을 하나로 묶는 것이 바람직하다. 이미 6.15 공동선언 제2항에 반영된 바와 같이 '평화공존'에서 한 걸음 더 나아가 '일국양제' 식으로 새로운 남북관계를 정립하는 노력이 필요한 시점이다.

동시에 미국을 포함하여 동아시아를 하나로 묶는 노력도 전개되어야 한다. 남북통일과 동아시아의 통합 사이에는 선순환적인 관계가 존재한다. 신냉전의 발생 가능성을 최소화하고 남북통일이 동아시아 지역의 안정에 기여할 것이라는 인식을 심어주기 위해서는 동아시아의 통합이라는 큰 맥락에서 한반도문제에 접근하는 것이 바람직하다. 특히 미국의 역할과 관련해서는, 미국이 중국과 일본 사이에서 균형자 및 안정자의 역할을 할 때 동아시아에 대한 미국의 영향력이 유지될 가능성이 높다는 점을 강조할 필요가 있다.

Full Text**1. Introduction**

East Asia has witnessed a great deal of conflict and tension since the mid-nineteenth century, when the traditional Sino-centric "world order" in the region came under attack from imperialistic powers. In a fifty-year period, China and Japan fought two major wars, and so did Japan and Russia. China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 accelerated the demise of the Ching Dynasty, and the destruction of the

Russian Fleet by the Japanese Navy in 1905 dealt a devastating blow to the Russian Empire. Of course, in a way, China and Russia returned the favor to Japan in World War II, with a little help from the United States. Japan's brutal colonial rule in Korea also came to an end in 1945. Although many hoped that the end of World War II would open a new era of reconciliation and cooperation in East Asia, the ensuing Cold War made it all but impossible for the countries in this region to work together toward a common future. Instead, the intense U.S.-Soviet rivalry during the Cold War resulted in the partition of the region along ideological lines and greatly increased risks of conflict. Nowhere was this more evident than in Korea, as the nation was divided along the 38th parallel and became a battleground for an internationalized civil war. Although the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s removed most of the structural constraints that had impeded regional integration, genuine reconciliation and cooperation in East Asia remain an elusive dream.

The challenge for East Asia is to find a new order that is effective in promoting reconciliation and cooperation but is at the same time non-threatening to the United States and other extra-regional countries. To promote reconciliation and cooperation, political breakthroughs should be supplemented by increased economic and cultural exchanges, which help to broaden and consolidate public support for improved political relations. Consistent and credible actions should be taken to build trust. Also, potentially enormous benefits from the integration of East Asia should be spelled out, for countries both inside and outside the region. After all, the construction of energy, information, and transportation networks and the integration of national markets in East Asia should offer tremendous business opportunities. Regional cooperation in East Asia should be used as a building block for global economic integration. The creation of a "Fortress East Asia" should not be the objective.

Although the Korean peninsula has often symbolized the animosities and divisions that exist in East Asia, remarkable changes are taking place in inter-Korean relations. While the continued division of the peninsula raises the ominous prospect of another confrontation developing between major powers in East Asia, rapprochement between North and South Korea has been unmistakable since the historic inter-Korean summit in 2000. Even the eruption of the second North Korea nuclear crisis of 2002 has failed to turn back the clock, and the integration of the Korean peninsula is likely to accelerate at a rapid pace when the nuclear crisis is resolved, with significant implications for international relations in East Asia.

This paper looks at Korean rapprochement within the broader context of East Asian integration. This paper discusses political and economic factors that have tended to facilitate Korean rapprochement and East Asian integration in recent years, and analyzes the set of problems that should be addressed if there is to be further progress. While the current nuclear crisis is not the focus of this paper, a brief overview is provided from an international relations perspective. For East Asian integration, the problems created by complex triangular interaction among China, Japan, and the United States are highlighted. The linkage between Korean rapprochement and East Asian integration is also emphasized.

Focusing on measures to promote market integration and infrastructure development in East Asia, this paper then explores policy options through which a stable, mutually beneficial new order can be established in the region and beyond. The Six-Party Talks and the ASEAN plus 3 framework provide useful institutional bases from which major players in East Asia can start their discussions. Currently an institutional arrangement to deal with the North Korea nuclear crisis, the Six-Party Talks can develop into

a regional forum at which economic issues with security implications (e.g., energy networks such as gas pipelines) can be discussed. Within the ASEAN plus 3 framework, with ASEAN and South Korea effectively playing the role of mediators between China and Japan, coordination and consultation regarding economic and security matters would be desirable. The construction of energy, information, and transportation networks and the integration of national markets should offer tremendous business opportunities for corporation from both within and outside the region. This paper emphasizes that regional cooperation in East Asia should be used as a building block for global integration. This paper also argues that it is in the interest of the United States to work with regional players to bring about this new order in East Asia.

2. Developments in Inter-Korean Relations

In the late 1980s, South and North Korea seemed to follow the same steps taken by East and West Germany in the early 1970s. Establishing diplomatic relations with North Korea's traditional allies through *nordpolitik*, Seoul applied pressure on Pyongyang to engage actively in inter-Korean talks. Worried about the viability of the regime in the aftermath of the collapse of the Communist Bloc, Pyongyang complied. A series of high-level inter-Korean talks ultimately led to the signing of the Basic Agreement¹ and Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in December 1991. These dramatic developments encouraged hopeful talk that the South and the North might be able to form a commonwealth by 1995, fiftieth anniversary of Korea's liberation from the Japanese colonial rule. Inter-Korean relations, however, stalled again before the two sides could move on from the stage of agreeing on a basic framework for peaceful co-existence to that of implementation, of having human and economic exchanges on a regular basis. The politically motivated posturing prior to the presidential election of 1992 in South Korea, the nuclear brinkmanship of North Korea, the death of Kim Il Sung and the ensuing controversy over the sending of condolence missions in 1994 all contributed to a rapid deterioration of inter-Korean relations.

With the cooling of inter-Korean relations, dissenting voices began to be heard in South Korea regarding unification. Interestingly enough, these dissenting views were primarily based on a misreading of the German experience with unification.

First, Germany's economic troubles after unification led some South Koreans to question not only the feasibility, but also the desirability of unification itself. Estimates for Korea's unification costs typically run on the order of hundreds of billion dollars according to the income target method, by which the North Korean per-capita income is usually set to reach 60 percent of the South Korean level within 10 years after unification.² These estimates imply that each and every South Korean, on average, will have to make a contribution on the order of \$10,000 over a period of 10 years.

Given the large estimates, concern about unification costs in South Korea is understandable.

¹Formally titled "the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation Between the South and the North," the Basic Agreement characterizes the inter-Korean relationship as "a special interim relationship" to be creatively dissolved through reunification.

²See, for instance, Hwang, Eui-Gak(1993), *The Korean Economies*(Oxford: Clarendon Press); Yeon, Ha-Cheong(1993), "Economic Consequences of German Unification and Its Policy Implications for Korea," KDI Working Paper no. 9303 (Seoul: Korea Development Institute); and Marcus Noland, Sherman Robinson, and Monica Scatasta(1996). "Modeling Economic Reform in North Korea," manuscript.

Those who question the desirability of unification on the grounds of cost seem to miss some crucial points in the economic aspects of unification, however. First of all, most of the large "unification costs" represent, and *should* be structured to represent, a long-term investment in the future rather than one-time cost that cannot be recovered. Second, it is unreasonable to presume that the South would have to take up all these costs alone. If the North commits itself to economic reform and the South is willing to provide support, it will not be difficult for North Korea to secure investment funds in this era of global capital mobility. In this regard, it must be kept in mind that South Korea, one of the world's poorest countries with bleak economic prospects in the early 1960s, was able to secure foreign loans in the initial phase of its own economic development. Third, "unification-phobes" do not seem to know what they intend to do should the North Korean regime actually collapse. Their position, in fact, seems to be based on a fundamentally false premise that the South can reduce unification costs by continuing to ignore the North's economic troubles; however, if the South waits until the North collapses to engage in economic exchange, the eventual unification bill will have become *larger*, not smaller. In fact, using a computable general equilibrium model, Noland, Robinson, and Scatasta (1996) show that the total unification bill will more than double with each delay of 5 years. Finally, in their preoccupation with unification costs, "unification-phobes" seem to overlook the potentially disastrous cost of national division. In June of 1994, South and North Korea nearly went to war, as the U.S. high-handedness in negotiations over North Korea's suspected nuclear program led to a deadlock. In this regard, it is worth noting that Helmut Kohl stated in his memoir that he would still have pushed for the unification of Germany even had he known that the unification would cost more than ten times the initial estimates. He asserted that a continued division of Germany was too risky a prospect to bear and that unification, though costly, would provide the basis for a secure and prosperous Germany. The position of "unification-phobes," in short, seems to be based on an extremely short-sighted economic logic.

In addition to the increasing concern for unification costs, the other troubling trend that developed within South Korea in the wake of the souring of inter-Korean relations is that a German-style unification-by-absorption began to surface among some political commentators as an alternative to the gradual approach that had been, and still remains to be, the official policy of the South Korean government. North Korea's increasing economic problems, combined with Pyongyang's hostile attitude toward Seoul, have encouraged speculation that the inflexible North Korean regime would collapse under the weight of the present crisis and that South Korea would have to be prepared to cope with transitional problems and move ahead with unification by absorption. Some proponents of this unification-by-absorption scheme go further and advocate that the South withhold economic assistance to the North and place heavy restrictions on inter-Korean economic exchange; they argue that economic assistance would only prop up a corrupt, oppressive, and ungrateful regime in Pyongyang.

Although this policy is supposed to be based on lessons from the German unification process, it contains a serious misreading of the German experience: West Germany did *not* use sanctions and other pressure tactics to bring the East German government to a collapse and achieve unification by absorption. Instead, West Germany extended generous economic assistance to the East. To some critics, this policy only seemed to help prolong the oppressive rule by the socialist regime in East Germany, and, in fact, even after unification, some maintained that while the West German government sought "stabilization with liberalization" in East Germany by providing economic assistance, what it actually achieved was

"stabilization without liberalization," as the East German government shrewdly used West Germany's economic assistance and held its ground until the very end.³

West Germany's generous policy certainly failed to soften the Honecker regime; however, it is certainly not true that the East German government was able to achieve "stabilization without liberalization" with West Germany's economic support. In fact, what seems to have transpired in East Germany was "destabilization without liberalization." Provided in return for the inter-German exchange of visits and correspondences, West Germany's economic assistance managed to drive a wedge between the government and the general populace of East Germany. Although the Honecker regime continued to drum up hatred for "imperialistic capitalists," West Germany's humane and generous policy began to convince the East German people that such a propaganda was simply groundless. And as prospects for liberalizing reforms became bleak, a profound sense of alienation and hopelessness began to spread throughout the society. Both the East German exodus and democratic revolution of 1989 had roots in this feeling of discontent, and Gorbachev's new international policy provided the necessary spark. Even the East German People's Army, for the most part, seems to have shared this feeling and did not intervene when citizens held massive demonstrations. When the East German government collapsed, it was a relatively easy task for the West German government to push ahead with a unification-by-absorption strategy.

Applied to the North Korean situation, the German experience implies that at least the following two conditions must be satisfied if the unification-by-absorption strategy is to succeed: (1) the North Korean people must so much envy, and expect generosity from, their Southern brethren that they want to be absorbed by the South instead of reforming their own system; (2) those who have the most to lose by absorption (e.g., the military) must be contained. Neither the active policy of strangling the North nor the passive, wait-and-see variety of unification-by-absorption policy, however, satisfies these conditions. Cut off from the outside world, few North Koreans will come to expect generosity from the South when all that they have heard through their government propaganda channels is active hostility or aloofness from the South. Moreover, without frequent contacts with their Southern counterparts in the first place, the North Korean people simply have little way of knowing about the superiority of the South's system. In short, as serious as they are about achieving national unification, proponents of the unification-by-absorption policy seem to take little account of the psyche of the North Korean people.

In fact, the sunshine policy of the Kim Dae-jung government reflected the realities of inter-Korean relations marked by a great deal of distrust between the two sides at the time. As "unification" could be interpreted as meaning the "extinction" of the other side when mutual distrust remained strong, the sunshine policy focused on promoting peaceful coexistence rather than unification. It specifically excluded unification-by-absorption as well as armed aggression as a unification strategy and instead sought to promote inter-Korean exchanges.

However, the building-up of trust between the two sides since the historic inter-Korean summit in 2000 and changes in international relations in East Asia seem to call for a more proactive unification policy. As Article 2 of the June 15 Joint Declaration in 2000 suggests, there is a commonality between the North's proposal for "a low-level confederation" and the South's scheme for a commonwealth, and the

³See Timothy Garton Ash(1993), *In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent* (New York: Random House).

formalization of inter-Korean relations along the lines of "one country, two systems" would be in accordance with the 1990 Basic Agreement's characterization of the inter-Korean relationship as "a special interim relationship" to be creatively dissolved through reunification.⁴ With reduced distrust between the two sides in recent years, such a tentative scheme for "unification" is unlikely to generate negative side-effects.

The re-definition of inter-Korean relations would also be an effective means of responding to changes in international relations in East Asia. With the rapid rise of China as an economic as well as political power, there is increasing concern that "a new Cold War" may break out between the United States and China. Some neocons have even suggested that the United States create a Great Crescent linking Japan, Taiwan, and India, to contain China. Before North and South Korea are forced to take sides in the new bipolar structure and further consolidate national division, it would be advisable to formalize inter-Korean relations along the lines of "one country, two systems." Moreover, as the two sides of the divided land-bridge in East Asia, North and South Korea should make every effort to promote the integration of East Asia, for it is likely to facilitate Korean rapprochement.

Inter-Korean economic cooperation is critically important. Not only would inter-Korean economic cooperation create mutually beneficial business opportunities for companies involved, but it would also have more significant implications as well. First, it would help North Korea to see a way out its current predicament as a rogue state. Through economic exchanges, North Korea would be able to earn money the old fashioned way rather than through questionable transactions involving narcotics or weapons. Also, by helping North Korea to get accustomed to market principles, inter-Korean economic cooperation would have the effect of facilitating and consolidating North Korea's economic reforms. Second, it would help South Korea to undertake industrial restructuring in a less painful manner. Third, inter-Korean economic cooperation would have the strategic significance of counterbalancing China's increasing influence in North Korea.

3. Changes in International Relations in East Asia

During the Cold War, most countries in East Asia belonged to one of the two competing hub-and-spoke alliances headed by the United States and the Soviet Union. Primarily due to historical reasons, including military conflicts in the 20th century, there was very little multinational cooperation in East Asia at the governmental level. Yet, economic linkages were extensive, at least in the non-socialist part of the region. Japan provided the lion's share of capital and intermediate goods to outward-oriented industrializing economies, which exported final goods to the American and European markets. The 1985 Plaza Accord accentuated this trend, as the appreciating yen led Japan to increase its investment in Southeast Asia. Although there was no preferential trade agreement in East Asia, extensive international production networks were established in the region to reap the benefits of global trade.⁵ At least until the

⁴Seoul envisages a process through which the present regime of no unified central government, two separate regional governments, and two different systems (0-2-2 formula) evolves first into a commonwealth (0.5-2-2) and eventually into a single unified state (1-0-1); whereas, Pyongyang proposes to create a low-level confederation of one central government, two separate regional governments, and two *different* systems (1-2-2 formula). Note that a commonwealth, based as it is on the free association of separate political entities, does not include a formal structure of central government with binding powers. Instead, it mandates a joint consultative conference between the two sides meeting on a regular basis.

end of the 1980s, East Asia took advantage of globalization without giving preference to regional integration. For the most part, export-oriented countries in this region adhered to multilateral principles.

A number of developments since then, however, have led East Asia to take a more favorable view of regional integration. The end of the Cold War and economic reform in transition countries such as China and Vietnam greatly enhanced the prospects for tighter integration in East Asia. Also, the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the formation of the European Union (EU) spurred exploratory discussions on "defensive" responses from East Asia. The 1997 economic crisis highlighted the need to create transnational institutions such as an Asian Monetary Fund to protect the collective interests of the countries in the region.⁶ Finally, the rapid rise, or more accurately, resurgence of China prompted a search for an international arrangement designed to minimize the risks associated with a shifting balance of power.

As a result, East Asia is becoming more interested in tighter regional integration, beyond the level consistent with a general trend toward globalization. In fact, in recent years, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), China, Japan, and South Korea have floated a number of proposals to promote the integration of East Asia, including bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) and plurilateral regional initiatives.

Yet, because these regional integration schemes have the potential of causing a significant shift in international relations, they may become a new source of tension both within East Asia for example, between China and Japan and with extra-regional players such as the United States. The challenge for East Asia is to find an alternative that is effective in promoting reconciliation and cooperation but is at the same time non-threatening to extra-regional countries.

3.1. The Burden of History

For many centuries, China was a dominant force in East Asia, if not the world. As late as 1820, according to Angus Maddison's estimate, its GDP accounted for over 25 percent of the world's total output, and its place in the world seemed secure.⁷ However, in the course of subsequent decades, the Chinese empire unraveled under the attack of intruding Western powers and a rising Japan.

In particular, the emergence of Japan as a revisionist power in East Asia was an important event because it fundamentally changed the dynamics of international relations in the region. Combining the Japanese ethos with Western technology, Japan rapidly modernized itself and adopted an increasingly proactive foreign policy.⁸ Although some intellectuals in Korea and China hoped that Japan would lend a

⁵On Japanese investment in Southeast Asia, see Seiichi Masuyama (2000), "The Role of Japan's Direct Investment in Restoring East Asia's Dynamism: Focus on ASEAN," in *Restoring East Asia's Dynamism*, edited by Seiichi Masuyama, Donna Vandebriek, and Chia Siow Yue (Tokyo: Nomura Research Institute), pp.213-296.

⁶On evolving views toward regional integration in East Asia, see C. Fred Bergsten (1990), "The World Economy after the Cold War," *Foreign Affairs* 69(3) and T. J. Pempel (1999), "Regional Ups, Regional Downs," in *The Politics of the Asian Economic Crisis*, edited by T. J. Pempel (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), pp.62-78.

⁷For historical perspectives on China's economic performance, see Angus Maddison (1995), *Monitoring the World Economy, 1820-1992* (Paris: OECD), p.30 and Angus Maddison (1998), *Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run* (Paris: OECD).

⁸See Michio Morishima (1982), *Why Has Japan Succeeded? Western Technology and the Japanese Ethos* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). For a comparative study of China and Japan in the 19th century, see George M. Beckman (1962), *The Modernization of China and Japan* (New York: Harper & Row).

helping hand in the modernization of their countries, their hopes were dashed as Japan became an imperialistic power of its own.⁹

Japan initially defined its role as a "junior partner" of global powers such as Britain and the United States and greatly expanded its influence in East Asia. Starting in the 1930s, however, Japan began to pursue an independent course of military adventurism. Seeking to dominate East Asia and to expel Western powers from the region, Japan called for the establishment of a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere," under the slogan of "Asia for Asiatics." Although Japan's defeat in World War II marked the end of this ambitious project, Japan's foreign policy before 1945 seems to have significant implications for regional cooperation in East Asia after the end of the Cold War.¹⁰

In this regard, it may be useful to draw lessons from Europe. A thought experiment by analogy may be particularly useful. In Europe, the initial impetus for regional cooperation came from the historical failure to cope with Germany as a revisionist power. Emerging victorious from World War II yet continued to be concerned with Germany, France took the initiative to promote regional cooperation that included Germany, which, for its part, made efforts to become a trustworthy neighbor. The unification of Germany served as a major driving force for the creation of the European Union, as Germany and its neighbors agreed to make Germany an integral part of Europe rather than an unhinged revisionist power.

The origin of the European Union can be traced back to the Schuman Declaration of May 9, 1950. In proposing this plan, Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet sought to arrest the relative decline of Europe in the postwar U.S.-Soviet bipolar system and to prevent the outbreak of war in Europe, especially between France and Germany. Acknowledging that a united Europe would *not* be made "all at once, or according to a single, general plan," Schuman expressed preference for a gradual approach, and, as "a first step in the federation of Europe," he called for the pooling of coal and steel production and sought to "change the destinies of those regions which [had] long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of war."

Accordingly, when France, West Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries established the European Coal and Steel Community(ECSC) in 1951, they not only sought to pursue common economic interests, but also intended to contribute to peace in Europe by jointly overseeing the production, distribution, and consumption of basic raw materials for the manufacture of heavy weapons namely, coal and steel. In 1957, these six nations established the European Atomic Energy Community(EURATOM), and created the European Economic Community (EEC) by signing the Treaty of Rome. Having secured a solid foundation for peace and prosperity in Europe, in 1967 the six member nations merged the EEC, ECSC, and EURATOM institutions creating *de facto* a single organization (the European Community) even if, legally, the three Communities retained their own separate legal identity. To guarantee the free flow of labor as well as finished goods, the member nations coordinated their job training and social security policies, and established the European Social Fund for the retraining and re-employment of laid-off workers.

⁹On the evolution of Japan's foreign policy before 1945, see Sang-Jung Kang (2002), *Toward a Northeast Asian Common House*, translated from Japanese to Korean by Kyung-Duk Lee (Seoul: Puriwa Ipari Publishing Co.).

¹⁰See Sunhyuk Kim and Yong Wook Lee (2004), "New Asian Regionalism and the United States: Constructing Regional Identity and Interest in the Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion," *Pacific Focus*, October.

Although the EC member nations had already agreed in 1969 to establish a single economic and monetary policy by 1980, the two oil shocks in the 1970s impeded their progress toward complete economic integration. With the adoption of the Delors Report in 1989, however, the member nations reasserted their desire to create a single Europe, and by signing the Maastricht Treaty on European Union in December 1991, they substantially expanded the scope of European cooperation to push for common foreign and security policies and justice and domestic affairs policies as well as economic and monetary union. The unification of Germany in 1990 was a decisive factor in Europe's renewed push for integration.

Events took a rather different turn in East Asia after World War II. The historical failure to cope with Japan as a revisionist power had been broadly similar to the European experience with Germany, but China did not have a chance to patch things up with Japan after the war, which instead established close relations with the United States as its "junior partner." No supranational body was created in East Asia along the lines of the European Steel and Coal Community.

Another thought experiment might be illustrative in this regard. Suppose that in World War II, Germany had surrendered to the United States before the advent of Soviet troops and maintained its territorial integrity. Suppose Poland, rather than Germany, was divided by the United States and the Soviet Union. Also, imagine that France was swept by a communist revolution in the wake of World War II. There would have been no Franco-German rapprochement, and as long as the U.S.-German relationship remained strong, Germany would have felt little need to address historical issues. The regional rivalry between France and Germany would have coexisted with the global Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. This scenario basically corresponds to the series of developments in East Asia since the end of World War II.

There are basically two reasons for the slow progress in genuine reconciliation and cooperation in East Asia. One has to do with Japan's failure to address its past wrong doings in a credible and consistent manner. The other has to do with the generally negative attitude of the United States toward regional cooperation in East Asia, for fear of being excluded from the region.¹¹

These two elements are closely linked. As long as Japan subscribes to the logic of *datsua* ("escape from Asia") and regards the Japan-U.S. alliance as one of overriding importance, Japan's willingness to work for reconciliation and cooperation in East Asia would be greatly diminished. In this case, Japan would likely reinforce U.S. concerns about regional cooperation in East Asia and take advantage of the bilateral alliance in its quest to become a "normal" country, volunteering to assume a larger share of the burden in international affairs. An unrepentant Japan intent on expanding its military role under the U.S.-Japan alliance would not be trusted by its neighbors, even if economic interaction in East Asia continues to increase. Such an outcome would not be conducive to the stability of the region.

3.2. Evolving Pattern of Economic Relations in East Asia

Geographically, East Asia is a region that includes ASEAN 10 (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) plus 3 large economies in Northeast Asia (China, Japan, and South Korea) as well as Mongolia and North Korea. The Russian Far East is

¹¹See Sunhyuk Kim and Yong Wook Lee (2004), "New Asian Regionalism and the United States: Constructing Regional Identity and Interest in the Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion," *Pacific Focus*, October.

sometimes included, especially when the region in question is narrowed to Northeast Asia. Although there is a continuing debate on whether East Asia constitutes a "natural" grouping, economic interaction within this fast-growing region has intensified over the past few decades, particularly among the ASEAN plus 3 countries. The region is now a large and growing market in its own right, and intra-regional trade and investment flows have become more important over time. The transformation of East Asia from an export production base for the rest of the world to an increasingly integrated market has significantly enhanced prospects for regional cooperation.¹²

In 1960, the combined GDP of ASEAN plus 3 was only two-fifths of U.S. GDP, with Japan contributing 81 percent of the total, followed by China with 8 percent.¹³ As Table 1 shows, by 2003, the combined GDP of ASEAN plus 3 had become approximately 70 percent of the GDP of the U.S. or EU 15 (Euro Zone).

Table 1. Regional Comparison of GDP and Population (2003)

Region	GDP (US\$ bil.)	Population (mil.)
ASEAN plus 3	7,028	2,001
ASEAN 10	686	537
China	1,410	1,288
Japan	4,326	127
South Korea	605	48
NAFTA	12,342	425
U.S.	10,882	291
EU 15	10,750	392

Source: *World Development Indicators* and *ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2004*.

As Table 2 shows, the total GDP of Asia as a whole is expected to surpass that of the U.S. in 2025, while the combined GDP of ASEAN plus 3 is forecast to be slightly less than the U.S. GDP. Within East Asia, there will be an important change as well. China's GDP, which was only about one-third of Japan's GDP in 2003, is expected to surpass Japan's in 2025.

These prospects have far-reaching implications for international relations in East Asia. Will China begin to throw its weight around and challenge U.S. supremacy in the region, much like Japan did before 1945? Will it act like the U.S. when it was beginning to emerge as a global power and establish a Monroe Doctrine of its own in East Asia and seek an "open door" policy in other continents? Will Japan idly stand by while China is almost certain to overtake Japan as an economic powerhouse? Will it choose to cooperate with China or try to form a united front with the U.S. against China? As these questions

¹²See Francis Ng and Alexander Yeats (2003), "Major Trade Trends in East Asia: What are their Implications for Regional Cooperation and Growth?", World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3084.

¹³See Lawrence Lau(2004), "Asian Regional Economy in a Multilateral Setting," paper presented at the Symposium on *Asian Network of Economic Policy Research (ANEPR) 2003-2004: Asia in Search of a New Order*, organized by the Research Institute of Economy, Trade, and Industry (RIETI), Tokyo, January 16-17, 2004.

suggest, changes in the relative size of the economies are likely to have a significant effect on the external strategies of these countries.

Table 2. Long-Term Forecast for GDP in Major Regions

	Nominal GDP Growth (Annual)					Nominal GDP(US\$ tril.) [World Share, %]		
	2001 -2005	2006 -2010	2011 -2015	2016 -2020	2021 -2025	2003	2015	2025
World	7.7	6.3	5.6	5.5	5.3	36.44 [100]	81.49 [100]	137.72[100]
U.S.	4.8	5.3	5.8	5.7	5.7	11.00 [30.2]	21.32 [26.2]	37.19 [27.0]
EU	12.3	4.7	3.5	3.6	3.5	10.52 [28.9]	21.17 [26.0]	30.04 [21.8]
Japan	1.5	6.1	4.5	2.9	2.1	4.29 [11.8]	8.57 [10.5]	10.94 [7.9]
BRICs	-	-	-	-	-	2.87 [7.9]	11.47 [14.1]	25.89 [18.8]
China	11.9	15.0	10.6	9.4	8.6	1.41 [3.9]	6.30 [7.7]	14.93 [10.8]
India	9.6	9.8	9.1	9.2	9.0	0.54 [1.5]	1.81 [2.2]	4.33 [3.1]
Brazil	2.9	6.5	7.0	6.7	6.4	0.49 [1.4]	1.33 [1.6]	2.51 [1.8]
Russia	23.4	11.2	10.1	9.5	5.1	0.43 [1.2]	2.04 [2.5]	4.12 [3.0]
Asia	4.8	8.8	7.1	6.3	6.1	8.17 [22.4]	21.72 [26.7]	39.60 [28.8]

Source: Global Insight, *World Economic Outlook*, January 2005.

Another factor that will have a significant effect is changes in the relative importance of intra-regional trade. The relative importance of intra-regional economic interaction in East Asia has undergone a dramatic change over the past century. If dependence on intra-regional trade is used as a measure of regional cooperation, East Asia had a much higher level of regional cooperation in the pre-war period. The gravity coefficient for the East Asian trading bloc showed a secular decline between the mid-1930s and the mid-1980s, when it began to rise again. The gravity coefficient in the mid-1930s was more than twice the level in the mid-1980s.¹⁴ There is little evidence that the relative decline in intra-regional trade adversely affected the economic performance of East Asian countries, which took advantage of increased opportunities for inter-regional trade in the postwar period. In fact, the relative decline in intra-regional trade coincided with the remarkable growth of outward-oriented industrializing economies in East Asia, which exported the bulk of their final goods to high-income countries in North America and Europe. The heavy dependence on extra-regional demand, however, seemed to rule out tighter regional integration in East Asia, because much of intra-regional trade was derived from the outside. After analysing trade patterns based on 1999 data, a Japanese researcher even warned against making too much out of economic inter-dependence in East Asia.¹⁵

¹⁴For a historical analysis of changes in the gravity coefficient in East Asia, see Peter Petri (1994), "The East Asian Trading Bloc: An Analytical History," in *Regionalism and Rivalry: Japan and the U.S. in Pacific Asia*, edited by Jeffrey A. Frankel and Miles Kahler (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), pp21-52. See also Eisuke Sakakibara and Sharon Yamakawa (2003), *Regional Integration in East Asia: Challenges and Opportunities*, *World Bank East Asia Project* (Tokyo: Global Security Research Center, Keio University).

¹⁵See K. Sugiura (2000), "The Fantasy of Asia's Inter-Dependence," FRI Research Report No. 79 (Tokyo: Fujitsu Economic Research Institute). In 1999, Japan's exports to the United States amounted to \$130.0 billion while its imports from the U.S. were only \$57.5 billion. AXJ9(Asia Excluding Japan: China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand) exported \$234.6 billion to the U.S. but

Demand from North America and Europe is likely to remain important for the foreseeable future, but there are signs that intra-regional demand is becoming more important in recent years. In particular, if China's impressive economic growth is sustained, its role as a market for final demand will become increasingly important.¹⁶ Currently, China is serving as "the world's factory," but rising affluence in its coastal areas and ambitious investment projects in underdeveloped regions in the west and northeast are creating a great deal of final demand. China's rapid economic growth offers great opportunities for East Asia to increase intra-regional trade. According to an estimate based on a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, China is projected to become the largest Asian importer by 2005. Contrary to the view that China's exports will stifle growth among its neighbors, China's expansion, particularly when accelerated by its WTO initiative, is projected to open unprecedented market opportunities for Asian exporters.¹⁷ Spearheaded by China's rapid growth, continuing economic expansion and increasing intra-regional interaction in East Asia is enhancing the prospects for tighter integration.

The rapid expansion of its domestic market is leading China to play an increasingly prominent role in regional cooperation in East Asia. For political as well as economic reasons, China has been making serious efforts to sign a free trade agreement with ASEAN countries, which, in turn, see preferential access to the Chinese market as a possible solution to their present difficulties. In particular, ASEAN countries hope that a free trade agreement with China would enable them to reap an "early harvest" of China's WTO accession commitments, although they are also concerned about the possibility of Chinese goods flooding their markets. In 2002, China committed itself to creating a free trade area with ASEAN by 2010. In 2004, as a gesture of goodwill, China reduced tariffs on goods imported from ASEAN 6 (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) and unilaterally eliminated tariffs on goods imported from the four late-comers in ASEAN (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam). China has been active in Northeast Asia as well. In 2002, it proposed an FTA with Japan and South Korea, and a year later, the three parties agreed on 14 priority areas for trilateral cooperation. Although the quality of institutions in China is not up to par with advanced industrial countries, China has used its sheer size and potential to advance major initiatives in regional cooperation. China enjoys a very strong bargaining position because it can offer its external partners huge benefits from market liberalization in the wake of its WTO accession if they in turn, agree to provide China with needed capital, technology, or geopolitical gains.

3.3 External Strategies of Major Players in East Asia

Faced with significant political and economic changes in East Asia, major players in the region are

imported only \$107.3 billion. By contrast, AXJ 9's exports to Japan were 118.4 billion while its imports from Japan amounted to \$151.9 billion.

¹⁶On the impact of China's economic growth, see Fred Hu et al. (2002), "The Five Great Myths About China and the World," Goldman Sachs. The five great myths are: (1) China is going to take over the world; (2) "New Industrial China" is hollowing out manufacturing and stifling growth in the rest of the world; (3) Low wages, high productivity growth and a grossly undervalued currency are relentlessly raising China's competitiveness; (4) Structural imbalances are driving deflation at home and abroad; (5) Japan, ASEAN and the rest of Asia are fighting for their lives against the rising mainland economy.

¹⁷See David Roland-Holst (2002), "An Overview of PRC's Emergence and East Asian Trade Patterns to 2020," ADB Institute Research Paper 44 (Tokyo: ADB Institute).

formulating external strategies to advance their national interests. Building on the strength of its rapid economic growth, China is engaging in proactive economic diplomacy on all fronts. At the same time, China is trying to keep a low profile and avoid creating the impression that it is out to challenge the status quo in international relations.¹⁸ China's regional initiatives have put Japan on the defensive. Although Japan initially wanted to be quite selective in signing preferential trade agreements, dealing first with advanced industrial economies such as Singapore and South Korea, it increasingly finds itself having to respond to China's regional agenda, especially in Southeast Asia. South Korea, for its part, is mainly concerned with promoting cooperation in Northeast Asia as a way of addressing the North Korea problem. ASEAN is actively engaged in trade negotiations with countries in East Asia as well as from the outside, but the lack of a unified internal market has weakened its bargaining position. Russia and the United States, as major powers with significant interests in the region, are also trying to formulate an effective East Asia strategy.

However, the U.S. response to Korean rapprochement and the integration of East Asia has been somewhat muddled. A counter-proliferation perspective is currently dominating U.S. policy toward the Korean peninsula, leaving little room for longer-term political and economic considerations. Furthermore, although the United States has made efforts to take advantage of tremendous opportunities created by East Asia's economic dynamism, especially China's, there is a growing debate on China's ultimate objective.¹⁹ As a result, there is a great deal of policy uncertainty regarding fundamental issues: What kind of East Asia does the United States want? What kind of role does the United States want to play in the region? Since 1945, the U.S. policy toward East Asia has been guided by the idea of hub-and-spoke alliance. To paraphrase a quote attributed to Michael Armacost, the United States has sought to cultivate better bilateral relations with each of the countries in the region than relations between the countries themselves. This policy is becoming increasingly obsolete with the integration of East Asia, but the United States has yet to come up with an effective alternative that would help consolidate its position in the region.

4. North Korea Nuclear Crisis as a Microcosm

To understand the nature of this new task, it may be useful to look at the North Korea nuclear crisis from a broader international relations perspective and examine how each of the major players in East Asia

¹⁸Given China's efforts to present itself as a benign and non-hegemonic power, the way it handled the Koguryo controversy was something of a surprise. With its territory extending from the northern half of the Korean peninsula to Manchuria, the ancient kingdom of Koguryo had the potential to develop into a contentious issue between Korea and China for some time. A major controversy erupted in 2004 when the Chinese Foreign Ministry decided to remove Koguryo from the ancient history of Korea in the country profile section on its website. When South Korea protested, China responded by deleting the entire pre-1948 history of Korea. The only consolation to Koreans was that China was at least fair enough to do the same to Japan. With North Korea being as dependent as it is on China, some Koreans interpreted the Chinese action as an attempt to do the historical groundwork to expand its influence into the Korean peninsula. The Chinese could have said that Koguryo was a multi-ethnic ancient kingdom whose rulers were Korean but whose cultural heritage was shared by China and Korea, but, for some unknown reason, the Chinese Foreign Ministry decided to go well beyond that. The Koguryo controversy led many Koreans to take a second look at China.

¹⁹See, for instance, Zbigniew Brzezinski and John J. Mearsheimer, "Clash of the Titans," *Foreign Policy*, January/February 2005.

is dealing with the issue. Their stance on the North Korea nuclear crisis appears to reflect their thinking on the larger issue of creating a new order in East Asia.²⁰

As for North Korea, its nuclear program seems to serve three functions: a deterrent against security threats, a useful bargaining chip in diplomatic negotiations, and an important element of indigenous energy development utilizing 26 million tons of natural uranium in North Korea. In 1994, North Korea's nuclear program was mainly used as a bargaining chip, but the Bush Administration's tough policy toward North Korea has brought about a significant change. Perhaps believing North Korea's threat to "demonstrate" the existence of nuclear weapons is not credible given its neighbors' concerns, the Bush Administration has basically ignored North Korea's attempt to use its nuclear program as a bargaining chip.²¹ Although North Korea's long-range artillery serves as an effective deterrent against South Korea, North Korea increasingly seems to regard nuclear weapons as a possible deterrent against the U.S., especially in light of the Iraq War. Unless the U.S. credibly abandons what North Korea believes is "hostile policy" toward it, there is very little chance that North Korea will give up its nuclear program. There is also a possibility that North Korea may try to "have cake and eat it, too." More specifically, North Korea may try to improve relations with the outside world without completely dismantling its nuclear program, instead offering to safeguard its existing nuclear materials within its borders and produce no more nuclear weapons. Unless the United States is willing to engage and test North Korea in serious negotiations, it is impossible to know how North Korea will act.

Why, then, is the United States reluctant to engage and improve relations with North Korea? First, North Korea's track record does not make it a trustworthy partner, and despite the pledge to improve bilateral relations contained in the Geneva Agreed Framework, there is a natural inclination to proceed slowly. Moreover, many Americans seem to have a serious problem with North Korea's tough negotiating style. For them, the thought of the world's only superpower getting "jerked around" by what they regard as "a rogue state" is a little too much to accept. More hawkish policymakers may even prefer a regime change in North Korea. Other U.S. policymakers, however, may see a *strategic* value in keeping North Korea as a rogue state. The United States can use an "irredeemable" North Korea not only as a convenient justification for such weapons programs as missile defense(MD), but as a useful tool to keep Japan and South Korea from pursuing a more independent line of foreign policy.²² Instead of seeking a new order in East Asia after the end of the Cold War, some policymakers may be content to prolong the status quo based on hub-and-spoke alliances. As long as North Korea faithfully plays the role of a rogue state, this policy of "malign neglect" might prove effective. However, if the United States, not North Korea, is perceived to be the stumbling block in the resolution of the nuclear problem, such a

²⁰See Wonhyuk Lim, "Economic Integration and Reconciliation in East Asia: Possibilities and Limitations," in *Rethinking Historical Injustice in East Asia: The Korean Experience in Regional Perspective*, ed. By Gi-Wook Shin et al. (forthcoming).

²¹Responding to North Korea's bargaining tactics, U.S. President George W. Bush once allegedly said: "You're hungry and you can't eat plutonium."

²²Jonathan Pollack, chairman of the Strategic Research Department at the U.S. Naval War College, notes that faced with South Korean and Japanese moves to improve relations with North Korea in 2002, the Bush Administration might have seen "a real possibility that its options on the [Korean] peninsula would be increasingly driven by the policy agendas of others." See Jonathan Pollack, "The United States, North Korea, and the End of the Agreed Framework," *Naval War College Review*, Summer 2003, Vol. LVI, No. 3, pp.10-49.

policy might lead to a nationalist backlash against the U.S. in East Asia.²³

Other players in East Asia have different perspectives on the issue depending on their perceived national interests. China's priority is to continue its rapid economic growth and its "peaceful rise" as a global power. Until very recently, China has acted in a cautious manner in international affairs so as not to attract unnecessary scrutiny from its neighbors as well as the United States. The last thing China wants is a rapid escalation of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula that may disrupt its economic growth and threaten its position in East Asia. Building on the strength of its rapid economic growth, China is engaging in proactive economic diplomacy on all fronts. China is forging close economic relations with other countries by offering access to its huge market, especially in the wake of its accession to WTO in 2001. China is also reaching out to resource-abundant countries around the globe in order to secure raw materials to sustain its economic growth. A good example is the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001 linking China with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Russia. This organization helps China to improve its energy security and increase its influence in the oil- and gas-rich countries in Central Asia.²⁴ Through such a strategy, China is in effect minimizing the possibility of containment by Japan and the United States.

Japan is interested in becoming a more "normal country," freeing itself from the legacies of World War II. However, there is some debate on what is the best means to achieve this objective. Many Japanese conservatives seem to be content to go along as "junior partners" of the United States at least for the foreseeable future and use the North Korean threat as a justification for re-militarizing Japan. By contrast, more liberal-minded Japanese call for a tighter integration with East Asia on the basis of historical reconciliation. To them, normalizing relations with North Korea is an integral component of this strategy.²⁵ At a fundamental level, Japan is still struggling with the same problem of identity it has faced since the second half of the 19th century: Is Japan inside or outside Asia? Japan's "escape from Asia" and domination of Asia defined the two phases of Japanese foreign policy before World War II. The question is whether Japan can now craft a new role as a benevolent neighbor and respected leader in East Asia instead of becoming a "junior partner" of a global power or a military adventurist on its own. In this regard, it may be interesting to note that the logic of *datsua* seems to be losing force as Japan's neighbors are becoming increasingly democratic and affluent, unlike around the turn of the 20th century.

Russia's priority in East Asia is to re-establish its influence in the region and develop the Russian Far East. North Korea's nuclear problem has enabled Russia to take a more proactive role in East Asia. A comprehensive solution to the problem is likely to involve energy assistance to North Korea, supporting Russia's plans to develop energy resources and promote economic development in the Russian Far East.

A divided land-bridge in East Asia, South Korea has much to gain from ending North Korea's isolation and building energy and transportation networks that connect different parts of East Asia. To resolve North Korea's nuclear problem and to promote peace and security in East Asia, South Korea is pushing for the construction of infrastructure networks in the region, facilitating economic development

²³On this point, see Desaix Anderson, "Who is Losing Asia?", mimeo, 2004.

²⁴See Howard W. French, "China Moves Toward Another West: Central Asia," *New York Times*, March 28, 2004.

²⁵See, for example, Haruki Wada, *A East Asian Common House*, translated from Japanese to Korean by Won-Duk Lee (Seoul: Iljogak, 2004).

not only in North Korea but also in China's Eastern provinces and the Russian Far East. Such investment projects will also create business opportunities for firms from this region as well as from the outside, and allow them to share in the benefits of increased regional integration. Ultimately, to achieve reunification, South Korea must maintain good relations with all its neighbors as well as the United States, and build an "optimal" level of national strength so that a unified Korea would be viewed as neither a pushover nor a threat.

While North Korea's neighbors have somewhat different policy priorities in East Asia, they share a couple of common interests regarding North Korea. One is to prevent the outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula as the fallout from the war is likely to have serious consequences. The other is to prevent any one of North Korea's neighbors from dominating North Korea in such a way as to cause a significant change in regional balance. In fact, North Korea's strategic location enables it to play its neighbors off against one another. South Korea cannot afford to allow North Korea to become overly dependent on China, especially in light of the recent controversy over Koguryo. Russia learned how foolish it was to marginalize itself in East Asia by disengaging from the Korean Peninsula during the Boris Yeltsin era, and has made serious efforts to strengthen relations with North Korea in recent years. Japan has also made diplomatic overtures to North Korea over the past few years, influenced by traditional geopolitical thinking that sees the Korean peninsula as a dagger aimed at Japan and a bridge connecting to the Asian heartland. Given the small amount of money required to keep North Korea afloat, its neighbors appear to be willing to provide aid to North Korea so as to maintain their influence.

Against this background, it is imperative that the United States find a solution that would not only resolve the immediate problem of the North Korea nuclear crisis but also address the longer-term challenge of creating a new order in East Asia. While the United States has successfully responded to a similar challenge in Europe in the wake of the Cold War, it has been rather slow to engage in serious discussions in East Asia.

5. Possible Trajectories for the Future

Sea changes in international relations triggered by the end of the Cold War and the rise of China are increasingly forcing countries in East Asia to look at regional integration schemes with far greater geopolitical and economic significance. For instance, China and Japan are competing to strengthen ties with Southeast Asia by signing a free trade agreement with ASEAN. Japan and South Korea are negotiating an FTA, raising concerns on the part of China. The United States is also keeping an eye on developments in East Asia, for fear of being excluded from any significant regional agreement. Combined with the very real possibility of major shifts in international relations, historical rivalry among major players is making any ambitious regional initiative by one country a potential source of tension in East Asia. At the same time, the region already has in ASEAN plus 3 a forum where various concerns can be addressed in a constructive manner.

Against this background, it may be useful to consider possible trajectories for regional integration in East Asia. By offering an asymmetrical liberalization schedule, China has made much more progress in its negotiations with ASEAN than has Japan or South Korea. Unlike Japan or South Korea, China is not hampered by an inefficient agricultural sector. While there is some concern about the possibility of Chinese imports flooding the market, ASEAN countries can expect an "early harvest" if they sign a

bilateral agreement with China ahead of other countries. The competitiveness gap between ASEAN and China is likely to widen in China's favor as China increasingly attracts more FDI than does ASEAN.²⁶ Delaying a free trade agreement with China will only reduce net benefits to ASEAN.²⁷ Consequently, the best strategy for ASEAN countries is to push for an early agreement with China while securing concessions from China to reduce adjustment costs in their domestic markets.

Japan and South Korea can move toward a free trade agreement of their own to facilitate industrial restructuring and promote investment. Although some Chinese scholars have expressed reservations about this agreement, a trilateral free trade agreement is not realistic at this point, not the least because of GATT/WTO Article 24 and vulnerability of the agricultural sector in Japan and South Korea. It will be more realistic to first seek at least partial solutions to agricultural problems during the course of multilateral trade negotiations, which offer greater room for compensatory mechanism. As in the case of NAFTA, which was expanded from a bilateral agreement between Canada and the U.S. to incorporate Mexico, a bilateral agreement can develop into a trilateral agreement when the shock from liberalized trade can be contained at a manageable level. However, the enthusiasm or urgency for a bilateral agreement between Japan and South Korea may not be as high as the one between ASEAN and China. In particular, the competitiveness gap between Japan and South Korea may not widen even if the signing of the agreement is delayed. While the bilateral agreement may create dynamic benefits by facilitating industrial restructuring in both countries and promoting investment flows from Japan to South Korea, short-run gains from trade liberalization are likely to be unevenly distributed in Japan's favor because Japan's current average tariff rate is lower than South Korea's. These issues must be addressed before the bilateral agreement can be successfully concluded.

The two sets of bilateral agreements can then serve as the building blocks for more extensive regional cooperation in East Asia and beyond. If and when Japan and South Korea are ready to address agricultural liberalization issues, China and ASEAN on the one side and Japan and South Korea on the other can join forces, either individually or as a duo. It is also at this juncture that a free trade agreement with the United States can be discussed in a substantive manner. The risks associated with a shifting balance of power in East Asia should be minimized through such cooperation. For the foreseeable future, the ASEAN plus 3 framework is likely to provide a forum for constructive discussions on promoting reconciliation and cooperation.

Although economic integration seems to offer tantalizing possibilities for formerly hostile nations in East Asia, it would require more than trade and investment ties for these nations to come to terms with history and craft a common vision for the region. Not only are there inherent limitations in using economic exchanges to promote mutual understanding, but geopolitical considerations interacting with historical animosity may also trump commercial interests favoring regional cooperation. Although China

²⁶In 1990, a year after the Tienanmen demonstrations, the net FDI inflow for China was \$3.5 billion; whereas, the net FDI inflow for ASEAN 10 was \$12.8 billion. By 1993, however, China had overtaken ASEAN 10, and the gap continued to widen in subsequent years. In 2003, the net FDI inflow for China was \$53.3 billion; whereas, the comparable figure for ASEAN 10 was \$19.1 billion. For Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, the net FDI inflow in 2003 was actually less than what these countries had attracted in 1990, respectively.

²⁷On this point, see Mohd Haflah Piei(2002), "The East Asia Free Trade Agreement: An ASEAN Perspective," paper presented at the conference on *Prospects for an East Asian Free Trade Agreement*, organized by the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy(KIEP), Seoul, Sept. 27, 2002.

has managed to attract a great deal of FDI from former foes as well as friends, there is no guarantee that economic interaction will continue to expand as Japan and the U.S. increasingly speculate about China's ultimate objective.

It would require conscious efforts on the part of civil society and political leaders to overcome the limitations of purely economic approaches. A political breakthrough in an effort to come to terms with history should be supplemented by increased economic and cultural exchanges to broaden mutual interests and understanding. Consistent and credible actions on the part of political leaders are important. Once significant progress has been made in regard to historical problems, civil society and political leaders should make efforts to construct and institutionalize a shared identity and a future vision that transcend national borders. To minimize the risk of conflict, proponents of these regional integration schemes should make it clear that they are to be the building blocks of larger integration. With ASEAN and South Korea effectively playing the role of mediators between China and Japan, coordination and consultation within the ASEAN plus 3 framework would be desirable.

Also, potentially enormous benefits from economic integration should be spelled out, for countries both inside and outside the region. The construction of energy, information, and transportation networks and the integration of national markets should offer tremendous business opportunities. In this regard, it is worth noting that unlike the Soviet Union during the Cold War, China has actively sought foreign direct investment(FDI). For East Asia to secure peace and prosperity, it is essential that East Asia be open to the world's major corporations so that they would have a stake in engaging, rather than containing, nations in the region and argue effectively against geopolitical strategists who tend to see more potential for conflict than cooperation.

Discussion

JOON-HYUNG KIM

1. The presenter's definition of mainstream IP/IR is not clear. The definition of Korean neorealist is not consistent. There is confusion with what Dr. Kim refers to when he speaks of neorealism, classical realism, nonconservatives, and neorealists in general and neorealists in Korea. Can we really call what he refers to as neorealists to be neorealist? This is the dilemma when writing theoretical papers.

2. Which version of neorealists-Kenneth Waltz, Robert Gilpin, John Mearsheimer-is Dr. Kim referring to when he speaks of neorealist in Korea? To me, it's more like dependent try to analyze Korean neorealist based on Waltz, and Mearsheimer.

3. Dr. Kim's categorization of neorealist paradigm as an outside-in approach and his alternative paradigm as an inside-out approach is theoretically very stripping. Though I understand that Korea has to get out of US alliance domination and neorealist thinking, would it be possible if we maintain inside-out too much? Perhaps this is why Dr. Kim's paper becomes a kind of normative argument in the end using terms such as 'should' and 'must'. Further, it is not theoretically connected to constructionism. The problem is that there are no definite solutions or alternatives to a neorealist and even though Dr. Kim introduced social constructionism, how is it connected and how is it applicable to the South Korean case?

4. Although Dr. Kim called the six-party talks a breakthrough, we still have a long way to go so I think we should be reserved in calling it a break through. I believe so because I consider the six-party talks still bilateral in substance and to have a security-dominate framework. In a security-dominate and bilateral framework, Korea does not have much to do. It is totally up to the US and North Korea. However, the US will want much more strict and thorough inspections than in the 1994 case which will not be accepted by North Korea. And North Korea will not be satisfied with heavy oil and light oil reactors. Thus, there are several big barriers in front of us.

1. 김선혁 교수가 말하는 주류 국제정치/국제관계의 용어 정의가 명확하지 않다. 한국의 신현실주의에 대한 정의도 일관적이지 않다. 김선혁 교수가 신현실주의, 정통 현실주의, 신보수주의, 일반적인 신현실주의자, 한국의 신현실주의자를 지칭할 때 혼동이 있는 것 같다. 김선혁 교수가 말하는 신현실주의자를 진정 신현실주의자라고 할 수 있을 것인가? 이것이 이론적 논문의 딜레마이다.

2. 김선혁 교수가 말하는 한국의 신현실주의는 월츠, 길핀, 미어샤이머 중 누구의 이론을 말하는 것인가? 내 의견으로는 한국의 신현실주의를 분석하려면 월츠와 미어샤이머의 이론에 바탕을 두어야 할 것이다.

3. 김선혁 교수가 신현실주의 패러다임을 outside-in 접근법과 그의 대안적 패러다임인 inside-out 접근법으로 구분하는 것은 이론적으로 매우 빈약하다. 물론 한국이 미 동맹의 지배나 신현실주의적 사고에서 벗어나야 한다는 점은 이해하지만, inside-out 접근법만으로 그것이 가능할까? 아마도 이것이 김선혁 교수의 글이 끝으로 가면서 '...해야한다' 등의 용어를 사용하여 규범적 논법으로 마무리되는 이유일 것이다. 게다가 이것은 이론적으로 구성주의와 연계되어 있지 않다. 문제는 신현실주의에 대한 명백한 해결책이나 대안이 없다는 사실이다. 김선혁 교수가 사회구성주의를 소개하

기는 했지만, 그것이 한국의 경우와 어떤 연결고리를 가지며, 어떻게 적용될 수 있는 것인지?

4. 김선혁 교수는 6자 회담을 돌파구로 표현했지만, 여전히 갈 길이 멀기 때문에, 돌파구라는 표현은 아직 유보해야 할 듯싶다. 그 이유는 나는 아직까지 6자 회담이 본질적으로는 양자회담이며 안보 위주의 구조를 가진다고 생각하기 때문이다. 안보 위주의 양자 구조 속에서 한국은 할 수 있는 일이 거의 없다. 전적으로 미국과 북한에 달려있는 문제인 것이다. 그런데, 미국은 1994년 때보다 훨씬 더 엄격하고 철저한 핵 사찰을 원할 것이고, 북한은 이를 받아들이지 않을 것이다. 그리고 북한은 중유와 경유 원자료가 만족스럽지 못할 것이다. 따라서 우리 앞에는 몇 가지 큰 장애가 놓여 있다고 하겠다.

HEAJEONG LEE

1. Dr. Suh's paper consists two parts. One is critical review of the US alliance system and questions pertaining to that traditionally posed by conservatives. The second part is constructive proposals for peace.

2. In regards to the first point, the critical parts or review, I'm not quite sure that we are not faced with either-or question. I'm not arguing against Dr. Suh's position. However, we need to try to find a third way, or we need to struggle for peace. In my opinion, we need to be more critical about the reality, and we need to be more critical in trying to find out what the stake here is: either-or question or if that is the either-or question, in what specific sense and if not, in what specific sense? There's no easy way to dodge that kind of break from the US or from Korean conservatives.

3. Second point on his critical review part is, is it really and is it only the US that has been destabilizing the security environment in East Asia? Is it really Bush administration's policy that will cause nuclear arms domino? My point is not just how to portion the blame among NK, SK, and China, but more fundamentally, we need to find out what's wrong with realism and what's wrong with balancing. If we took a really neorealistic perspective, then the most important destabilizing force in Northeast Asia is rising China, not just US policy. On the other hand, we need to be more realistic. Without Bush, will there be no arms race here? I don't think so. We need to be more cautious, and we need more balanced analytics here.

4. In regards to the second part, Dr. Suh's constructive proposal is really constructive. I fully agree with his goal or aspiration, but unfortunately I'm not satisfied with his proposals again. It seems to me that there is a bifurcated way of approaching peace on Northeast Asia. On one hand economic functionalism and security community idea on the other hand. On the first one, we need to satisfy North Korea's security dilemma, their perception of vulnerability, North Korean driven peace process and Korea nuclear-free zone, etc. The second one is regional how to attain and how to tame potential rivalry between China and Japan and the US. We need multilateral regional security arrangements. Then the question is how to put together those political economic foundation and political or security arrangement and on the side of security arrangement how to coordinate our action program in terms of North Korea first or regional

security arrangement between middle powers, regional powers. The problem here is Dr. Suh's proposition is NK peace first. But the problem is that what's at stake is not just Korea's peace, China's future is not yet settled, and inside US there was a China basher, China engager, so US policy toward China is not yet settled, and it won't be settled in one or two years in a foreseeable future. So, there isn't enough incentive for China or US or Japan to give security guarantee to Kim Jung-il. It is a very difficult process in how to arrange it in a good manner, how to prevent vicious circle of conflicts, imperatives of regional stability and peace on the Korean peninsula.

1. 서재정 교수의 논문은 두 부분으로 구성된다. 하나는 미 동맹체제에 대한 비판적 검토와 보수주의자들이 전통적으로 제기해온 관련 질문들이고, 두번째는 평화를 위한 건설적 제안들이다.

2. 비판적 검토 부분에 대해서, 나는 우리가 직면한 문제가 양자택일의 문제인 것 같지는 않다. 서재정 교수의 입장에 대해 반론을 제기하는 것은 아니지만, 우리는 제 3의 길을 찾거나 평화를 위한 투쟁을 해야만 한다. 우리는 현실에 대해, 그리고 현실에서의 이해관계를 찾아내는 일에 보다 비판적이 되어야 한다. 즉, 양자택일의 문제라면 어떠한 면에서 그런지, 또 아니라면 어떠한 면에서 그렇지 않은지를 밝혀야 한다. 미국이나 한국의 보수주의자들의 반론을 쉽게 피할 수 있는 방법은 없다.

3. 두번째 논점은, 동아시아의 안보 환경을 불안정하게 하는 요인이 진정 그리고 오직 미국뿐인가 하는 것이다. 부시 행정부의 정책이 진정 핵무기 도미노 현상을 야기하게 될 것인가? 단순히 책임 부분을 나누자는 이야기가 아니라, 보다 근본적으로, 현실주의의 오류는 무엇이고, 균형론이 왜 잘못 되었는지를 밝힐 필요가 있다. 진정한 신현실주의적 시각에서 본다면, 동북아시아를 불안정하게 하는 가장 중요한 힘은 중국의 부상이지, 미국의 정책뿐만이 아니다. 다른 한편으로는 보다 현실적이 되어야 한다. 부시만 아니라면, 무기 경쟁이 없겠는가? 그렇지 않을 것이다. 보다 신중하고, 보다 균형적인 분석이 필요하다.

4. 두번째 부분에 대해서, 서재정 교수의 건설적 제안은 정말 건설적이다. 그의 목표나 포부와 동감은 하지만, 그러나 그의 제안이 완전히 만족스럽지는 않다. 동북아시아에서 평화를 이룩하는 길은 두 갈래가 있다고 생각한다. 하나는 경제기능주의, 다른 하나는 안보공동체 구상이다. 첫번째 경우에서 우리는 북한의 안보딜레마, 약점에 대한 인식, 북한 주도의 평화 확립 과정 및 한반도 비핵화 등을 만족시킬 필요가 있다. 안보공동체는 지역적 문제이다. 중국, 일본, 미국 간 경쟁심을 어떻게 다루느냐 하는 문제이다. 다자적 지역 안보 협정이 필요하다. 그 이후의 문제는 그러한 정치경제적 기반과 정치 및 안보 협정을 어떻게 결합하느냐와, 안보협정에 있어 우리의 행동계획을 어떻게 조화시키느냐 하는 점이다. 여기에서 문제는 서재정 교수의 제안이 북한의 평화를 우선한다는 점이다. 그런데 문제는, 현재 이해관계가 얽힌 것은 한반도의 평화뿐만이 아니라는 점이다. 중국의 미래도 불안정하고, 미국에는 중국 비난 세력과 포용 세력이 있어 미국의 대중정책도 아직 정해진 바가 없으며, 가까운 미래에 정해질 것 같지도 않다. 따라서 김정일에게 안보보장을 해 줄 만한 충분한 동기가 중국이나 미국, 일본에 없는 것이다. 이것은 갈등의 악순환을 피하고 한반도에 안정적으로 평화를 정착시켜야 한다는 점에서 매우 어려운 과정이다.

KEESEOK KIM**Structural Changes of South Korea-Japan Relations: Its Limits and Potentialities**

1. Professor Kimiya's paper contains lots of information and ideas about Korea-Japan relations. It is hard for a middle man working on Korea-Japan relations to speak to an audience of the counterpart country, especially under recent conditions of sour diplomatic relations. Nevertheless professor Kimiya conveys positive and future-oriented messages by taking objective and analytic stances on sensitive diplomatic issues such as Dokdo and history textbooks.

2. Brief overview of his understanding of Kimiya's paper is presented.

3. I agree with professor Kimiya's arguments for changes of general tendencies and main aspects of bilateral relations between the two countries over the past 6 decades. As mentioned in the paper, however, the real problems now such as the textbook issue, Dokdo problem, or more broadly history-related issues that are the important and dangerous problems lying ahead on the road to stable and constructive relations are not part of the new structure that was transformed by the end of the Cold War. Rather, it is an old and continuing issue that began in the early 1980s. So, to me, in the context of the argument of this paper, the crucial issue that needs to be raised and discussed for the analysis of Korea-Japan relations is why the old issues get higher significance in Korea-Japan relations.

4. Another analytical question is: what does the term "structure" mean in this paper? It seems to me that the term structure means every important thing in this paper.

5. In terms of the newly emerged multi-dimensional aspects of Korea-Japan relations, Korea-Japan relations are affected by the changes in the regional order, particularly the rise of new regionalism in East Asia and Asia-Pacific. As was alluded to in the paper, add up of new dimensions that go beyond the formal governmental relations are extremely important in stabilizing the bilateral relations of the two countries. However, it is no less important to take into consideration the dimensions of regional dynamics for the analysis of Japan-Korea relations. I do think that, in order to analyze the structural changes of Korea-Japan relations, this kind of new dimension needs to be included. What do you think?

In fact, this line of reasoning is already implied in the paper by mentioning the development of new dimensions of bilateral and bi-directional relations beyond the governmental and economic ones, such as societal-cultural or NGOs interactions. Moreover, advocating the collaboration for the provision of public goods in the international society implies that the author has very similar ideas in mind but did not elaborate it. So, let me suggest doing it.

1. Kimiya 교수의 논문은 한일관계에 대한 여러가지 정보와 견해를 담고 있다. Kimiya 교수는 독도 문제나 역사교과서 문제 같은 민감한 외교적 사안들에 대해 객관적이고 분석적인 입장을 취함으로써 긍정적이고 미래지향적인 메시지를 전달한다.

2. 나는 지난 60년간 한일관계의 일반적 경향과 주요 국면들의 변화에 대한 Kimiya 교수의 주장에

대해서는 동의한다. 그러나 논문에서 이야기되었듯, 현재의 진짜 문제들, 즉 역사교과서 문제, 독도 문제, 또는 보다 광범위한 역사 관련 논점들처럼 보다 안정적이고 건설적인 한일관계를 가로막는 중요하고 위험한 문제들은 냉전 이후 변형된 새로운 구조에 포함되지 않는다. 이러한 문제들은 오히려 1980년대 초에 시작되어 이어져온 오래된 문제들이다. 따라서, Kimiya 교수의 주장과 연계해서 생각할 때, 한일관계의 분석을 위해 제기되고 논의되어야 할 중요한 사안은 왜 한일관계에서는 낡은 논쟁들이 더 큰 중요도를 가지는가 하는 점이다.

3. 이 논문에서 '구조'라는 용어가 의미하는 바는 무엇인가? 이 논문에서 '구조'라는 용어가 가지는 의미는 매우 큰 것 같다.

4. 새로이 등장한 한일관계의 다각적인 면에서 볼 때, 한일관계는 역내 질서 변화, 특히 동아시아와 아시아태평양 지역의 새로운 지역주의의 부상으로 인해 영향을 받는다. 논문에서 언급되었듯, 형식적인 정부 간 교류를 뛰어넘는 새로운 관계를 형성하는 것은 한일관계를 안정시키는 데 굉장히 중요하다. 그러나 마찬가지로 중요한 것은 한일관계를 분석하려면 지역 역학을 감안해야 한다는 사실이다. 한일관계의 구조적 변화를 분석하려면, 이러한 새로운 측면이 포함되어야 한다는 생각인데, Kimiya 교수는 어떻게 생각하는지?

사실, Kimiya 교수는 사회문화적 교류나 NGO 활동과 같은 정치경제적 관계를 넘어선 한일관계의 새로운 측면의 개발을 언급함으로써 이러한 추론을 논문에 이미 함축하고 있다. 게다가, 저자가 국제사회에 공공재를 공급하기 위한 협력을 주창하고 있다는 사실은 저자가 논문에서 부연 설명하지는 않았지만 그러한 생각을 가지고 있음을 보여준다. 따라서 이를 제안하는 바이다.

YONG WOOK LEE

1. At substantial level, possibility for a bilateral structural change from a quasi-alliance to something else presupposes that both Korea and Japan want or are willing to formulate and implement their bilateral policies independent of the U.S. This is because conflict and cooperation of Korea and Japan have swung back and forth by U.S. policies rather than Korea or Japan's bilateral policies toward each other. If so, the paper should discuss further on how these two countries would reinvent or reimagine their relations with the U.S. and how the U.S. would respond to them.

2. Theoretically in social scientific considerations, this paper is a bit unclear on the relative importance of variables that might hinder or facilitate the change from Hobbesian to Lockean bilateral relationship. In addition to the important variables mentioned by Dr. Lee, he might want to put several hypotheses on the relative importance of a variable or combination of them to provide causal paths for structural change.

3. ASEAN plus Three successfully launched Chiang Mai swap arrangement in 2000 to increase regional financial stability. Though Korea played a pivotal role in this process by proposing to create this arrangement, it was in fact the Japanese government that asked the Korean government to propose to create it. Korea accepted Japan's request and Chiang Mai initiative has become one important step towards the creation of East Asian Community. Viewing from this example we can see that Korea-Japan cooperation positively facilitated the making of the East Asian Community. As such, Korea and Japan

bilateral relationship might be more mature than we conventionally think it to be.

1. 본질적인 면에서, 한일관계가 유사동맹에서 다른 형태로 구조적 변화를 맞을 가능성은 양국이 모두 미국과는 독립적으로 한일 간 양자 정책을 형성하고 보완할 의지가 있어야 한다는 것을 전제로 한다. 이는 한일 간 갈등과 협력이 한국과 일본의 상대국에 대한 정책보다는 미국의 정책에 의해 좌우되어 왔기 때문이다. 그렇다면, 이 논문은 한국과 일본이 미국과의 관계를 어떻게 개선하고 또 새로이 구상할 것이며 미국은 그에 어떻게 반응할 것인지에 대해 더 깊이 다루어야 한다.

2. 이론적으로 사회과학적 고찰을 통해 볼 때, 이 논문은 홉스에서 로크적 양자관계로의 변화를 방해하거나 또는 촉진할 수 있는 변수의 상대적 중요성에 관해 조금 불분명하다. 논문에서 언급된 주요 변수들 외에도 다른 변수와 가설들을 포함하여 구조변화의 인과관계를 설명한다면 좋을 것이다.

3. 2000년 ASEAN+3는 지역금융안정을 강화하기 위한 치앙마이 통화스왑협정을 성공적으로 시작했다. 한국이 이 협정을 제안함으로써 이 과정에서 중추적 역할을 했음에도 불구하고, 실제로 한국 정부가 협정을 제안하도록 요구한 것은 일본 정부였다. 한국은 일본의 요구를 받아들였고, 치앙마이 합의는 동아시아 공동체를 생성으로 한 발 다가가는 중요한 계기가 되었다. 이러한 예에서 볼 때, 우리는 한일 협력이 동아시아 공동체 형성에 긍정적으로 작용하였음을 알 수 있다. 그것으로 보아, 한일관계는 우리가 전통적으로 생각해온 것보다 훨씬 성숙하다고 할 수 있다.

JAE HO CHUNG

1. The first section of Dr. Wang paper is entitled of a heritage of cold war. I think probably remnant would be more appropriate in this case. Although I agree with Dr. Wang's argument that both sides have their shares of fault in the region and only patience and vision will solve the problem, I think this is rather too abstract. In other words, issues such as where we get this vision, whether there is only one vision or couple of visions for the region, on what basis we should select, how long patience should last, and what is going to happen if patience runs out, need to be addressed.

2. On the second section, neo-geopolitics, I'm not quite sure what this neo-geopolitics really means as it relates to the Korean peninsula. It needs to be stated more explicitly.

3. The third section, responsibility of the US, could be controversial. Is NK really going for a tit-for-tat strategy as suggested by this paper? Or, alternatively, does Pyongyang have its own agendas and goals to respect whatever Washington is going to do?

4. Concerning the fourth section, DPRK-PRC issues, I have two questions. First of all, Dr. Wang offers impressionistic observations based on his one-week Pyongyang trip. This kind of impressionistic observation can be quite dangerous because he seems to be quite confident on regime sustainability of

North Korea. Empirical basis of such opinion must be considered further. 100% of North Korea's input last year was from China, so when Dr. Wang says China's influence over NK is limited; it must be distinguished whether it is intentions that is limited or the capability of influence that is limited.

5. In regards to the final section on ROK-PRC issues, Dr. Wang presents a very interesting suggestion, that is, South Korea should help China realize a peaceful rise. But he doesn't give us details as to how we can go about doing it. This is a very interesting proposal because Korea and China now have a comprehensive cooperative partnership but it is not a concrete partnership. So what Dr. Wang suggests here could be an important beginning of this arrangement, but I'd like to hear what he has in mind.

1. Wang 교수 논문의 첫 부분은 냉전의 유산(heritage)이라고 되어 있는데, 유산보다는 자취(remnant)가 더 적당한 표현일 것 같다. 양측 모두 잘못에 책임이 있고 인내와 비전만이 문제를 해결할 수 있다는 Wang 교수의 주장에 동의하기는 하지만, 이 말은 너무 추상적이다. 다시 말해서, 그러한 비전을 어디서 얻을 수 있을지, 비전이 하나인지 또는 여럿인지, 무엇을 근거로 비전을 세울 것인지, 언제까지 인내해야 하는지, 그리고 더 이상 인내할 수 없게 되면 어떻게 될 것인지 등이 언급되어야 한다.

2. 두번째 부분, 신지정학에 대한 부분은, 이 신지정학이 한반도 문제에서 정확히 무엇을 의미하는지 나는 잘 모르겠는데, 보다 명확히 기술할 필요가 있다.

3. 세번째, 미국의 책임 부분은 논쟁의 소지가 있다. 이 논문에서 이야기하듯, 북한은 정말 미국에 대해 맞대응 전략을 취하고 있는가? 아니면 대신, 북한 정부는 미국 정부가 어떤 태도를 취하든 관계없이 추구할 스스로의 의제와 목표를 갖고 있는가?

4. 네번째, 북중 문제 관련 두가지 질문이 있다. 하나는, Wang 교수는 본인의 일주일간의 평양 여행에 기반하여 인상적인 관찰 내용을 제공하는데, 이러한 인상에 근거한 관찰 내용은 위험하다. 왜냐하면, Wang 교수는 북한의 정권 지속성에 대해 매우 확신을 갖고 있는 듯 하기 때문이다. 이러한 의견의 실증적 근거는 더 깊이 고려되어야 한다. 작년 북한에 대한 공급은 100% 중국으로부터 이루어졌다. 따라서 Wang 교수가 북한에 대한 중국의 영향력은 제한되어 있다고 할 때, 그것이 의도의 한계인지 아니면 능력의 한계인지 구분되어야 한다.

5. 다섯번째 한중 문제에 관해서 Wang 교수는 매우 흥미로운 제안을 내놓는데, 한국이 중국의 평화적 부상을 도와야 한다는 것이다. 그러나, 한국이 어떻게 그렇게 할 수 있는지 자세한 언급은 빠져있다. 이것은 현재 한중관계가 포괄적 협력 관계이지만 변함없는 파트너 관계는 아니라는 점에서 매우 흥미로운 제안이다. 따라서 Wang 교수의 제안은 발전된 한중관계 준비에 중요한 시발점이 될 수 있을 것이다. Wang 교수의 의견을 듣고 싶다.

CHUNG-IN MOON

1. As you can see in his paper, his basic message is very clear and straightforward. It is whole issue of Kantian peace. Besides the two major components of Kantian peace, Prof. Choi adds one more point;

community of security. Contrary to common belief, Prof. Choi has been warning that you cannot mechanically apply Kantian peace to East Asia, and I think from there we can learn lots.

2. Going further into details, Prof. Choi had three major sections. First of all, the title of his paper is "Ideational Base or Foundation for East Asian Community." I hope Prof. Choi can elaborate on whole what would be the so-called ideational foundation of East Asian Community. In the third section of East Asian Community he gives more emphasis on social imageries rather than really ideational components of a community building in East Asia.

3. Second question is, in Europe, there are many heroes for community building, but why do we not have such imageries in East Asia while there are many in Europe? Even in North America, in the wake of the formation of NAFTA, there have been great advocates of idea of community building. The same for ASEAN countries as well. But why not in East Asia? Particularly, Northeast Asia?

4. Third question is related to the issue of emerging conflict between regionalism and nationalism. In Korea, Japan, and China, intellectual heroes were all political heroes; their banner is nationalism. Why such phenomenon is pervasive in particularly northeast Asia? As an extension to that one, if you look at the behavior of China, Japan, and even Korea, we see a very interesting pattern. Japan and China are taking the route of detour-regionalism, circumventive regionalism rather than direct sub-regionalism focusing on Northeast Asia. And all of the sudden, South Korea felt abandoned. Then, last year, the Korean President declared that we are going with ASEAN countries too, and we'll be signing FTA by 2008, Japan 2009, and China 2010. But China declared 2010 first, and Japan and Korea want to catch up. Then how can you explain this in detour-regionalism?

5. Then finally, I understand Prof. Choi's reasoning of advocating and favoring minimalist approach. But in South Korean context, even in universal context, can you justify your position? Democratic unification may not be more favorable than gradualist approach honoring NK position and its own contextuality. And particularly, since you are #1 theorist of democracy, if you say no to democratic unification, how would you defend your position if somebody criticizes you, particularly Chosun Daily, saying that you are #1 theorist of democracy and democratic change in South Korea but you don't want democracy in NK or so-called democratic form of unification? How would you like to respond to that question?

1. 최 교수의 기본 요지는 매우 명확하다. 칸트의 영구평화론에 대한 이야기다. 칸트의 평화의 두가지 주요 요건 외에, 최 교수는 안보 공동체를 추가한다. 일반적 믿음과 대조적으로, 최 교수는 동아시아에 칸트의 평화론을 기계적으로 적용할 수 없음을 경고해 왔으며, 우리는 여기서 많은 것을 배울 수 있다.

2. 세부적으로 들어가면, 최 교수는 세가지 주요 주장을 담고 있다. 첫째로, 논문의 제목은 "동아시아 공동체를 위한 관념적 토대"이다. 동아시아 공동체의 관념적 토대가 무엇인지에 대해 보다 상세한 설명이 덧붙여지면 좋겠다. 동아시아 공동체의 세번째 부분에서 최 교수는 동아시아 공동체 건설의 관념적 요소들보다는 사회적 심상에 보다 주안점을 두고 있다.

3. 두번째 질문은, 유럽에는 공동체 건설의 영웅들이 많이 있는데, 왜 동아시아에는 그러한 심상이 없는가? 북미에서도, NAFTA 형성 이후, 공동체 형성 계획의 창도자가 있어 왔다. 그런데 왜 동아시아에는, 특히 유난히 동북아시아에는 왜 부재하는가?

4. 세번째 질문은 지역주의와 민족주의 사이에 일어나는 갈등에 대해서이다. 한국, 일본, 중국에서 지적 영웅들은 모두 정치적 영웅들이었고, 그들의 기치는 민족주의였다. 왜 이러한 현상은 특히 동북아시아에 팽배하는가? 이와 연장 선상에서, 중국, 일본, 심지어 한국의 행동을 보면 매우 흥미로운 양상이 나타난다. 일본과 중국은 동북아시아 관계에서 단도직입적으로 소지역주의(sub-regionalism)를 택하기보다는 우회 지역주의(detour-regionalism) 노선을 택하고 있다. 그러자 한국은 소외감을 느꼈고, 작년에 대통령이 한국도 ASEAN 국가들과 함께 할 것을 표명하였다. 따라서 우리는 2008년까지 FTA를 체결하게 될 것이며, 일본은 2009, 중국은 2010년이다. 중국이 먼저 2010년을 발표하였고, 일본과 한국이 따라잡고 싶어하는 것이다. 그렇다면 우회 지역주의(detour-regionalism) 노선을 어떻게 설명할 것인가?

5. 마지막으로, 최장집 교수가 minimalist 접근법을 지지하고 선호하는 근거는 이해하겠는데, 한국의 상황에서, 보편적 상황에서라도, 그러한 입장을 정당화할 수 있는지? 북한의 입장과 전후 사정을 존중할 때 민주적 통일은 점진주의적 접근법 보다 유망하지 않을 수 있다. 그리고, 특히, 최장집 교수는 국내 제일의 민주주의 이론가이므로, 민주적 통일을 지지하지 않는다고 했을 때 제기될 반발에 대해 어떻게 답하겠는가?

MYONG SOB KIM

1. First, I'd like to ask Dr. Feffer how he would define the concept of East Asia. I think many participants have different concepts geographically, geopolitically, or geoeconomically. So, commonality of perception in certain regions is very important to have a vision of a community.

2. The second question is about the concept of order. The subtitle of Dr. Feffer's paper is 'US and regional order in East Asia' in which he tries to answer the lingering question why there has been no East Asian NATO or CSCE. But order is different from security framework. So, in my view, if we are talking about order in a certain region, we have to talk about the ideational, behavioral, and structural level.

3. Thirdly, Dr. Feffer mentioned why there is no East Asian NATO or CSCE, and he emphasized the role of NK. NK is a pivot according to his term. But historically recasting, NK has been a player, not just a pivot, at least on a regional level. South Korea was a pivot. But since democratization, South Korea is now trying to play in the regional level. In this regard, I think the theory of balancer can be interpreted in this general tendency of South Korean perception.

4. Fourthly, Dr. Feffer mentioned Korean nationalism. Is Korean nationalism really a more powerful source of anti-American sentiment than communism as Dr. Feffer mentioned? There has been a general tendency to hypothesize that South Korean anti-Americanism is a byproduct of rising nationalism. Quite contrary to this widespread hypothesis, however, an empirical analysis recently conducted based on

nationwide survey in South Korea indicates that South Korean nationalism has a positive correlation with the level of trust for the US.

5. Further, Dr. Feffer mentioned that South Korea may well have to give up claims to Dokdo in exchange for gaining greater regional economic support for inter-Korean reconciliation. This can provoke big controversy in South Korean society. Dokdo is not just a matter of small territory but it has a symbolic historical meaning under the point of criticality.

6. Concluding my discussion, I'd like to mention the formative period of the post-Cold War. I think, the essence of transformation of the world order is the normalization of relationship made by Cold War. At the creation of this Cold War order, many American officials were too Euro-centric. Thus this is the time of normalization.

1. 우선, Feffer 박사가 생각하는 동아시아의 정의를 묻고 싶다. 여러 참가자들이 모두 지리적, 지정학적, 또는 지정학적으로 동아시아에 대해 다른 개념을 가진다고 생각하는데, 지역에 대한 공통된 인식이 공동체에 대한 비전을 갖는데 매우 중요하다.

2. 두번째는 질서의 개념에 대한 질문이다. Feffer 박사 논문의 소제목은 '미국과 동아시아의 지역 질서'이고, 여기서 그는 동아시아에는 왜 NATO나 CSCE 같은 단체가 없었는지에 대한 답을 찾으려 노력한다. 그러나 질서는 안보 구조와는 다르다. 따라서, 내 견해로는, 역내 질서에 대해 이야기하려면, 관념적, 행위적, 구조적 측면에서 접근해야 한다.

3. 세번째로 Feffer 박사는 동아시아에 NATO나 CSCE 같은 단체가 없음을 언급하고, 북한의 역할을 강조했다. 그에 따르면 북한은 주축(pivot)이다. 그러나, 역사적 맥락으로 보았을 때, 북한은, 적어도 지역 내에서는, 주축일 뿐 아니라 주체(player)이기도 했다. 한국은 주축이었다. 그러나 한국도 민주화 이후로는 지역적 수준에서 참여하려고 노력 중이다. 이러한 측면에서 균형자론은 한국의 일반적인 인식 경향에서 해석될 수 있다고 생각한다.

4. 네번째로 Feffer 박사는 한국의 민족주의를 이야기한다. 그의 말처럼 한국의 민족주의는 진정 공산주의보다 더 강력한 반미감정의 원천인가? 한국의 반미감정은 민족주의의 부산물이라는 가정이 일반적 추세가 되었다. 그러나, 한국에서 최근 진행된 조사를 바탕으로 한 실증적 분석 결과에 따르면, 한국의 민족주의는 미국에 대한 신뢰도와 긍정적 상관관계를 가진다고 한다.

5. Feffer 박사는 한국이 한반도의 화합을 위한 역내 경제 지원을 이끌어내는 대가로 독도를 포기해야 할 수도 있다고 말했다. 이는 한국 사회에서 큰 논쟁을 야기할 수 있다. 독도는 단순히 영역의 문제가 아니라 역사적 상징성을 가진다.

6. 논의를 마무리하며, 탈냉전 형성 시기에 대해 언급하고 싶다. 세계 질서 변화의 본질은 냉전 시대에 형성된 관계의 정상화라고 생각한다. 냉전 시대 질서를 형성할 때, 미국의 관리들은 대부분 유럽중심적이었다. 따라서 지금은 정상화의 시기이다.

JINWOO CHOI

1. To my understanding, Prof. Lim made three points. I think the third point, in which Prof. Lim suggeststwo solutions for ways to stop the working of divided force, is the most creative part of his paper.

2. As for the third point, his suggestion for the future, I believe we need more discussion. First, Prof. Lim suggested one country-two system formula as an alternative to unification by absorption or unification by military aggression. But how can we persuade domestic actors in South Korea and maybe in NK as well to accept such progressive measures? The first question is related to the domestic conditions of Korea, and the next question is related to the international dimension of integration politics. I don't see how it can be possible to build an East Asian Community that includes the US or one that the US regards as compatible with its own security and economic interests. And related to this, I don't think Chinese people will eagerly accept the idea of East Asian Community that includes the US.

3. Finally, it's interesting to me that Prof. Lim is quite optimistic about a couple of things. The first is linkage between economic cooperation and security cooperation or security stability and the second is prospect for bilateral FTAs developing into multilateral FTAs. As to the first optimism, in the case of Europe from which we draw a lot of lessons for integration of East Asia, it was not economic integration that generated stable security environment. Actually, it was vice versa. So, the causal relationship that Prof. Lim seems to have in his mind might be reversed. As for the second optimism, Prof. Lim mentions the NAFTA experience as empirical ground that supports his view, but there might be other examples where bilateral FTAs failed to develop into further integration. Thus, we need to map out the conditions conducive to bilateral cooperation more carefully.

1. 임원혁 교수는 세가지 요지를 제시했다. 나는 세번째 요지, 힘의 분열을 막기 위해 임 교수가 제안한 두 가지 방법이 이 논문에서 가장 창의적인 부분이라고 생각한다.

2. 임 교수의 세번째 요지, 미래에 대한 제언과 관련해 보다 많은 논의가 필요할 것 같다. 우선, 임 교수는 일국가 이체제 방식을 흡수통일이나 무력통일에 대한 대안으로 제시했다. 그러나 이러한 진보적인 방법을 한국 또는 북한의 actor들에게 어떻게 설득시킬 것인가? 첫번째는 한국의 국내 상황 관련 질문이고, 두번째는 통합정치의 국제적 차원에 대한 질문이다. 나는 미국이 포함된, 또는 미국이 자국의 안보 및 경제적 이해관계에 부합한다고 여길만한 동아시아 공동체가 어떻게 가능한지 이해할 수 없다. 또한, 중국이 미국이 포함된 동아시아 공동체를 적극 받아 들일 것이라고 생각하지도 않는다.

3. 마지막으로, 임 교수가 몇 가지 사안에 대해 낙관적 태도를 보이는 사실은 매우 흥미롭다. 첫번째는 경제협력과 안보협력 또는 안보안정 간 관계이고, 두번째는 양자 FTA의 다자 FTA로의 발전 전망이다. 첫번째 낙관론에 대해서는, 우리가 동아시아 통합의 교훈으로 삼는 유럽의 경우에서 안정된 안보 환경을 이룩한 것은 경제통합이 아니었다. 오히려 그 반대였다. 따라서 임 교수가 생각하는 인과관계는 순서가 뒤바뀌었다고 봐야 할 것이다. 두번째 낙관론은, 임 교수는 NAFTA를 주장의 경험적 근거로 들고 있는데, 양자 FTA가 보다 발전된 통합으로 나아가지 못한 다른 예들이 있을 것이다. 따라서 우리는 양자 협력을 촉진하는 조건들을 보다 신중히 기획

해야 한다.

Answers to Discussion Questions

SUNHYUK KIM

1) I don't think that that's just semantic or terminological problem, I seriously have some problems with the substantive aspects of those different terms like neorealism, realism, neoconservatism, and because of this emphasis on globalization, there may be some room for confusion between American neorealism and neoliberalism, and neoliberalism in IR literature and neoliberalism in globalization literature. So there are a lot of confusions, and I have to work to clarify them.

2) I admit that I probably have this moving or very unclear target that I must specify and define first. And it's very intriguing and interesting that Dr. Kim pointed that out by discussing the South Korean version of neorealism and trying to connect South Korean literature or discourse with American literature on neorealism or realism. I might be unintendedly elevating the status of whatever theory we have in South Korea that is not really approximate to the level of neorealism. Next time I revise this paper, I might dilute this connection between South Korean version of neorealism. I tried to do that by placing quotation marks everywhere, but maybe I have to think about disconnecting the connection between American neorealism and South Korean neorealism.

(Not recorded.)

1) 언어적 문제만은 아닌 것 같고, 실제로 신현실주의, 현실주의, 신보수주의와 같은 용어 사용에 있어 본질적인 문제를 지니고 있다. 또한 세계화에 중점을 두다 보니, 미국의 신현실주의와 신자유주의, 국제관계학에서의 신자유주의와 세계화 문맥에서의 신자유주의 사이에 혼동의 여지가 있다. 따라서 보다 명확한 용어의 정리가 필요하다.

2) 내가 이야기하고자 하는 바가 명확하지 않아서, 그 대상을 먼저 구체화시켜 정의를 내려야 할 것이라는 점은 인정한다. 또한 김준형 교수가 한국판 신현실주의를 논하며, 한국의 문맥이나 담론을 미국의 신현실주의나 현실주의에 대한 문맥에 연관시켜 그 점을 지적한 것은 매우 흥미롭다. 아마도 내가 의도치 않게 신현실주의 수준이 아닌 국내 이론의 사정을 격상시켰을 수 있다. 다음에 원고를 수정할 때는, 한국판 신현실주의와의 이 같은 관계를 회색시켜야 할 것 같다. 사실 이번에도 인용부호를 씌우려 그렇게 하려고 했지만, 미국의 신현실주의와 한국의 신현실주의 사이의 연결관계를 끊는 것을 생각해봐야 하겠다.

(이후 녹음 끝김.)

YIZHOU WANG

1) On the issue of North Korea, I have three reasons about why I believe that DPRK can last for a longer time than many people predict. First, according to my own observation and discussions with ambassadors, diplomats and local people in DPRK, I feel it is very worth while to mark the elements which are similar to late 70s in China. It is still very difficult, but in the future, we see some chances. Second, North Korea is different from former Soviet Union or Iraq. There are no opposition groups. At the least, it's very low and very weak. Third, I think, China supports.

2) Concerning what the Chinese think about in terms of nuke future of the Korean peninsula, one thing

for sure is that the government official line is not for nuclearization of DPRK or ROK. In my view there are three reasons: first, influence be likely according to our officials' positions very strongly influence our Northeast region's reform and development Second, if DPRK has nuclear weapons, it's no rejection for Japan, ROK, or for Taiwan to take similar actions. This is very dangerous for us. So, I believe China will not want to see nuke proliferation on the peninsula. Third, in some dialogues between China and ROK, defense ministries of two countries met several times, together with lower officials. The Korean side recently has a very important stance by its president, defense and military, stating that Korea will not involve or let its forces within the peninsula, involving the potential conflict, confrontation in Taiwan. We appreciate this very much. I see this as a kind of strategic stance, and I think this is a good base for the future cooperation, especially compared with Japan.

1) 내가 북한이 일반적인 예측보다 더 오래 존속될 것이라 믿는 데는 세가지 이유가 있다. 첫째, 스스로의 관찰이나 외교관, 북한주민들과의 대화를 통해 나는 1970년대 말 중국에서와 비슷한 요소들을 주목하는 것이 중요하다고 생각한다. 그것은 여전히 어렵지만, 미래에는 가능성이 보인다. 둘째, 북한은 구 소련이나 이라크와는 다르다. 저항 세력이 없다. 있다고 해도 매우 미약하다. 셋째, 내 생각에, 중국의 지지를 받고 있다.

2) 한반도 핵문제의 미래를 중국이 어떻게 전망하는가에 대해 한가지 분명한 것은 중국정부의 공식 입장은 한반도의 비핵화를 원한다는 것이다. 내 생각에 세가지 이유가 있을 것이다. 첫째, 중국정부의 입장은 동북아시아 지역의 개혁과 개발에 강한 영향력을 가진다. 둘째, 북한이 핵무기를 보유했다면, 한국, 일본, 대만도 비슷한 행동을 취할 수 있다. 이것은 중국에 매우 위협적이다. 따라서, 중국은 한반도에 핵무기가 자리하는 것을 원하지 않을 것이다. 셋째, 한중 국방부가 여러 번 만나 가진 대화를 보면, 최근 한국측은 한반도 문제와 관련하여 대만 문제를 연관시키지 않겠다는 중요한 입장을 밝히고 있다.

JANG-JIP CHOI

1) My topic is not exactly or satisfactorily focused on the topic itself. I agree completely with Prof. Moon's comments. This topic was brought up after I arranged my presentation so there's a little discrepancy between my title and my content. If I have the opportunity to develop my ideas further, I would like to write about what will be very important ideological components if we endeavor to formulate and develop an ideal about East Asian Community building.

2) Why don't we have an imaginative political leadership as seen in Europe? Actually, this is a very broad question. This reflects important differences between East Asia and Europe after WWII and how differently the two developed its own course of shaping postwar international order. Roughly, I think, major courses for such differences are: First, the Cold War system. This Cold War system is actually the direct consequences of how WWII ended and how those fought WWII. These two factors are directly linked. I think the strength of Cold War anti-communist ideology in Europe is relatively mild and not so confrontational compared to those in East Asia, and I think this is the most important factor. As Dr. Feffer discussed, Europe put forward the Helsinki Accord, modeled after the CSCE. But in East Asia we do not

have this kind of institution and common effort. Second factor is the nature of the US and countries in the region. Many characterize US-East Asian countries' relationship as bilateral, and unilateral reason is easily imposed on this international environment. But in Europe, multilateralism can be developed in the form of NATO and EEC; Third factor is different state systems in two regions. I think this is linked to a fourth factor, tradition of diplomacy. In Europe, since the Westphalia Peace Treaty, it was very knowledgeable how to manage conflicts among competing states in the region. But we do not have such experiences. I think these factors make a difference between two regions. So, the answer to this simple question is quite complicated.

3) This question is centered on the issue of nationalism. I think nationalism is quite inter-linked with the strength of Cold War anti-communism ideology in East Asia. During the Cold War era, East Asian countries did not have the opportunity to overcome or to dilute the strength of nationalism as a tradition ideology. After the end of Cold War, countries in this region revived nationalism to justify and to mobilize their own people for political purposes. I think this strength of nationalism and regionalism are not directly opposing forces but very closely related quite negatively.

4) The last one is about democracy, democratic value and norms.

How can I justify my argument that minimalist approach to unification is better than maximalist approach.

I think democracy has many dimensions in terms of norms and values, and procedure and substance. In this case, I think it is necessary to understand democracy differently; democracy from an international relations perspective and democracy from domestic politics perspective. We have to make distinctions between the two different levels. In this paper, my question is centered around how to build a peace order principally on the Korean peninsula. So, in this case, from an international relations perspective, I think the value and norms of peace is more important than the value and norms of democracy. This is the reason why I criticize Bush administration's approach to the Middle East and NK regime as well. My argument, theoretically and philosophically, relied on the Kantian conception of peace. Kant also emphasizes peace rather than the Republican type of regime types as a very important value. In this sense, I applied Kantian ideas to the Korean situation.

1) 나의 주제는 정확히 또는 만족스럽게 주제 자체에 집중되어 있지 않다. 사실, 문정인 교수의 지적처럼, 나는 오히려 한편으로는 동아시아 공동체 건설을 저해하고 또 한편으로는 동아시아 공동체 생성을 구상하는 동아시아 지역의 구조적 조건들에 더 초점을 맞췄다. 논문을 좀더 발전시킬 기회가 생긴다면, 동아시아 공동체 설립을 위한 이상을 형성하고 발전시키는 데 필요한 요소들에 대해 써보고 싶다.

2) 왜 우리는 유럽에서와 같은 정치적 리더십이 없는가? 사실 이것은 매우 광범위한 질문이다. 이는 세계 제2차 대전 이후 동아시아와 유럽의 차이, 즉 이 둘이 전후 국제질서의 확립을 어떻게 이행시켰는지를 반영한다. 이러한 차이가 생성된 데 대해 내가 생각하는 바는 대강 이렇다. 첫째는 냉전체제이다. 이 냉전체제는 사실 세계 제2차 대전의 종전과 직결된 결과이다. 따라서 이 문제는 또한 세계 제2차 대전 이후 냉전시대 사상을 형성했다. 유럽에서 냉전시대 반공사상

의 영향력은 동아시아에 비해 상대적으로 약하고 심하게 대립적이지 않은데, 이것이 가장 중요한 요인이라고 생각한다. Feffer 박사가 다루었듯, 유럽은 CSCE를 본받아 헬싱키 협정을 추진했다. 그러나 동아시아에서는 이러한 기구도, 그를 위한 공동의 노력도 없다. 두번째 요인은 미국과 주변국들의 특성이다. 많은 사람들이 미국과 동아시아 국가들 간 관계를 양자관계로 규정한다. 그러나 유럽에서는 NATO나 EEC의 형태로 다자주의가 발전될 수 있다. 세번째 요인은 두 지역 간 다른 국가 체제를 들 수 있다. 이 것은 네번째 요인인 전통과 외교로 이어진다. 베스트팔렌 평화조약 이후 유럽에서는 역내 경쟁국가들 간 갈등을 조정하는 법이 널리 퍼져있었다. 그러나 우리는 그런 경험을 하지 못했고, 바로 이러한 요인들이 두 지역 간의 차이를 만들어낸다고 생각한다.

Q 3. 세번째 질문은 민족주의에 관한 것이다. 나는 이 민족주의 문제가 동아시아의 냉전 반공이데올로기의 영향력과 맞물려 있다고 생각한다. 냉전 시대에 동아시아 국가들은 전통적 이데올로기로서 민족주의의 영향력을 극복할 기회를 갖지 못했다. 냉전이 끝난 후, 이들은 정치적 목적을 정당화하고 국민 동원을 위하여 민족주의를 부활시켰다. 나는 민족주의의 영향력과 지역주의의 영향력이 직접적 대립관계가 아니라 부정적으로 긴밀한 상관관계를 가진다고 본다.

Q 4. 마지막 질문은 민주주의, 민주주의적 가치와 기준에 대한 것이다. 통일에 대한 minimalism 접근이 maximalism 접근보다 낫다는 나의 주장을 어떻게 정당화할 것인지. 민주주의는 규범과 가치, 과정과 본질에 있어 여러 측면을 지닌다. 이 경우에는, 국제관계적 시각에서의 민주주의와 국내정치적 시각에서의 민주주의를 다르게 이해하는 시각이 필요하다. 이 둘에 대한 구분을 해주어야 한다. 이 논문에서 나의 초점은 우선적으로 한반도의 평화질서를 어떻게 세워야 할지에 맞춰져 있다. 따라서, 여기에서는 국제관계적 시각으로 보아, 평화의 가치와 규범이 민주주의의 가치와 규범보다 우선한다. 이것이 내가 부시 행정부의 중동 및 대북 정책을 비판하는 이유이다. 내 주장은 이론적으로 또 철학적으로 칸트의 평화 개념에 의존하고 있다. 칸트 또한 공화국 형태의 정권보다는 평화를 더 중요한 가치로 강조한다. 이러한 면에서 나는 칸트의 사상을 한반도의 경우에 적용시켜 보았다.

JOHN FEFFER

1) (Not recorded.) It's not only that the two regions are different and that they have different histories, but it's no longer 1975. We are in a completely different time period now and we could go into many details about the differences but just to mention one, of course, the Westphalian model has broken down in significant degree such that the whole notion of sovereignty has changed. Sovereignty was the key part of recognition, the preservation of sovereignty in 1975 discussions, but today, of course, our notions of sovereignty have changed rather dramatically. However, we lack transitional models. The CSCE model is an unusual model in that it is the transitional model that brings together the countries of very different ideological persuasions. Simply put, it's an experience we can learn from, that we being Asia as well as US.

2) What is East Asia, how would I define East Asia? That's an excellent question and I would say that

Europe, too, is having difficulty defining what Europe is, and the discussion continues in the EU as they discuss expansion. And of course there's no similar union here in Asia and yet the definitional discussion continues. I would say that the definition of East Asia in some sense comes out of institutional discussions. If, in fact, the six-party talks become institutionalized, then East Asia in a multilateral security framework becomes to find among those parties.

3) I talked about order in my title, but in fact, I didn't talk about order in the paper itself, and that's a very perceptive observation because in some sense I was implicitly talking about a shifting order in Asia and order which in some sense is trying to come to grips with transformations in the security, reality, and economic reality, and for the first time actually a consideration that the two are linked in a negotiating framework; we see that of course in the six-party talks and to a certain extent in the ARF and ASEAN.

4) Why I would say NK can be both a pivot and a player, it's unusual I'm sure there's something in game theory about the weakest player in particular game having an influence, a disproportionate influence on the game than their power would suggest. But I would argue that NK is both pivot and player in this regard.

5) On the issue of nationalism, I tried to distinguish between what I considered to be anti-Bush administration policy here in South Korea and a much more endemic anti-Americanism in NK. And anti-Americanism that is actually a part of history and policy in NK, and the sum of two nationalism scenarios that I talk about in the paper is a combination of anti-Bush administration policy and more anti-Americanism that one would find in NK.

6) Finally, I threw in the Dokdo point at the end thinking that it is the most provocative thing I could possibly say coming to South Korea. What I meant was not giving Dokdo to Japan but rather considering Dokdo in some other arrangement in cooperation with Japan and other countries. But the larger point is that negotiations are give-and-take. In other words, when considering grand bargains in East Asia, countries cannot simply think about what they get out of the bargain, but also what they give up. I think still here in East Asia countries are thinking only in terms of benefits and not in terms of give-and-take. It's not just Asia of course, US thinks largely only in terms of what benefits it can get rather than what US can give up. But if there's going to be an agreement on NK nuclear crisis, US will give up a substantial amount I'm not talking financial or economic, but about how US conceives NK, and the possibility "rewarding the bad guy", being at the essence of the CSCE process. It was only when the US and Western Europe finally agreed that they would reward the bad guy that that process could go forward. I think US must in order to come to some agreement in the six-party talks which would serve as that foundation of multilateral security framework and to also give up its conception of NK and reward the bad guy.

1) (녹음 안됐음.) 동아시아와 유럽, 두 지역이 역사가 다르고 다른 점이 많다는 것 외에도, 지금은 더 이상 1975년이 아니다. 이제 우리는 완전히 다른 시간대에 있고, 그 간에도 여러 차이점들이 생겨났지만, 한가지만 들어보자면, 베스트팔렌 모델이 무너지면서 주권에 대한 개념이 완전히 바뀌게 되었다. 1975년에는 주권 수호가 가장 중요한 쟁점 사안이었지만, 오늘날 주권에

대한 우리의 인식은 꽤 극적으로 변화했다. 그러나 우리는 과도기적 모델이 없다. CSCE 모델은 과도기적 모델로 사상적 신념이 많이 상이한 국가들을 한데 모았다는 점에서 흔치 않은 예이다. 간단히 말해서, 이것은 우리, 아시아와 미국이 교훈을 얻을 수 있는 경험인 것이다.

2) 동아시아를 어떻게 규정할 것인가? 훌륭한 질문이다. 나는 유럽도 또한 유럽을 정의하는 데 어려움을 겪고 있으며, EU에서도 확장 문제와 함께 논의가 계속되고 있다. 물론 아시아에는 비슷한 단체가 없다. 하지만 정의에 대한 논의는 계속되고 있다. 동아시아에 대한 정의는 어떤 면에서 제도적인 논의에서 나온다고 할 수 있다. 실제로, 6자 회담이 제도화된다면, 다자안보구조속에서의 동아시아는 해당 6개 국가 사이에서 찾아볼 수 있을 것이다.

3) 제목에 질서를 넣기는 했지만, 사실 논문에서는 질서에 대해 얘기하지 않았다. 김명섭 교수의 발언은 매우 통찰력 있는 관찰이었는데, 왜냐하면 나는 전적으로 아시아 질서의 변화를 함축적으로 이야기하고자 했기 때문이다. 물론 우리는 그것을 6자 회담에서 보고 있으며, 또 어느 정도는 ARF와ASEAN에서도 보았다.

4) 북한을 주축이라고 한 것, 북한이 주축이면서 동시에 주체라고 한 것은 일반적이지 않다. 게임 이론에서 가장 약한 주체라도 특정 게임에서는 그 힘이 암시하는 이상의 영향력을 가지는 경우가 분명히 있을 것이다. 바로 이러한 측면에서 북한이 주축이면서 주체라고 주장하고 싶다.

5) 민족주의에 대해서는, 나는 내가 생각하기에 한국의 반 부시 행정부와 그보다 훨씬 심각한 북한의 반미 감정을 구분하고자 했다. 실제로 역사와 정책의 한 부분인 북한의 반미는, 그리고 논문에서 얘기했던 두 가지 민족주의의 혼합 시나리오는 반 부시 행정부 정책과 북한에서 발견되는 보다 심한 반미 감정의 혼합이다.

6) 마지막으로, 한국에서 논할 수 있는 가장 도발적 주제라는 생각에 독도 문제를 포함시켰다. 내 뜻은 독도를 일본에 내주자는 것이 아니라, 일본 및 다른 국가들과의 협력 속에 다른 각도로 생각해보자는 것이었다. 중요한 것은 협상이란 주고받음(give-and-take)이라는 사실이다. 다시 말해, 동아시아에서 대타협을 생각할 때, 무엇을 얻어낼 수 있을 것인지만 생각해서는 안 되고, 무엇을 포기할지도 생각해야 하는 것이다. 동아시아 국가들은 아직까지 얻을 이익만을 생각할 뿐, 이익에 대한 대가는 생각하지 않는 것 같다. 물론 아시아뿐 아니고, 미국도 마찬가지로 이익만을 생각한다. 하지만, 북핵 위기에 대한 협정이 있게 되면 미국은 많은 것을 포기할 것이다. 재정이나 경제적인 면에서가 아니라, 북한에 대한 미국의 시각을 말하는 것이다. 미국이 다변적 안보 체제 구실을 할 6자 회담에서 어느 정도의 합의에 도달하기 위해서는 북한에 대한 관념을 단념 또는 양보해야 한다.

WONHYUK LIM

First question was how I'm going to sell this idea of one country two systems to conservative people in ROK and DPRK. The way I'll sell this to conservative people in ROK and DPRK is as follows.

1) As I mentioned, commonwealth and low-level confederation have some commonalities. As we know, South proposal for commonwealth is basically 0.5 central government, two regional governments, and

two systems. I say 0.5 because it doesn't presuppose a formal central government having some kind of jurisdiction over the two sides but rather it posits a consultative process that meets on a regular basis such as inter-Korean summit annually, ministerial meetings regularly and so on. Now low-level confederation proposed by NK also is based on the idea of two systems two regional governments, but instead of not having formal central government it proposes to set up a formal central government as well. So, it's a one-two-two format formula. But the basic idea is that we'll have two regional governments and two systems, but two systems will eventually converge to a single system, and that requires some assumptions about the future trajectories of NK and South Korea. An example of such case was seen in China when it proposed the idea of one country two systems to Hong Kong. In a similar vein the way I'll argue for one country two systems in the Korean context is that we need some time to see how NK accumulates track record of reform, and NK needs to be convinced that South Korea does not have bad intentions, for instance, and two sides need to see that there's going to be a convergence toward a common system down the road. To the conservative people of South Korea I would argue that if they are really conservative they should be concerned about the possibility of the Korean peninsula being ripped apart once again due to centrifugal forces that seem to begin its strength in East Asia. That point has some relationship with Prof. 최장집's comments on maximal and minimal routs to unification. What I would like to differentiate instead is objective and process. I'd like to argue that the objective of unification is something like democratic market economy or some better alternative that Korean people will arrive at voluntarily. And I would argue that democracy is not a finished product that could be imported from the outside but rather needs to be grown internally, domestically, and the best means of promoting such a transformation is through continued contacts with the outside world. So, I would argue that the two seemingly conflicting goals, the objective of achieving a democratic market economy as the system for the unified Korea and doing so peacefully and gradually, is not so conflicting actually.

2) The second question had to do with the East Asian Community embracing the US. In my view, what I'm trying to imagine is sort of a strange type of regional community in that the natural two anchors of regional community would continue to have some tension. In the East Asian context, what I'm trying to picture is US continuing to serve the role of balancer and stabilizer between China and Japan and two Koreas and ASEAN playing the role of facilitators. China and Japan, although they remain somewhat unfriendly, have to go along with these efforts toward greater regional cooperation. That's the idea but I don't know how workable that is.

3) I'll briefly mention two minor questions Prof. Choi had. He thought that I was being optimistic about economic cooperation leading to security cooperation, but actually my point was that I was not so optimistic about it. Maybe I should clarify my writing in subsequent division. My point is it is important to have political and diplomatic breakthrough first followed by small steps in economic and social spheres which is internally followed by further improvement in political relations. It's sort of a breakthrough and small steps taking turns building up, and so I'm not really optimistic about economic cooperation solving all problems.

4) Finally, the last question had to do with my assessment of the possibility of bilateral FTAs growing to

multilateral FTAs, and I agree with Prof. Choi's point that I might have to look more carefully at the evidences because I just cited on a single example.

1) 일 국가 이 체제 개념을 한국과 북한의 보수주의자들에게 어떻게 설득시킬 것인가 하는 첫 번째 질문에 대한 답은 다음과 같다. 언급했듯이, 연방체제와 하위 연합(low-level confederation)은 몇 가지 공통점이 있다. 알다시피, 남측의 연방체제 제안은 기본적으로 0.5 중앙정부와, 두 개의 지역정부, 즉 두 체제를 말한다. 0.5 중앙정부라고 한 것은, 이 제안이 양측에 대한 관할권을 가지는 정식 중앙정부를 전제하는 것이 아니라 남북한 정상회담이나, 정기적 장관급 회담 등 정기적인 논의과정을 이끌어가는 역할이기 때문이다. 북한이 제안한 하위 연합 또한 두 체제 두 지역정부 개념에 바탕을 둔 것이긴 하지만, 중앙정부의 설립을 함께 제안한다. 즉, 1-2-2 체제가 된다. 그러나, 기본 개념은 두 개의 지역정부와 두 체제를 유지하리라는 것, 그러나 두 체제는 결국 하나의 체제로 귀착될 것이고, 따라서 남북한의 향후 케도에 대한 가정이 필요하다. 이와 비슷한 예는 중국이 일 국가 이 체제 개념을 홍콩에 제안했던 경우에서 볼 수 있다. 비슷한 맥락에서, 한국의 상황에서 일 국가 이 체제 방식을 설득시킬 방안은 북한이 개혁 노선을 어떻게 축적하는지 두고 볼 시간이 필요하다는 것이다. 더불어 북한은 한국이 북한에 대해 불순한 의도를 가지지 않는다는 사실에 확신을 가질 수 있어야 하고, 궁극적으로 공동시스템에 도달하게 될 것임을 알아야 한다. 한국의 보수주의자들에게는, 만약 그들이 진정한 보수주의라면 동아시아에서 새로이 생성되는 듯한 주변 분권들로 인해서 한반도가 다시 한번 갈라지게 될 수 있는 가능성을 우려해야 한다고 이야기하고 싶다. 이 점은 최장집 교수의 통일을 향한 minimalism, maximalism 접근법에 대한 언급과도 관계가 있다. 대신 내가 차별을 두고자 하는 부분은 목적과 과정이다. 나는 통일의 목적이 민주주의 시장경제나 한국인들이 자발적으로 도달할만한 더 나은 대안이라고 주장하고 싶다. 또한 민주주의는 외부에서 들여올 수 있는 완제품이 아니라 국내에서 내부적으로 발전시켜나가야 하는 부분이며, 그러한 변화를 촉진하는 가장 좋은 방법은 외부 세계와의 접촉을 이어가는 것이다. 그러므로 통일 한국의 체제로 민주주의 시장경제를 달성하는 목적과 그 목적을 평화적이고 점진적으로 이루어가는 과정은 상충될 것 같지만 사실은 별로 상충되는 요소가 아니라는 것이 나의 생각이다.

2) 두번째 질문은 미국을 포함하는 동아시아 공동체에 관한 것이었다. 내가 생각한 것은 역내 주요국 둘이 일종의 긴장을 유지하는 조금 색다른 지역공동체이다. 동아시아적 맥락에서, 내가 구상하는 것은 미국이 중국과 일본 사이에서 균형자와 안정자의 역할을 계속하고, 남북한과 ASEAN 국가들이 기능적인 역할을 하는 것이다. 중국과 일본은 우호적이지 않은 면이 있기는 하지만 보다 나은 지역 협력을 위한 노력을 기울여야 한다. 이것이 내 구상인데, 얼마나 실현 가능할지는 모르겠다.

3) 최진우 교수는 또 내가 경제협력이 안보협력으로 발전할 가능성에 대해 낙관적이라고 했는데, 사실 내 요지는 내가 이 점에 대해 그리 낙관적이지 않다는 것이었다. 아마도 이 부분을 다시 명확하게 고쳐야 할 것 같은데, 내 논지는 우선 정치외교적 돌파구를 먼저 만들고 그 다음에 경제사회적 분야에서의 작은 조치들이 뒤따라야 한다는 것이다. 그리고 다시 정치적 관계에서 그 이상의 발전이 내부적으로 뒤따라야 한다. 즉, 큰 타개책과 작은 조치들이 번갈아 이루어져야 한다는 것이고, 따라서 나는 경제 협력이 모든 문제를 해결할 수 있다는 견해에는 부정적이다.

4) 마지막 질문은 양자 FTA의 다자 FTA로의 발전 가능성에 대한 주장에 대한 것이었는데, 하나의 예만 들어 설명하였기 때문에 보다 조심스럽게 근거를 살펴야 한다는 최진우 교수의 지적에 동의한다.

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